

WEBVTT

1

00:00:00.145 --> 00:00:02.445

Up here, if there's any further questions that you want

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00:00:02.445 --> 00:00:06.965

to ask, uh, out in public as the N NTS Bs want to perform.

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00:00:07.035 --> 00:00:09.725

Exactly. Uh, now's the time. Joe, back to you.

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00:00:11.305 --> 00:00:14.885

One thing is, uh, you know, just as an aside, it's always,

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00:00:15.305 --> 00:00:19.085

uh, as an NTSB person, you always an investigator.

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00:00:19.085 --> 00:00:21.325

You always, uh, you come to grips very quickly

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00:00:21.325 --> 00:00:22.925

that no one really likes to see you.

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00:00:23.545 --> 00:00:25.245

And, uh, you know, when we walk into the room,

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00:00:25.245 --> 00:00:26.685

usually something bad has happened.

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00:00:27.065 --> 00:00:28.765

Uh, we, but, uh,

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00:00:28.765 --> 00:00:30.885

after the first couple of times, I don't take it personally.

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00:00:31.385 --> 00:00:33.765

Um, but, and then afterwards, an investigation,

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00:00:33.765 --> 00:00:35.165

it's always difficult

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00:00:35.165 --> 00:00:37.365

because you're always saying, well, oh, it's good to,

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00:00:37.365 --> 00:00:38.605

you know, it's good to work with you.

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00:00:38.625 --> 00:00:40.285

And, and, but I always, uh,

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00:00:40.835 --> 00:00:42.205

some people are uncomfortable with that.

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00:00:42.385 --> 00:00:44.765

But I can say, I mean, I've just met a couple people

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00:00:44.765 --> 00:00:48.085

that I haven't seen for 18 years, uh, and more.

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00:00:48.665 --> 00:00:50.085

Um, but I always,

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00:00:50.105 --> 00:00:51.885

the way I always put it is it's a bad event,

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00:00:51.885 --> 00:00:53.405

but it's always good to work with good people.

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00:00:53.905 --> 00:00:58.735

And, um, throughout my career at the NTSB, I've met a lot

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00:00:58.735 --> 00:00:59.935

of great people to work with.

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00:01:00.355 --> 00:01:03.095

So it's not a bad thing, even though you have a, a bad day.

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00:01:03.715 --> 00:01:07.055

And, uh, and it's not a good, good way to meet us.

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00:01:07.395 --> 00:01:09.335

Uh, it is always good to work with good people.

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00:01:10.275 --> 00:01:13.295

Um, so, uh, let's see.

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00:01:15.515 --> 00:01:17.655

We got ops, human, uh, performance.

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00:01:17.915 --> 00:01:19.015

We can talk a little bit more about

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00:01:19.015 --> 00:01:20.175

interviews if we want later.

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00:01:20.835 --> 00:01:24.615

Here's one that I'm sure all of you are worried

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00:01:24.635 --> 00:01:26.695

and scared about is, uh, is data.

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00:01:27.235 --> 00:01:30.695

Um, what type of data is NTS

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00:01:30.995 --> 00:01:32.495

or what is NTSB?

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00:01:32.795 --> 00:01:35.415

Uh, what do they control with regard

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00:01:35.415 --> 00:01:36.695

to an accident on an airplane?

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00:01:36.695 --> 00:01:40.255

Just the recorders. The FDR and CVR.

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00:01:44.815 --> 00:01:46.295

Anything, any and all.

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00:01:47.395 --> 00:01:49.815

And if it comes from the airplane, okay.

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00:01:50.155 --> 00:01:52.535

So that's where we get the TM side of things, right?

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00:01:52.885 --> 00:01:56.685

With the tm, we, uh, we get,

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00:01:57.195 --> 00:02:00.365

with the flight test accident that we've done, we've gotten,

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00:02:01.225 --> 00:02:04.445

uh, loads of additional data right from that.

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00:02:04.905 --> 00:02:09.005

But just because it's to an offsite location does not mean

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00:02:09.005 --> 00:02:12.005

that, it's not that we don't have control over that.

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00:02:12.915 --> 00:02:16.045

Okay. It's a, it's a difficult concept for some people to,

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00:02:16.045 --> 00:02:19.005

even on a commercial side, uh, the QAR, you know,

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00:02:19.005 --> 00:02:20.525

you have the FDR and then the QAR.

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00:02:20.525 --> 00:02:24.845

I've had literally, uh, air, you know, flag carriers,

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00:02:25.265 --> 00:02:28.325

one American Airlines once, you know, telling me, um,

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00:02:28.465 --> 00:02:30.285

oh yeah, we're gonna go get the c uh, the,

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00:02:30.305 --> 00:02:34.285

the QAR quick a access, quick access recorder off the,

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00:02:34.665 --> 00:02:36.005

uh, the airplane.

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00:02:36.065 --> 00:02:38.245

And I'm like looking at 'em going,

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00:02:38.835 --> 00:02:39.845

what do you, what do you mean?

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00:02:39.865 --> 00:02:42.205

You know, that's our data. They go, oh, no, no, no.

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00:02:42.205 --> 00:02:43.645

You got the FDR. We got the QAR.

