WEBVTT

1
00:00:00.515 --> 00:00:02.485
It's an honor to be here today, um,

2
00:00:02.975 --> 00:00:04.365
being able to talk to you again.

3
00:00:05.145 --> 00:00:08.525
Um, I was actually in the morning thinking about

4
00:00:08.705 --> 00:00:11.245
to skip the presentation and take the day off

5
00:00:11.245 --> 00:00:15.675
because whatever I'm gonna say, say to you today is, uh,

6
00:00:15.785 --> 00:00:18.075
been presented in the last presentations,

7
00:00:18.375 --> 00:00:19.515
uh, from yesterday.

8
00:00:20.675 --> 00:00:23.145
So, um, you're gonna see a lot of stuff

9
00:00:23.145 --> 00:00:24.905
that's been already been talked about or presented.

10
00:00:25.045 --> 00:00:26.265
Um, however,

11
00:00:27.685 --> 00:00:31.345
my talk is about a small scale flight test organization

12
00:00:31.925 --> 00:00:34.275
and, um, you might have

13
00:00:34.275 --> 00:00:37.195
to compromise in sizing of your SMS.

14
00:00:41.365 --> 00:00:43.185
So sacrifices need to be made.

15
00:00:43.885 --> 00:00:47.865
The legend has it that these were the last words of ianal

16
00:00:47.865 --> 00:00:50.585
after the crash that eventually cost him his life.

17
00:00:51.915 --> 00:00:52.935
He was an engineer.

18
00:00:52.955 --> 00:00:55.405
He test pilot the first man

19
00:00:55.405 --> 00:00:58.915
to repeatedly fly heavier than air, cautiously

20
00:00:59.015 --> 00:01:01.355
and systematically expanding his knowledge

21
00:01:01.355 --> 00:01:04.725
and pushing the envelope step by step with

22
00:01:05.515 --> 00:01:09.635
a flight test organization ably consisting of two people.

23
00:01:10.845 --> 00:01:13.505
And, um, from a modern point of view, I

24
00:01:14.105 --> 00:01:15.545
strongly disagree with that statement.

25
00:01:17.305 --> 00:01:19.965
Uh, recent, recent studies by DLR gutting

26
00:01:19.965 --> 00:01:22.525
and showed that his glider was flawlessly designed

27
00:01:22.705 --> 00:01:26.485

but not suitable for the given weather of the day.

28
00:01:28.005 --> 00:01:31.315
Would a proper modern day safety management

29
00:01:31.315 --> 00:01:32.435
system have saved his life?

30
00:01:33.675 --> 00:01:35.935
Probably not as the database

31
00:01:35.935 --> 00:01:38.895
that could have prevented his crash only had one occurrence

32
00:01:39.245 --> 00:01:40.415
from the week before,

33
00:01:42.695 --> 00:01:47.045
and, um, there was no common knowledge base on the field

34
00:01:47.045 --> 00:01:48.085
of heavy and air flight.

35
00:01:48.385 --> 00:01:49.885
He had just started building it up.

36
00:01:51.405 --> 00:01:53.105
So would there be any such thing

37
00:01:53.105 --> 00:01:55.465
as safety management systems without a sacrifice

38
00:01:55.465 --> 00:01:56.665
or the many that followed his path?

39
00:01:57.505 --> 00:02:02.365
Probably not either about this talk.

40
00:02:02.465 --> 00:02:06.665
Um, it will be very brief,

41
00:02:07.345 --> 00:02:11.905
I hope, um, because I would like to hear your thoughts

42
00:02:11.905 --> 00:02:13.785
and your opinions about the ideas

43
00:02:13.785 --> 00:02:15.025
that I have built up there.

44
00:02:15.485 --> 00:02:18.175
So I would really appreciate your feedback later on.

45
00:02:19.305 --> 00:02:23.285
And, uh, if you have not that much flight testing going on

46
00:02:23.305 --> 00:02:27.135
and more like in a sense of how could this be done?

47
00:02:27.475 --> 00:02:28.535
Am I right on this point?

48
00:02:32.065 --> 00:02:33.345
I gotta read this. Sorry.

49
00:02:34.725 --> 00:02:37.225
So, um, my name is Sebastian Witz.

50
00:02:37.245 --> 00:02:39.865
Uh, I'm a flight test engineer at the German aerospace

51
00:02:39.865 --> 00:02:43.065
centers, uh, flight experiments facility in Ober.

52
00:02:44.485 --> 00:02:47.745
And according to the internet, so it must be right, right?

53
00:02:48.465 --> 00:02:52.365
Um, we operate the largest European civilian research fleet

54
00:02:52.375 --> 00:02:55.405

consisting of a mix of fixed wing and rotary aircraft.

55
00:02:56.605 --> 00:03:00.185
And we operate in accords with part SPO

56
00:03:00.645 --> 00:03:03.025
and part 21 of the European Union rules.

57
00:03:04.495 --> 00:03:08.155
And, um, we do have a safety management system,

58
00:03:09.035 --> 00:03:10.715
although it would not be mandatory

59
00:03:11.905 --> 00:03:13.285
for a flight test organization.

60
00:03:14.705 --> 00:03:15.725
Um, at over f

61
00:03:15.725 --> 00:03:17.045
and h we have a limited amount

62
00:03:17.825 --> 00:03:20.475
of flight testing is our core business

63
00:03:21.305 --> 00:03:23.845
is providing research platforms for atmospheric

64
00:03:23.845 --> 00:03:25.045
and remote sensing research.

65
00:03:26.915 --> 00:03:31.125
And, um, contrary to Joseph's organization, uh,

66
00:03:31.465 --> 00:03:35.295
at over, no, we are about about two handfuls

67
00:03:35.295 --> 00:03:37.935
of people doing the flight testing.

68
00:03:39.465 --> 00:03:43.085
So when I started having, getting the chance to come here

69
00:03:43.105 --> 00:03:45.485
and making a presentation, um,

70
00:03:46.815 --> 00:03:48.215
I thought I would not like

71
00:03:48.215 --> 00:03:50.295
to talk about our organization in detail,

72
00:03:50.315 --> 00:03:54.495
but how I think personally, um, a safety management system

73
00:03:54.515 --> 00:03:56.855
for an organization that does relatively little flight

74
00:03:56.855 --> 00:04:01.025
testing like our department could be realized.

75
00:04:02.185 --> 00:04:04.885
So when I started up building this presentation, I thought,

76
00:04:04.905 --> 00:04:08.525
Hey, what does AA think SMS is?

77
00:04:10.175 --> 00:04:13.315
So AA says this, aviation safety needs

78
00:04:13.315 --> 00:04:15.195
to be managed proactively by all actors.

79
00:04:16.095 --> 00:04:18.915
Safety management benefits the total aviation system

80
00:04:19.015 --> 00:04:21.915
by strengthening the traditional risk control practices

81
00:04:21.915 --> 00:04:24.635

and ensuring safety risks are managed in a systematic way.

82
00:04:26.255 --> 00:04:28.315
Safety management allows room

83
00:04:28.315 --> 00:04:29.595
for innovation and flexibility.

84
00:04:29.655 --> 00:04:32.475
It is less about describing what, describing what to do

85
00:04:32.775 --> 00:04:34.515
and more about how to achieve safety.

86
00:04:36.075 --> 00:04:38.335
Pretty long sentences, um, here,

87
00:04:39.785 --> 00:04:41.935
quite European, probably German.

88
00:04:42.635 --> 00:04:47.335
Um, what stuck to my mind though was this sentence here,

89
00:04:49.165 --> 00:04:53.605
aviation safe needs to be managed proactively by all actors.

90
00:04:54.885 --> 00:04:57.775
That really sums up what I think the core of a healthy

91
00:04:57.795 --> 00:04:59.975
and living and functional safety system is.

92
00:05:02.765 --> 00:05:04.585
So who is all actors?

93
00:05:07.495 --> 00:05:10.395
It means that depends on way draw the,

94
00:05:10.785 --> 00:05:12.195
draw the line around your system.

95
00:05:13.915 --> 00:05:15.685
What about the obvious choice?

96
00:05:15.685 --> 00:05:17.885
In our case, the hangar building with attached offices?

97
00:05:18.275 --> 00:05:20.165
That would include probably cleaning stuff.

98
00:05:20.285 --> 00:05:24.115
I mean, if you skip those slide

99
00:05:25.145 --> 00:05:28.595
tripped two or three times in a week at the same,

100
00:05:28.705 --> 00:05:32.835
same time in the morning, probably should postpone cleaning

101
00:05:32.975 --> 00:05:34.755
for later time of day or something.

102
00:05:35.615 --> 00:05:40.485
Um, so obviously this should not be

103
00:05:40.485 --> 00:05:43.565
limited to test pilots or flight test engineers

104
00:05:43.905 --> 00:05:46.085
or test banners include maintenance.

105
00:05:58.035 --> 00:06:01.565
Then what does proactively stand for in the past?

106
00:06:02.325 --> 00:06:05.005
Learning from accidents to prevent them in the future?