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00:02:43.705 --> 00:02:45.165

No, no, that's not the way it works.

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00:02:45.505 --> 00:02:49.445

Or in, in your guys' case, um, you know, you got the,

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00:02:49.505 --> 00:02:51.765

you got the flight recorder if it does one on there, right?

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00:02:51.905 --> 00:02:54.525

Uh, and we got the TM data. No, that's not how it works.

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00:02:55.265 --> 00:02:57.725

We need to have every and all, uh, bit of data that's on

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00:02:57.725 --> 00:03:01.125

that, uh, airplane or streaming from that airplane. Okay.

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00:03:01.925 --> 00:03:03.725

I wonder if we can explore that a little bit. Yep.

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00:03:04.265 --> 00:03:08.165

Uh, a commercial product being tested under an FA

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00:03:08.165 --> 00:03:11.445

experimental certification with an inherently

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00:03:11.965 --> 00:03:13.605  
military mission in-flight refueling.

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00:03:14.105 --> 00:03:17.645  
Yep. Say there's an in-flight refueling mishap mm-hmm.

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00:03:17.765 --> 00:03:18.805  
Between the two airplanes.

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00:03:20.095 --> 00:03:24.965  
Where is where, who has jurisdiction over the data?

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00:03:24.985 --> 00:03:29.445  
The test data that might be in the military channels?

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00:03:30.705 --> 00:03:34.805  
One military and is are, if you're talking about on, say,

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00:03:34.825 --> 00:03:37.085  
the refueling aircraft, okay.

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00:03:38.015 --> 00:03:39.965  
Which is a non-military aircraft.

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00:03:41.105 --> 00:03:44.805  
Um, we've investigated a point MAGOO 7 0 7, right?

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00:03:44.985 --> 00:03:47.205  
Um, it's, the only thing is if,

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00:03:47.205 --> 00:03:49.085  
if there's a midair even okay.

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00:03:49.085 --> 00:03:51.085  
Between a military and, and civilian.

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00:03:51.385 --> 00:03:53.285  
So let's say if it's a, a refueling event

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00:03:53.285 --> 00:03:56.485

and something to that effect happens, it's,

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00:03:56.485 --> 00:03:57.925

it's an NTSB investigation.

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00:03:58.905 --> 00:04:00.925

Um, it doesn't mean that the,

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00:04:00.925 --> 00:04:02.605

that the military won't get that data.

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00:04:02.945 --> 00:04:04.605

And, and specifically in our regs, again,

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00:04:04.605 --> 00:04:06.325

and we talked about it with regard to FAA,

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00:04:06.545 --> 00:04:10.085

but that also goes to D-O-D-D-O-D can conduct an

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00:04:10.405 --> 00:04:11.965

investigation that they, that our,

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00:04:12.065 --> 00:04:14.605

our regs don't negate them from doing

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00:04:14.605 --> 00:04:15.765

it or keep them from doing it.

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00:04:15.875 --> 00:04:18.245

What it does though, is we have priority over certain data,

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00:04:19.185 --> 00:04:21.725

uh, and we'll talk a little bit li more about this Ashburn

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00:04:21.725 --> 00:04:23.165

Accord, which talks about the FAA,

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00:04:23.165 --> 00:04:26.045

but we can also talk about, you can also, um, uh,

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00:04:26.185 --> 00:04:29.325  
mix in the DOD with that in a sense that

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00:04:30.385 --> 00:04:33.245  
we all get the same data, uh, no matter what.

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00:04:34.105 --> 00:04:38.685  
Um, so, so if it's, if it's not a military aircraft, we're,

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00:04:38.735 --> 00:04:40.045  
we're responsible for it.

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00:04:41.065 --> 00:04:43.885  
Hey, Jim, with respect to that,

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00:04:43.915 --> 00:04:45.405  
that was declared a public aircraft

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00:04:45.405 --> 00:04:46.965  
operation. Are you guys still

102

00:04:47.565 --> 00:04:49.765  
Involved or, we do do public aircraft as well sometimes.

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00:04:50.345 --> 00:04:53.445  
And so it's, we do do that. We have a pub.

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00:04:53.445 --> 00:04:55.605  
We actually have a, we have a public aircraft, uh,

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00:04:55.605 --> 00:04:58.645  
because what it, um, we, we used

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00:04:58.645 --> 00:04:59.965  
to have actually have an accident number

107

00:04:59.965 --> 00:05:01.525  
that had pa public aircraft.

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00:05:01.865 --> 00:05:03.885

We got rid of it. 'cause it really didn't really, you know,

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00:05:03.885 --> 00:05:05.365

we have another button that clicks in it now.

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00:05:05.365 --> 00:05:06.965

So we decided we didn't need that.

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00:05:06.965 --> 00:05:08.685

But yes, public aircraft doesn't matter.

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00:05:11.345 --> 00:05:14.885

Joe, I have a question. Uh, some of our operations would,

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00:05:15.515 --> 00:05:20.175

uh, the aircraft, uh, has informa

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00:05:20.175 --> 00:05:21.735

or systems in the back that are under test.