107
00:06:06.185 --> 00:06:08.945
Reactively was all the rage, and I tried to look it up

108
00:06:08.945 --> 00:06:09.945

and pinpoint it down.

109
00:06:10.085 --> 00:06:11.585
It started like something in the

110
00:06:11.705 --> 00:06:12.865
twenties and went on to the sixties.

111
00:06:13.445 --> 00:06:17.045
And a more modern approach would be to have an SMS in place

112
00:06:17.075 --> 00:06:20.205
that will prevent mishaps and or accident in the future.

113
00:06:21.395 --> 00:06:23.325
This is done by managing data

114
00:06:23.705 --> 00:06:25.685
of lesser significance than an accident

115
00:06:25.685 --> 00:06:29.195
or an incident to show shortcomings within the organization

116
00:06:30.995 --> 00:06:33.735
or occurrences that could lead to an accident, which

117
00:06:34.555 --> 00:06:38.925
is like the hot news stuff as since the nineties.

118
00:06:38.985 --> 00:06:40.455
If you try

119
00:06:40.455 --> 00:06:43.775
and look up when this all kind of started with turnable,

120
00:06:43.815 --> 00:06:47.525
I guess the downside is you can only assume

121
00:06:47.525 --> 00:06:49.725
that it's working based on your statistical data.

122
00:06:54.745 --> 00:06:57.675
I've asked our safety pilot slash safety manager if he had

123
00:06:57.675 --> 00:06:59.915
an additional input for the presentation

124
00:06:59.915 --> 00:07:03.895
and that was his thought safety management system can be

125
00:07:03.895 --> 00:07:06.375
seen as common sense put into a

126
00:07:06.375 --> 00:07:07.935
presentable and auditable format.

127
00:07:12.065 --> 00:07:15.655
How do I see a effective SMS?

128
00:07:16.665 --> 00:07:18.285
In my opinion, it's closely related

129
00:07:18.345 --> 00:07:20.445
to quality management in a general sense.

130
00:07:20.905 --> 00:07:23.575
If done properly, it will fit seamlessly

131
00:07:24.085 --> 00:07:25.895
into other organizational handbooks

132
00:07:25.895 --> 00:07:28.885
or rule work will build up on upon those.

133
00:07:29.225 --> 00:07:31.845
So however, I think the strongest foundation

134
00:07:31.845 --> 00:07:34.085
of a good SMS is constructed

135
00:07:34.105 --> 00:07:35.765

of a well-established agriculture

136
00:07:37.095 --> 00:07:39.625
that feeds into a readily available reporting structure

137
00:07:39.625 --> 00:07:42.145
with, which then helps building up a strong safety database.

138
00:07:43.135 --> 00:07:46.725
And, um, if you remember Rods and Tom Hos

139
00:07:46.725 --> 00:07:49.165
and Ken's talks from yesterday, the term culture

140
00:07:50.075 --> 00:07:53.015
and reporting culture was featured as well.

141
00:07:54.705 --> 00:07:56.405
And Claude is my witness that, uh,

142
00:07:56.545 --> 00:07:58.525
you got my presentation earlier on yesterday

143
00:07:58.585 --> 00:08:00.525
and I did not sneak that stuff in there.

144
00:08:03.985 --> 00:08:06.565
So, um, how to feed the database.

145
00:08:07.175 --> 00:08:10.625
There's a option to use big data,

146
00:08:11.855 --> 00:08:14.065
just feed a huge amount of more

147
00:08:14.065 --> 00:08:16.385
or less meaningful data automatically into the system

148
00:08:16.385 --> 00:08:18.925
and have it analyzed like quick access data

149
00:08:19.245 --> 00:08:21.675
recorded, for example.

150
00:08:22.715 --> 00:08:26.095
Um, if you're an airline, you might, uh, get all

151
00:08:26.095 --> 00:08:29.655
that data downloaded and into your system, have it analyzed,

152
00:08:29.755 --> 00:08:32.895
and probably you end up with a high number

153
00:08:32.895 --> 00:08:33.895
of terrain alerts.

154
00:08:34.455 --> 00:08:38.735
And the, the, the, the result would be

155
00:08:38.735 --> 00:08:42.095
to have altered approach routes for in that case, uh,

156
00:08:42.355 --> 00:08:43.895
for the airport of same as in Greece.

157
00:08:44.475 --> 00:08:47.965
The other option,

158
00:08:48.665 --> 00:08:50.365
and especially when we're just a few people,

159
00:08:52.045 --> 00:08:56.365
is individual reporting, uh, which I've mentioned

160
00:08:56.365 --> 00:08:59.905
before, have all your actors report whatever they find

161
00:08:59.905 --> 00:09:03.495
necessary, rate it and work out the consequences.