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00:05:21.735 --> 00:05:23.415

Mm-hmm. Those systems may have

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00:05:24.005 --> 00:05:27.455

some fairly significantly classified data.

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00:05:27.595 --> 00:05:31.455

Mm-hmm. Uh, obviously it, it's locked down to start with,

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00:05:32.035 --> 00:05:34.975

but it, what would the process be to determine whether

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00:05:35.325 --> 00:05:38.775

that data has any bearing on the incident or not?

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00:05:39.215 --> 00:05:42.175

There'll be, there's a couple things. One, um, and, and,

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00:05:42.175 --> 00:05:44.415

And how do you get access to classified data? Right.

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00:05:44.445 --> 00:05:47.095  
Okay. All of, uh, myself and,

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00:05:47.395 --> 00:05:49.495  
and, uh, we just got all of my guys as well.

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00:05:49.755 --> 00:05:54.455  
And, um, my boss and, uh, the director all have ts.

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00:05:55.385 --> 00:06:00.045  
Um, so we can, we have that. We didn't have it before.

126

00:06:00.345 --> 00:06:02.005  
Uh, not everybody, but we got it

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00:06:02.005 --> 00:06:03.605  
for all my guys in case this happens.

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00:06:04.595 --> 00:06:06.485  
Okay. We will work with,

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00:06:06.515 --> 00:06:08.845  
with the other government agency with regard to it.

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00:06:08.845 --> 00:06:09.965  
And we can talk a little, we'll wait,

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00:06:09.965 --> 00:06:11.685  
and I'll, I'm gonna hold that a little bit till we start

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00:06:11.685 --> 00:06:12.925  
talking about proprietary data.

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00:06:13.625 --> 00:06:15.725  
And, uh, because it's, it's similar

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00:06:15.905 --> 00:06:18.245  
and like for commercial space, the big thing is iar,

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00:06:18.745 --> 00:06:21.525

you know, you got proprietary data where if we release it,

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00:06:21.525 --> 00:06:23.045

you know, you guys can sue the heck out of us.

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00:06:23.545 --> 00:06:26.405

But if, uh, for a commercial space, IAR stuff,

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00:06:26.745 --> 00:06:28.045

if we release it, we can go to jail.

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00:06:28.075 --> 00:06:29.125

Literally, you know,

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00:06:29.125 --> 00:06:30.445

even though we're government employees, right?

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00:06:30.905 --> 00:06:34.885

So, um, so it's all works together.

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00:06:35.705 --> 00:06:37.325

And, um, and it was one,

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00:06:37.325 --> 00:06:39.525

and when we talk about that, I'll talk about Spaceship two,

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00:06:39.585 --> 00:06:41.245

uh, investigation, because that's where,

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00:06:41.585 --> 00:06:44.405

and the, um, the Boeing, um, uh,

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00:06:45.455 --> 00:06:48.205

7, 8, 7 battery investigation, there was a lot

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00:06:48.265 --> 00:06:50.365

of proprietary data in that. Yeah.

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00:06:50.665 --> 00:06:52.285

The whole issue of the intellectual

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00:06:52.645 --> 00:06:54.885

Property that, that inter interaction, anything like that.

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00:06:55.345 --> 00:06:57.365

And that's what we have to, to sort

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00:06:57.365 --> 00:06:58.805

of hopefully get across to you.

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00:06:58.805 --> 00:07:00.605

There's, you gotta look at it in two

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00:07:00.625 --> 00:07:02.005

phases with regard to that.

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00:07:02.005 --> 00:07:05.405

Just as a preview one for the investigators,

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00:07:05.405 --> 00:07:08.845

everything within the investigation is, is protected.

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00:07:09.195 --> 00:07:12.285

Okay. And then we have that public side, right?

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00:07:12.795 --> 00:07:14.605

Just 'cause we have it. We don't release everything.

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00:07:14.605 --> 00:07:16.125

We release the things that are necessary

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00:07:16.505 --> 00:07:17.525

and we release the things,

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00:07:17.525 --> 00:07:19.365

and we'll talk about that with the public docket.

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00:07:19.785 --> 00:07:21.885

But there's a difference between us getting it

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00:07:21.885 --> 00:07:22.885

and us releasing it.

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00:07:23.105 --> 00:07:24.885

And you have to really look at it that way.

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00:07:26.945 --> 00:07:30.005

The one thing with, uh, with TM is, is do you think

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00:07:30.005 --> 00:07:31.485

that we could actually look at that data

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00:07:31.705 --> 00:07:32.925

and your, and your test data?

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00:07:33.225 --> 00:07:35.365

No answer is no. So what do we do with that?

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00:07:35.985 --> 00:07:37.765

Get the company To help you. Exactly.

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00:07:37.855 --> 00:07:39.445

We'll, we'll come to your place. We'll help.

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00:07:39.595 --> 00:07:43.085

What we did, it took a long time, like for spaceship two

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00:07:43.345 --> 00:07:45.045

for us to get the data back into our system.

172

00:07:45.245 --> 00:07:46.925

'cause it had to be converted. And then, uh,

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00:07:47.545 --> 00:07:50.645

but what we did is we utilized, we were involved in

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00:07:50.645 --> 00:07:54.725

that on scene and then, um, worked with it that way.

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00:07:55.545 --> 00:07:59.325

But, um, we, we do need your help to do it, to look at it.

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00:08:01.185 --> 00:08:02.805

Um, what does the, what

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00:08:02.805 --> 00:08:04.045

Does the NTSB inspect happens

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00:08:04.045 --> 00:08:06.675

with additional copies? The data stream,

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00:08:07.095 --> 00:08:08.595

The copy should be all locked down.

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00:08:10.805 --> 00:08:12.285

'cause look at it this way. And,

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00:08:12.285 --> 00:08:14.125

and that's, it's difficult even like for a,

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00:08:14.225 --> 00:08:16.325

for a launch accident and that sort of thing from, uh,

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00:08:16.335 --> 00:08:19.805

let's say for an orbital launch, uh, or a space

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00:08:19.945 --> 00:08:23.005

or a, a, uh, Falcon nine launch, something like that,

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00:08:23.005 --> 00:08:24.925

that's different, slightly different than a, um,

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00:08:25.035 --> 00:08:27.565

spaceship two, which is a suborbital launch.

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00:08:28.225 --> 00:08:31.485

Um, they have multiple,

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00:08:32.085 --> 00:08:34.005

multiple streams going across country Okay.

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00:08:34.225 --> 00:08:38.685

To the FAA, uh, to Hawthorne, to, uh, down to the cape,

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00:08:38.785 --> 00:08:42.605

to a couple other places, to, um, uh, aerospace corporation.

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00:08:43.385 --> 00:08:47.445

So, but what has to happen is you have to have in your,

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00:08:47.505 --> 00:08:51.005

in your, uh, response plan a way to lock down the data

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00:08:51.025 --> 00:08:52.085

to keep it from HAP to,

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00:08:52.265 --> 00:08:54.525

to keep access from GA being gained on that.

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00:08:55.465 --> 00:08:58.405

Uh, because what happens if it's not,

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00:09:00.715 --> 00:09:03.525

what is that group that's doing a small little investigation

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00:09:03.525 --> 00:09:06.765

on their own with that data gonna be doing compared

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00:09:06.765 --> 00:09:09.525

to everybody, to, to our basic investigation?

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00:09:09.745 --> 00:09:10.885

And at the very least,

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00:09:10.885 --> 00:09:12.925

it's gonna potentially cause some confusion.

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00:09:13.505 --> 00:09:16.045

So one of the, one of the NTSB rules is, is

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00:09:16.045 --> 00:09:17.765

that you will not be conducting a separate

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00:09:18.445 --> 00:09:22.685  
accident investigation of, uh, of using data, the, the,

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00:09:22.685 --> 00:09:24.565  
the accident data and, and, and all that.

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00:09:26.105 --> 00:09:28.525  
So if you lock down the data, then

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00:09:28.625 --> 00:09:30.365  
how does the company proceed with a flight test?

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00:09:30.365 --> 00:09:32.605  
They need that data to review the results

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00:09:32.705 --> 00:09:35.445  
and then proceed on as a buildup. Yep. You know?

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00:09:35.635 --> 00:09:37.485  
Exactly. And that's why we have the group.

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00:09:37.705 --> 00:09:39.245  
Here's the thing, no matter,

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00:09:39.265 --> 00:09:41.485  
and everybody always says the same thing.

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00:09:41.515 --> 00:09:44.205  
It's like, imagine even United Airlines, Southwest Airlines,

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00:09:44.205 --> 00:09:45.805  
when you have a 7, 4, 7 go down

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00:09:46.225 --> 00:09:48.045  
or anything to that effect, uh,

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00:09:48.065 --> 00:09:50.005  
or even like I said, Southwest Yuma,

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00:09:50.705 --> 00:09:51.845

oh, we need to find out.

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00:09:51.885 --> 00:09:53.285

Now we got 200 airplanes.

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00:09:53.285 --> 00:09:55.645

You know, it's like, well, okay, you do,

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00:09:55.645 --> 00:09:57.485

but this air, these airplanes have been flying for years.

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00:09:57.505 --> 00:09:59.245

Now, this is different with the flight test, right?

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00:09:59.585 --> 00:10:01.005

But with a, if it's a prototype,

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00:10:01.825 --> 00:10:04.285

do you think even internally, if we weren't in, in,

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00:10:04.465 --> 00:10:06.845

in the mix, would you be flying within a week?

224

00:10:10.245 --> 00:10:11.405

Probably not. Because you gotta be able

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00:10:11.405 --> 00:10:12.485

to look at everything you have to do.

226

00:10:12.795 --> 00:10:16.565

Okay. All that we're asking is that we be involved.

227

00:10:17.795 --> 00:10:21.325

Because if you're out doing your thing and we're over here

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00:10:21.785 --> 00:10:23.525

and you guys make a determination, and,

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00:10:23.525 --> 00:10:24.605

and, oh yeah, we're gonna do this, this,

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00:10:24.605 --> 00:10:26.635  
and this, again, at the very least,

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00:10:26.635 --> 00:10:27.715  
it's gonna extend everything.