162
00:09:04.155 --> 00:09:05.695

And remember, it should be all actors

163
00:09:07.045 --> 00:09:09.215
because ideally you'd have option one

164
00:09:09.215 --> 00:09:13.625
and two combined for an example, which is

165
00:09:14.525 --> 00:09:16.095
just an example you might have

166
00:09:16.835 --> 00:09:19.215
in the flight test will some unexpected behavior

167
00:09:19.435 --> 00:09:23.445
of your aircraft, get a report, put it into a register,

168
00:09:24.265 --> 00:09:28.005
and this might result in alter TJs or SOPs.

169
00:09:32.785 --> 00:09:36.615
Or if your flight test ops is small enough, chances are

170
00:09:36.615 --> 00:09:40.005
that you don't have enough data to come even close

171
00:09:40.065 --> 00:09:43.245
to something like big data and statistical relevance.

172
00:09:44.135 --> 00:09:47.515
So you will have to rely on individual reporting

173
00:09:49.375 --> 00:09:51.035
to establish a meaningful system.

174
00:09:51.255 --> 00:09:53.035
You need strong support by all actors,

175
00:09:53.865 --> 00:09:55.175
especially the management.

176
00:09:57.155 --> 00:09:58.885
There's a huge downsides to a,

177
00:09:59.025 --> 00:10:02.245
to a report based SMS getting people to report

178
00:10:03.855 --> 00:10:07.555
no or very little reporting does not mean your operation is

179
00:10:07.555 --> 00:10:10.875
safe to get people to report.

180
00:10:11.135 --> 00:10:12.155
It must be made clear

181
00:10:12.155 --> 00:10:14.315
that reports are good and that they're welcome.

182
00:10:15.115 --> 00:10:17.615
The asset tries pretty hard to make that clear

183
00:10:17.635 --> 00:10:20.295
as can be seen in their, uh, acceptable means of compliance

184
00:10:20.295 --> 00:10:21.295
or guidance material.

185
00:10:21.645 --> 00:10:24.695
It's not about blaming people,

186
00:10:24.965 --> 00:10:26.335
it's about finding a solution.

187
00:10:32.855 --> 00:10:37.635
So for a small operation,

188
00:10:37.635 --> 00:10:39.155
you'll end up with a formal system

189
00:10:39.155 --> 00:10:41.475

that is built on a foundation of soft skills,

190
00:10:42.845 --> 00:10:45.175
even if decidedly non-punitive.

191
00:10:45.175 --> 00:10:47.015
It is hard to be put into practice.

192
00:10:47.395 --> 00:10:49.775
It needs active work from this, from dedicated people.

193
00:10:50.295 --> 00:10:53.615
I mean, if you ever come across comments like this is

194
00:10:53.845 --> 00:10:56.495
unnecessary, we already have accident reporting,

195
00:10:56.835 --> 00:10:58.095
so this is double the work.

196
00:10:59.725 --> 00:11:01.895
More reporting won't make us any safer,

197
00:11:02.155 --> 00:11:03.935
and which is completely wrong.

198
00:11:04.065 --> 00:11:06.705
We've seen it in the other presentations.

199
00:11:08.155 --> 00:11:12.595
So how to motivate every everyone on board you need to try

200
00:11:12.615 --> 00:11:14.395
to reach minds and hearts alike.

201
00:11:17.465 --> 00:11:21.845
One approach, in my opinion, what can you do?

202
00:11:21.935 --> 00:11:23.965
Let's say keeping it simple is the key.

203
00:11:25.515 --> 00:11:28.325
Make the reporting system as easily accessible as possible.

204
00:11:29.085 --> 00:11:32.255
Like we've seen on in, on Ken's presentation yesterday.

205
00:11:33.545 --> 00:11:35.765
Um, multiple choice forms in comment section.

206
00:11:36.405 --> 00:11:38.695
Obviously there's solutions to that already.

207
00:11:39.555 --> 00:11:43.355
Um, implement anonymous reporting, which

208
00:11:44.095 --> 00:11:45.715
can be a challenge, a tough one,

209
00:11:45.715 --> 00:11:47.835
especially if you're only 10 plus minus people.

210
00:11:47.975 --> 00:11:51.115
So you only have three test pilots and you get a report.

211
00:11:53.930 --> 00:11:55.695
Given the small amount of data,

212
00:11:55.755 --> 00:11:57.695
you can easily relate who was doing what.