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00:10:28.415 --> 00:10:30.715  
But at the very most, we might have a difference of opinion.

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00:10:30.775 --> 00:10:32.555  
And then it gets into the question of who's right.

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00:10:33.695 --> 00:10:35.675  
And that's where it gets into, um,

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00:10:36.385 --> 00:10:40.935  
into the problem publicly, uh, with the open agency, um,

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00:10:41.195 --> 00:10:43.655  
not just with us, but it's, it's, it's gonna, even

237

00:10:43.655 --> 00:10:47.925  
for your company, because even like when I say, uh,

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00:10:48.235 --> 00:10:50.765  
when we go internationally, tell Boeing guys,

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00:10:50.885 --> 00:10:54.285  
I tell United guys, I tell, uh, um, ALPA guys,

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00:10:54.285 --> 00:10:57.085  
whoever's over there, I know you're not gonna do

241

00:10:57.245 --> 00:10:59.215  
anything to this airplane.

242

00:11:00.095 --> 00:11:02.555  
And people, you know, there's not much that you can do.

243

00:11:02.555 --> 00:11:04.635

But people don't even, uh, you know, think about that.

244

00:11:04.645 --> 00:11:07.915

Let's say even the recorders, like for MH 17, every, we had

245

00:11:07.915 --> 00:11:10.435

to answer, uh, multiple questions

246

00:11:10.435 --> 00:11:13.915

to other government agencies when, how hard it would be to,

247

00:11:14.095 --> 00:11:15.955

um, to modify FDR data.

248

00:11:16.735 --> 00:11:18.715

And I said, we could maybe do it if you,

249

00:11:18.775 --> 00:11:20.835

we could modify one parameter if you give us a year

250

00:11:20.835 --> 00:11:22.995

to do it, and then it's still gonna, you know, so,

251

00:11:23.255 --> 00:11:26.235

but is even if you, it's just a perception.

252

00:11:26.255 --> 00:11:28.035

So in this case, it's a perception issue.

253

00:11:28.535 --> 00:11:31.155

If like, my, if I, when I went overseas

254

00:11:31.155 --> 00:11:32.715

and I would say, Boeing guys, don't go up

255

00:11:32.715 --> 00:11:33.875

to the cockpit all by yourself.

256

00:11:34.175 --> 00:11:35.235

You're not gonna do anything.

257

00:11:35.295 --> 00:11:37.755

But you know what, from our perceptions from the local

258

00:11:37.755 --> 00:11:38.795

investigator in charge,

259

00:11:39.225 --> 00:11:40.595

he's gonna be saying, why are you up there?

260

00:11:40.595 --> 00:11:42.355

Are you trying to protect, you know,

261

00:11:42.355 --> 00:11:43.555

your company's airplane?

262

00:11:44.015 --> 00:11:46.315

So in this case, if that happens and,

263

00:11:46.455 --> 00:11:48.995

and, uh, someone takes another set of data

264

00:11:48.995 --> 00:11:51.755

and is doing all this stuff, your company's gonna have

265

00:11:51.755 --> 00:11:55.125

to ask answer to, why are you doing a separate one from the,

266

00:11:55.145 --> 00:11:56.245

the full investigation?

267

00:11:56.345 --> 00:11:59.045

Are you trying to hide something? We know you're not.

268

00:11:59.765 --> 00:12:01.975

I know you're not. But

269

00:12:01.975 --> 00:12:03.575

that's what's gonna be coming out in the press.

270

00:12:04.115 --> 00:12:05.455

The other question I have is, uh,

271

00:12:05.935 --> 00:12:08.015

I know you have a flight test background.

272

00:12:08.015 --> 00:12:10.415

Mm-hmm. But, uh, not all your investigators do.

273

00:12:10.875 --> 00:12:15.255

So, so what do you, what do you do to, uh, to, uh,

274

00:12:15.445 --> 00:12:17.935

prevent the, uh, the questions like you were flying

275

00:12:17.945 --> 00:12:20.495

above the, the, the approved gross weight of this airplane,

276

00:12:20.955 --> 00:12:23.695

uh, on those kinds of questions that, that, that, that,

277

00:12:23.925 --> 00:12:26.815

that we flight testers have to do to, in order to get to I

278

00:12:26.815 --> 00:12:27.815

Agree. I understand. And

279

00:12:27.815 --> 00:12:28.415

that's the thing.

280

00:12:28.415 --> 00:12:32.175

And that's where it gets, so I, I try to get involved with

281

00:12:32.175 --> 00:12:33.295

as many, or at least be there.

282

00:12:33.295 --> 00:12:35.415

People know that of my background. So they do that.

283

00:12:35.715 --> 00:12:38.585

But that's why we have group members. Okay.

284

00:12:38.875 --> 00:12:41.425  
Group members on that ops group will say,

285

00:12:41.525 --> 00:12:42.865  
that's a normal operation.

286

00:12:42.865 --> 00:12:44.545  
And we'd say, yes, you're correct. It is.

287

00:12:44.905 --> 00:12:46.145  
'cause you take off over gross so

288

00:12:46.145 --> 00:12:48.465  
that you can hit your max weight at altitude.