213
00:11:58.825 --> 00:12:02.045
And, um, eventually try to give people a reward

214
00:12:02.855 --> 00:12:05.755
and maybe just a friendly, like, thank you

215
00:12:05.815 --> 00:12:08.515
for submitting your report pop up.

216
00:12:08.935 --> 00:12:10.115

And the system might be something.

217
00:12:13.335 --> 00:12:18.175
So what did I learn when I put this thing together?

218
00:12:22.495 --> 00:12:25.705
Um, it takes time.

219
00:12:29.385 --> 00:12:33.555
It takes a lot of patience and a lot of work

220
00:12:35.495 --> 00:12:36.555
and personal effort

221
00:12:42.605 --> 00:12:46.155
and um, if you get all get all those elements

222
00:12:46.155 --> 00:12:48.395
to work together, you have a very good chance

223
00:12:48.895 --> 00:12:50.585
to get the SMS up and running.

224
00:12:52.095 --> 00:12:54.555
But then how to keep it running.

225
00:12:55.245 --> 00:12:58.785
The subtitle of, uh, my talk said how to keep it alive

226
00:12:58.785 --> 00:13:02.025
and well, to keep it going.

227
00:13:02.355 --> 00:13:06.255
Motivation is key. You cannot force anyone to report.

228
00:13:07.135 --> 00:13:09.405
There are various approaches on how to motivate people

229
00:13:09.405 --> 00:13:11.085
to participate with a,

230
00:13:11.205 --> 00:13:13.125
I think there's a whole industry build around it.

231
00:13:13.705 --> 00:13:16.205
Um, you need someone to operate that oil.

232
00:13:16.305 --> 00:13:20.505
Can someone who continuously has an eye on the system

233
00:13:20.565 --> 00:13:21.625
and takes care of it.

234
00:13:23.535 --> 00:13:25.755
It highly depends on the people you work with

235
00:13:25.895 --> 00:13:28.795
to keep your flight testing as safe as possible.

236
00:13:29.645 --> 00:13:33.625
And, um, a SMS handbook printout won't

237
00:13:33.625 --> 00:13:35.145
prevent a single accident.

238
00:13:35.865 --> 00:13:38.145
I mean, well maybe if you use it as a door stop,

239
00:13:38.145 --> 00:13:39.505
it will prevent you pinching your fingers.

240
00:13:39.645 --> 00:13:43.195
But, um, you need people to work with this.

241
00:13:46.225 --> 00:13:48.625
So that's the, that was the bottom line.

242
00:13:49.005 --> 00:13:50.225
The, the fewer the people

243
00:13:50.225 --> 00:13:53.975

that you have in your organization, the fewer flights

244
00:13:53.975 --> 00:13:57.495
or the fewer flight hours you have, the higher the relevance

245
00:13:57.955 --> 00:14:00.095
of the a culture and the reporting culture.

246
00:14:02.725 --> 00:14:06.965
And that's me talking. So I would like to have your input

247
00:14:07.145 --> 00:14:10.645
and, and questions probably maybe there are none

248
00:14:10.645 --> 00:14:12.805
because everything has been said already in the,

249
00:14:12.805 --> 00:14:13.965
in the past few days.

250
00:14:15.665 --> 00:14:16.665
Thank you.

251
00:14:25.035 --> 00:14:28.175
You had a phrase there that, um, is a little bit

252
00:14:28.175 --> 00:14:31.375
of a catchphrase for some of us that's, you had a goal of

253
00:14:31.925 --> 00:14:34.335
zero incidents or zero reports or something like that.

254
00:14:35.275 --> 00:14:37.735
And, and you know, can you hear what I'm saying? Zero.

255
00:14:37.955 --> 00:14:40.095
You had a phrase that said zero incidents

256
00:14:40.095 --> 00:14:41.895
or zero reports, perhaps as a goal.

257
00:14:42.395 --> 00:14:44.135
Uh, that can be an insidious goal.

258
00:14:44.475 --> 00:14:47.175
For example, in a production environment you have zero

259
00:14:47.245 --> 00:14:49.975
defects or in a development program, zero problem reports.

260
00:14:50.645 --> 00:14:54.885
The tendency can be if I'm a leader to squash the reporting

261
00:14:54.995 --> 00:14:56.365
because I look successful.

262
00:14:56.585 --> 00:14:58.765
Oh, I think that came up, that came up wrong.

263
00:14:58.905 --> 00:15:02.205
The the ultimate goal would be to have zero accidents.

264
00:15:02.585 --> 00:15:06.345
So no crash, no loss of life, no loss of aircraft,

265
00:15:06.405 --> 00:15:07.545
not zero reporting.

266
00:15:07.565 --> 00:15:09.945
That's completely wrong. So I, I

267
00:15:09.945 --> 00:15:11.615
Know that was your goal, but my question is,

268
00:15:15.965 --> 00:15:17.055
Yeah, that's the tricky part.

269
00:15:17.175 --> 00:15:19.855
I mean, that's my approach would be to keep it as simple

270
00:15:19.915 --> 00:15:22.815

as possible to, to talk to people, to be open.

271
00:15:23.795 --> 00:15:28.645
Um, because if you have a small organization like we do,

272
00:15:28.905 --> 00:15:30.885
we have four aircraft and,

273
00:15:30.885 --> 00:15:34.335
and, um, I mean,

274
00:15:34.455 --> 00:15:36.615
we're not doing production testing.

275
00:15:36.835 --> 00:15:40.055
So what we are doing is, um, we got sensors and,

276
00:15:40.055 --> 00:15:41.575
and external stores on the aircraft

277
00:15:41.715 --> 00:15:44.135
for temporary, just for small times.

278
00:15:44.195 --> 00:15:47.015
And, and, and, and we have to cer get 'EM certified

279
00:15:47.155 --> 00:15:49.175
and test, retest the envelope.

280
00:15:49.745 --> 00:15:52.985
Um, but we cannot afford to lose an aircraft.

281
00:15:52.985 --> 00:15:55.905
So we have to be really cautious on the traditional sides.

282
00:15:56.405 --> 00:16:00.425
And we want to use the opportunities that A SMS gives you

283
00:16:00.445 --> 00:16:03.265
to be predictive and see, okay, where can we get better?

284
00:16:03.315 --> 00:16:07.385
Where can we, um, we can, we can we say, how can we

285
00:16:08.475 --> 00:16:13.015
increase the safety that we have with the motivation goal

286
00:16:13.115 --> 00:16:14.495
of zero accidents?

287
00:16:16.185 --> 00:16:17.325
So that's what I meant with this.

288
00:16:20.475 --> 00:16:22.455
Uh, could you talk about a little bit the fact

289
00:16:22.455 --> 00:16:26.335
that your organization has, uh, a, a large number

290
00:16:26.475 --> 00:16:28.655
of very small diverse programs

291
00:16:28.995 --> 00:16:31.255
and uh, some examples of how you were able to,

292
00:16:31.275 --> 00:16:32.335
to collect this data

293
00:16:32.355 --> 00:16:34.215
and make it applicable across all those

294
00:16:34.885 --> 00:16:36.015
very diverse programs?

295
00:16:36.915 --> 00:16:41.215
That's the point. Um, we basically just started having SMS

296
00:16:41.395 --> 00:16:45.245
and um, the fleet is quite diverse with smaller

297
00:16:45.345 --> 00:16:46.365

and in bigger aircraft.

298
00:16:46.385 --> 00:16:48.245
But then again, we have two facilities.

299
00:16:48.265 --> 00:16:51.365
One is in wick and the other one is in, uh,

300
00:16:52.225 --> 00:16:55.105
and, um, the fleet that we operate in over no,

301
00:16:55.125 --> 00:16:56.145
is just for aircraft.

302
00:16:56.685 --> 00:16:58.275
And, uh, so,

303
00:16:58.695 --> 00:17:01.755
and the flight testing, we we're not really a flight test,

304
00:17:02.875 --> 00:17:05.925
um, flight test facility there.

305
00:17:05.985 --> 00:17:09.525
So we do the flight testing as a purpose for getting the,

306
00:17:09.545 --> 00:17:11.445
the, the installations certified.

307
00:17:12.345 --> 00:17:16.915
Um, and we are working just, we are in progress of,

308
00:17:16.975 --> 00:17:19.675
of harmonizing and getting information together from the

309
00:17:19.675 --> 00:17:20.755
other guys and, and,

310
00:17:20.755 --> 00:17:23.155
and trying to get solutions out of this.

311
00:17:23.375 --> 00:17:26.355
But this is still ongoing. So this is the new stuff.

312
00:17:26.775 --> 00:17:29.435
And you got lots of people that are already

313
00:17:29.815 --> 00:17:33.315
or have been in the organization for a long time

314
00:17:33.935 --> 00:17:37.565
and for some it's hard to, uh,

315
00:17:38.805 --> 00:17:42.155
adapt and, and and, and, and do the extra work.

316
00:17:42.845 --> 00:17:44.025
And for some it's pretty easy.

317
00:17:44.025 --> 00:17:45.105
And they say, well, yeah, I can,

318
00:17:45.585 --> 00:17:47.105
I see the, I see where you're, where you're going.