289

00:12:48.465 --> 00:12:50.345  
Right? Or, you know,

290

00:12:50.345 --> 00:12:51.785  
you're gonna do all sorts of different things.

291

00:12:51.785 --> 00:12:52.825  
You're gonna, uh, and,

292

00:12:52.965 --> 00:12:56.945  
and where you have to do it, uh, for, to test it out.

293

00:12:57.005 --> 00:12:59.225  
And even though they don't have that background, that, that,

294

00:12:59.225 --> 00:13:01.585  
that's what the group members for is to, is to, is

295

00:13:01.585 --> 00:13:05.425  
to make sure that the NTSB investigator who may be worked

296

00:13:05.425 --> 00:13:08.785  
for United and was an in-flight test, understands that.

297

00:13:09.405 --> 00:13:11.545

And if they don't understand that, then you go

298

00:13:11.565 --> 00:13:14.265

to the coordinator, coordinator goes to the the IIC and,

299

00:13:14.325 --> 00:13:15.905

and we all have a big discussion.

300

00:13:15.905 --> 00:13:16.745

Everybody understands it.

301

00:13:21.895 --> 00:13:24.795

We also have of course, uh, picture, uh, analysis.

302

00:13:24.895 --> 00:13:25.955

Uh, when it's a flight test,

303

00:13:26.175 --> 00:13:30.955

we have generally a lot more data than we do on a, um, uh,

304

00:13:31.335 --> 00:13:33.595

on a, uh, on a regular, uh,

305

00:13:33.625 --> 00:13:35.635

scheduled flight or anything to that effect.

306

00:13:35.635 --> 00:13:37.755

That's a hard, that's the interesting thing for us

307

00:13:37.775 --> 00:13:39.635

to get used to with commercial space, is

308

00:13:39.635 --> 00:13:41.195

because we know when an accident could happen.

309

00:13:41.695 --> 00:13:43.995

And it's really weird. Um, you know,

310

00:13:44.235 --> 00:13:45.595

normally we go about our life and then all

311  
00:13:45.595 --> 00:13:48.555  
of a sudden we get called and your life gets transformed,

312  
00:13:48.575 --> 00:13:49.795  
and, and it, uh,

313  
00:13:49.975 --> 00:13:51.955  
and it, you can't prepare for it no matter what.

314  
00:13:52.215 --> 00:13:54.195  
If you're an accident investigator, first six months,

315  
00:13:54.195 --> 00:13:58.655  
you got that go bag ready to go and oh, it's gonna happen.

316  
00:13:58.715 --> 00:14:00.975  
No, no. Okay. No, nope. Not gonna go.

317  
00:14:00.995 --> 00:14:02.935  
And then, then you go, okay. You sort of forget about it.

318  
00:14:02.935 --> 00:14:05.215  
And then at the worst time in your life is when, when, uh,

319  
00:14:05.215 --> 00:14:06.295  
something happens.

320  
00:14:06.435 --> 00:14:10.055  
So this is, uh, down in the lower right is, uh,

321  
00:14:10.145 --> 00:14:11.375  
sound spectrum analysis.

322  
00:14:11.915 --> 00:14:15.575  
We do that a lot. This was the, uh, COLLETTA 7, 4 7.

323  
00:14:16.195 --> 00:14:19.415  
Um, we got the, uh, the harmonics from the engines,

324  
00:14:19.415 --> 00:14:20.775

and we, we could see, we can't,

325

00:14:20.775 --> 00:14:21.815  
couldn't tell which one it was,

326

00:14:21.815 --> 00:14:23.455  
but it would turned out to be number three engine.

327

00:14:24.115 --> 00:14:27.645  
It, uh, it dropped, uh, for a little bit,

328

00:14:27.645 --> 00:14:29.005  
but then you could see it started to,

329

00:14:29.005 --> 00:14:30.285  
it actually started to recover.

330

00:14:30.705 --> 00:14:31.925  
So he shouldn't have aborted.

331

00:14:31.925 --> 00:14:36.605  
Anyway, Vehicle performance.

332

00:14:37.465 --> 00:14:38.565  
Um, this is another thing.

333

00:14:38.565 --> 00:14:41.485  
This is a big, big, big issue, okay?

334

00:14:43.065 --> 00:14:44.445  
The, uh, getting the arrow work.

335

00:14:44.785 --> 00:14:46.765  
We wanna have, you know, we wanna know, is it,

336

00:14:46.765 --> 00:14:50.125  
is this aircraft, this is one of the big issues with, um,

337

00:14:50.705 --> 00:14:52.005  
of course was with Gulfstream

338  
00:14:52.025 --> 00:14:54.165  
and, uh, the Gulfstream accident in Roswell.

339  
00:14:55.845 --> 00:14:59.505  
Um, we, we need to be involved with it.

340  
00:14:59.665 --> 00:15:00.985  
'cause we need to know what was done

341  
00:15:00.985 --> 00:15:02.265  
prior to what was known.

342  
00:15:02.325 --> 00:15:05.945  
How was the vehicle performing, uh, versus what it was, uh,

343  
00:15:06.015 --> 00:15:07.225  
what it was designed to do.

344  
00:15:08.735 --> 00:15:10.985  
Okay? It's hard for you guys to do that.

345  
00:15:11.525 --> 00:15:12.545  
We will work with you

346  
00:15:12.545 --> 00:15:15.435  
and work at your company for most of this work,

347  
00:15:15.935 --> 00:15:17.275  
but we do have to have access.

348  
00:15:17.375 --> 00:15:20.315  
Our performance engineers, uh, have to have access

349  
00:15:20.335 --> 00:15:21.915  
to this data to work together.

350  
00:15:22.175 --> 00:15:23.515  
We can't say, well, trust us.

351  
00:15:25.445 --> 00:15:27.305

One of the things here that I, I improve, uh,

352

00:15:27.305 --> 00:15:28.945  
put this in this, uh, lift curve.

353

00:15:29.325 --> 00:15:31.505  
You can see that we have, we have a OA on the bottom,

354

00:15:32.165 --> 00:15:36.785  
but then our lift curve, uh, our cl on the side, we have,

355

00:15:36.805 --> 00:15:38.145  
we don't have any magnitude.

356

00:15:38.375 --> 00:15:41.625  
Okay? Now we have it, but we don't release it.

357

00:15:42.095 --> 00:15:43.225  
This is one of those things with,

358

00:15:43.225 --> 00:15:44.665  
we talk about proprietary data.

359

00:15:45.055 --> 00:15:46.985  
What we wanna show is certain data.

360

00:15:47.135 --> 00:15:48.545  
What, what do we wanna show on that?

361

00:15:48.545 --> 00:15:50.345  
That's all that we're gonna talk about.

362

00:15:50.485 --> 00:15:52.545  
99% of the time, we, we go through

363

00:15:52.545 --> 00:15:55.385  
and we decide what we work with the, with the company,

364

00:15:55.385 --> 00:15:57.385  
with the group members, and we all come

365  
00:15:57.385 --> 00:15:59.705  
to a very easy consensus of what needs to be released.

366  
00:16:00.125 --> 00:16:01.305  
The other stuff is protected.

367  
00:16:01.525 --> 00:16:03.145  
If we get FOIAed for that data, guess what?

368  
00:16:03.145 --> 00:16:07.365  
We're not giving it up. We have protections for that, okay?

369  
00:16:07.665 --> 00:16:09.125  
But it's hard for you guys to understand

370  
00:16:09.125 --> 00:16:10.325  
that in the first couple of days.

371  
00:16:14.925 --> 00:16:18.065  
So the, I said there was two po two important meetings.

372  
00:16:18.065 --> 00:16:20.185  
So the, the second most important meeting

373  
00:16:20.675 --> 00:16:23.105  
after the org meeting is the progress meeting.

374  
00:16:23.605 --> 00:16:26.745  
So after the org meeting, the next day

375  
00:16:26.765 --> 00:16:29.505  
or that afternoon, the all groups go out.

376  
00:16:29.565 --> 00:16:32.185  
10, 12 groups are gonna be, uh, dispersed.

377  
00:16:32.495 --> 00:16:34.145  
Some might be in Washington dc.

378  
00:16:34.615 --> 00:16:37.665

Some might be, uh, back, uh, maintenance,

379

00:16:37.715 --> 00:16:40.145

maybe records back at your, uh, if you're, let's say,

380

00:16:40.145 --> 00:16:41.745

doing testing in Roswell.

381

00:16:41.765 --> 00:16:44.105

But if, if it's a Boeing aircraft, they,

382

00:16:44.105 --> 00:16:45.745

they're gonna be going back up to Seattle.

383

00:16:45.775 --> 00:16:49.785

They're gonna be, or, uh, anywhere or back here to Savannah.

384

00:16:50.645 --> 00:16:55.115

Um, all of them are doing their work. How do we know?

385

00:16:55.625 --> 00:16:57.555

What, if you're a a, an ops guy,

386

00:16:57.655 --> 00:16:59.275

how do you know what's being found out on scene?

387

00:16:59.945 --> 00:17:02.805

And this is it right here. The Prague meeting every day.

388

00:17:02.915 --> 00:17:04.205

It's an important one.

389

00:17:04.845 --> 00:17:06.605

NTSB investigators, certain ones,

390

00:17:06.605 --> 00:17:08.925

especially the 10 kickers, the structures guys.

391

00:17:08.945 --> 00:17:11.125

And they're like, I don't want to go.

392

00:17:11.445 --> 00:17:13.805

I got too much work out here to do. Okay?

393

00:17:14.115 --> 00:17:16.645

Everybody that's taking part knows they don't wanna stop.

394

00:17:17.265 --> 00:17:19.405

But you know what, if we don't stop, then

395

00:17:19.405 --> 00:17:20.805

what happens is we have these indivi,

396

00:17:20.805 --> 00:17:22.645

you don't know what's happening out there.

397

00:17:22.985 --> 00:17:25.445

And it, and you have to have that cross pollination of data.

398

00:17:26.445 --> 00:17:27.465

So this is where it happens.