319
00:17:47.225 --> 00:17:49.645
I see, um, the whole meaning and the, the sense of it.

320
00:17:49.705 --> 00:17:50.965
And this is a good thing.

321
00:17:51.485 --> 00:17:54.745
So convincing people is, is key in this, in this thing.

322
00:17:58.125 --> 00:18:01.265
Uh, Sebastian on that beautiful machine there, easy

323
00:18:01.265 --> 00:18:02.825
to put a quick access recorder in there.

324
00:18:02.825 --> 00:18:04.625

Do you have any recorders for your lighter airplanes?

325
00:18:04.625 --> 00:18:05.785
Smaller, lighter airplanes?

326
00:18:06.625 --> 00:18:11.415
Um, we have not from, uh,

327
00:18:11.595 --> 00:18:13.375
uh, from the, from the OEMs,

328
00:18:13.795 --> 00:18:17.015
but, um, the, at least in O five, no,

329
00:18:17.595 --> 00:18:21.135
we have a far 20 that is, um, equipped

330
00:18:21.135 --> 00:18:24.915
with a sophisticated atmospheric system

331
00:18:25.105 --> 00:18:28.355
that will track DGPS data and, and,

332
00:18:28.375 --> 00:18:30.035
and pressures and all that stuff.

333
00:18:30.725 --> 00:18:34.185
So we have, uh, like highly dedicated

334
00:18:34.285 --> 00:18:38.305
but also working as um, FTI systems

335
00:18:39.285 --> 00:18:41.305
and there, so the only aircraft we have

336
00:18:41.305 --> 00:18:43.825
with the quick access data recorder is the Gulfstream, uh,

337
00:18:44.935 --> 00:18:45.935
Regard. Uh, in

338
00:18:45.935 --> 00:18:48.195
regards to your motivation aspect of this,

339
00:18:48.195 --> 00:18:51.235
several years ago we implemented an aviation safety action

340
00:18:51.235 --> 00:18:53.675
program, an ASAP program at Boeing.

341
00:18:54.335 --> 00:18:56.315
And the whole goal was, uh, one of the things

342
00:18:56.315 --> 00:18:59.035
that the real advantages of an ASAP program is if you report

343
00:18:59.035 --> 00:19:01.955
and you get dual source reporting from a TC, uh,

344
00:19:01.955 --> 00:19:04.875
there is no licensing action taken against the pilot.

345
00:19:05.335 --> 00:19:07.835
So you get now two deviation, things like that.

346
00:19:08.415 --> 00:19:10.435
Uh, because we know that most of these types

347
00:19:10.435 --> 00:19:11.915
of deviations are unintentional.

348
00:19:12.425 --> 00:19:13.555
What that does then is

349
00:19:13.555 --> 00:19:16.595
because of the protections afforded through that, it, uh,

350
00:19:16.735 --> 00:19:19.715
it has driven up our reporting culture into areas that are

351
00:19:19.715 --> 00:19:21.235

beyond just a safety portion,

352
00:19:21.255 --> 00:19:22.995
but even things that have to do with quality.

353
00:19:23.695 --> 00:19:25.155
So what you do is you find an,

354
00:19:25.215 --> 00:19:27.235
you incentivize the program for reporting.

355
00:19:27.675 --> 00:19:28.835
'cause there are advantages to report.

356
00:19:28.925 --> 00:19:31.435
We've had several license, what I would call saves

357
00:19:31.435 --> 00:19:33.235
because they only, they stop at a certain area,

358
00:19:33.775 --> 00:19:35.395
but it really has increased our reporting.

359
00:19:35.395 --> 00:19:37.875
Ralph, you can probably address this better than I can at

360
00:19:37.875 --> 00:19:38.915
what we've seen at Boeing, but it

361
00:19:38.915 --> 00:19:40.035
really has been a great program.

362
00:19:40.295 --> 00:19:42.835
So something like that, if people are interested,

363
00:19:42.905 --> 00:19:44.315
we'd be more than happy to help with

364
00:19:44.315 --> 00:19:46.995
that if you don't have an ASAP program in your organization.

365
00:19:48.525 --> 00:19:49.395
Thank you.

366
00:19:58.825 --> 00:20:02.645
Thanks. S Jennifer. Interesting, uh, presentation.

367
00:20:02.985 --> 00:20:05.605
And I imagine in a small organization, one

368
00:20:05.605 --> 00:20:06.925
of the big challenges is,

369
00:20:06.985 --> 00:20:09.945
is getting human factors, uh, reports.

370
00:20:10.165 --> 00:20:11.985
And you mentioned anonymous reports

371
00:20:12.005 --> 00:20:14.945
and I'm wondering if you also do, um,

372
00:20:15.145 --> 00:20:18.225
confidential reporting, uh, so not anonymous,

373
00:20:18.365 --> 00:20:20.345
but confidential and how you then handle

374
00:20:20.345 --> 00:20:21.465
that in such a small group?

375
00:20:22.985 --> 00:20:25.955
Well, confidentially confidentiality,

376
00:20:27.195 --> 00:20:29.975
I'm not really sure if we thought about that,

377
00:20:30.115 --> 00:20:34.405
but then again, um, as we are

378
00:20:34.505 --> 00:20:37.845

so few people, people are actually talking to each other,

379
00:20:38.025 --> 00:20:39.725
so there's not much confidentiality.

380
00:20:42.175 --> 00:20:44.915
You are usually everyone's working on the same program, so,

381
00:20:45.015 --> 00:20:48.300
um, there's not much that could be held con

382
00:20:48.300 --> 00:20:50.195
or would have to be held confidential.

383
00:20:50.425 --> 00:20:54.245
Then there is, uh, I think, um,

384
00:20:58.575 --> 00:21:00.725
there was something about, uh, the, the,

385
00:21:00.825 --> 00:21:03.725
the representation representatives of the,

386
00:21:03.725 --> 00:21:05.405
of the workers in, in the last presentation.

387
00:21:06.025 --> 00:21:09.805
Um, there's an issue about that during, uh,

388
00:21:10.475 --> 00:21:12.965
when it comes down to the, an thing being

389
00:21:13.155 --> 00:21:14.485
reporting anonymously.

390
00:21:15.605 --> 00:21:20.585
Um, so the, some strange German laws, maybe not strange,

391
00:21:20.645 --> 00:21:23.345
but, um, you have to kind of get all that stuff together.

392
00:21:24.475 --> 00:21:26.615
So confidentially confidentiality,

393
00:21:27.775 --> 00:21:29.545
I don't know, sorry.

394
00:21:34.935 --> 00:21:37.105
Because the interesting thing is not just, uh,

395
00:21:37.305 --> 00:21:40.565
confidential reporting in terms of events,

396
00:21:41.025 --> 00:21:45.285
but also human factors, hazards, um,

397
00:21:45.905 --> 00:21:48.765
issues that people can see coming up in, in terms of, uh,

398
00:21:49.205 --> 00:21:54.035
procedures or, uh, deviations in, in flying habits.

399
00:21:54.735 --> 00:21:58.285
And uh, at Airbus, we, we offer

400
00:21:58.995 --> 00:22:00.845
open reporting, confidential reporting,

401
00:22:00.845 --> 00:22:02.045
and anonymous reporting.

402
00:22:02.195 --> 00:22:04.045
Okay. But I, I don't think I've ever had

403
00:22:04.145 --> 00:22:05.165
an anonymous report.

404
00:22:06.595 --> 00:22:10.525
Okay. And, uh, somehow there's a need to develop, uh,

405
00:22:10.585 --> 00:22:12.805

an ability for people to, to trust the system

406
00:22:12.805 --> 00:22:14.765
that they can report confidentially,

407
00:22:15.755 --> 00:22:17.895
but still give you the data that you need and,

408
00:22:17.895 --> 00:22:21.215
and the, um, the ability to go back

409
00:22:21.215 --> 00:22:23.135
and discuss with individuals.

410
00:22:23.845 --> 00:22:26.695
Okay. And again, we, I can show you if you like

411
00:22:26.695 --> 00:22:28.175
what we do in terms of, uh,

412
00:22:28.175 --> 00:22:29.255
confidential report. Yeah. I would

413
00:22:29.255 --> 00:22:30.575
Like to chat with that about you later on

414
00:22:30.575 --> 00:22:32.175
because I'm not really sure I get the idea,

415
00:22:32.635 --> 00:22:34.415
but, um, it sounds interesting.

416
00:22:41.235 --> 00:22:42.005
Alright. Thank you

417
00:22:42.445 --> 00:22:43.445
Sebastian. Thank you. Let me,

418
00:22:43.445 --> 00:22:44.885
uh, do the symbolic grip

419
00:22:44.885 --> 00:22:46.285
and grin now and show you that.

420
00:22:47.905 --> 00:22:49.005
Thanks. Thank you.

421
00:22:49.995 --> 00:22:53.615
Uh, it, as I said, you know, as we said, it takes courage

422
00:22:53.615 --> 00:22:56.255
to come and present and do these things.