399

00:17:28.005 --> 00:17:30.265

The first Prague meeting on that first day,

400

00:17:30.525 --> 00:17:32.945

as you can imagine, because that's your biggest day of,

401

00:17:32.965 --> 00:17:35.305

of doing initial fines, can last two, three hours.

402

00:17:36.135 --> 00:17:38.625

Okay? But in order for that to only last two

403

00:17:38.645 --> 00:17:41.585

or three hours, we have to have only a few people talk.

404

00:17:43.705 --> 00:17:45.285

You will not talk in that meeting.

405

00:17:45.385 --> 00:17:46.925

You will get together, your group members,

406

00:17:47.345 --> 00:17:49.370

or you will get with your group if you're a group group, uh,

407

00:17:49.385 --> 00:17:53.045

uh, and, uh, and you will decide, we will talk with the, uh,

408

00:17:53.135 --> 00:17:56.085

group chairman, NTSB group chairman who's leading

409

00:17:56.085 --> 00:17:57.605

that group, and decide what, you know,

410

00:17:57.605 --> 00:17:58.885

the findings were from that day.

411

00:17:59.865 --> 00:18:01.885

And then the NTSB group chairman will talk,

412

00:18:02.345 --> 00:18:04.045

the coordinator will be able to ask questions.

413

00:18:04.625 --> 00:18:06.885

The party coordinator, the board member

414

00:18:07.125 --> 00:18:08.445

will, for clarification.

415

00:18:09.795 --> 00:18:12.455

But other than that, no. Nobody else is talking.

416

00:18:12.475 --> 00:18:15.415

And the main reason for that is just for time. Okay?

417

00:18:15.915 --> 00:18:17.055

And the more people that talk,

418

00:18:17.055 --> 00:18:19.735

the more likely it gets into analytical discussion.

419

00:18:20.275 --> 00:18:21.535

And that's not what we're here for.

420

00:18:21.625 --> 00:18:25.135

We're here to, to discuss the facts, findings from that day.

421

00:18:25.795 --> 00:18:27.535

And I'll also say, what's gonna happen tomorrow?

422

00:18:28.115 --> 00:18:29.335

And everything to that effect.

423

00:18:30.475 --> 00:18:34.985

Um, the board member's in there, not an investigator,

424

00:18:35.645 --> 00:18:37.305

but why would the board member be in there?

425

00:18:44.705 --> 00:18:46.115

They're gonna, they're gonna,

426

00:18:46.115 --> 00:18:47.675

they're not representing the public there,

427

00:18:47.675 --> 00:18:48.835

but what they're doing is getting ready for

428

00:18:48.835 --> 00:18:49.995

the, for the press conference.

429

00:18:51.025 --> 00:18:53.875

Okay? So the press conference, we put together the facts,

430

00:18:54.615 --> 00:18:57.675

and then the, the board member will sit down with the IIC

431

00:18:57.675 --> 00:18:59.915

or the Deputy IIC and, um,

432

00:19:00.095 --> 00:19:02.075

and put together what will be released at

433

00:19:02.075 --> 00:19:03.875  
that night's press conference.

434

00:19:04.645 --> 00:19:06.635  
We'll talk a little bit more about press conferences

435

00:19:06.835 --> 00:19:08.875  
'cause they're a pain in the butt, but, um,

436

00:19:09.265 --> 00:19:10.995  
they're a necessary evil to the job

437

00:19:15.055 --> 00:19:16.555  
Family and press briefings.

438

00:19:17.285 --> 00:19:19.155  
Again, flight test, you guys aren't

439

00:19:19.155 --> 00:19:21.675  
what we would call a legislative accident, okay?

440

00:19:21.675 --> 00:19:24.875  
You're not a 1 21 carrier, so you don't have

441

00:19:24.875 --> 00:19:29.675  
to have a company, a uh, a uh, a passenger response, uh,

442

00:19:30.295 --> 00:19:34.395  
you know, and a family response, um, uh, set up.

443

00:19:35.095 --> 00:19:36.395  
But one 20 one's due,

444

00:19:37.305 --> 00:19:40.835  
however, you should, especially in, in your situation.

445

00:19:41.095 --> 00:19:43.435  
And these, this is where we're talking with other companies

446

00:19:43.435 --> 00:19:44.995

that have gone through it to know what happened.

447

00:19:45.025 --> 00:19:48.635

It's like Spaceship two, all those that the, um, you know,

448

00:19:48.635 --> 00:19:49.955

having to, you have,

449

00:19:50.305 --> 00:19:52.515

when you know when a launch is gonna happen, guess what?

450

00:19:52.515 --> 00:19:55.625

There's family members out there, they can see it happen.

451

00:19:56.965 --> 00:19:59.025

That's a, it's not a, it's not a fun time,

452

00:19:59.445 --> 00:20:00.945

but you gotta deal with it.

453

00:20:01.765 --> 00:20:05.225

We will, even though it's not legislative, we will attempt,

454

00:20:05.455 --> 00:20:08.545

depending on how it sets up though, to inform the,

455

00:20:08.605 --> 00:20:12.745

the families prior to going to the press conference.

456

00:20:13.415 --> 00:20:14.915

We don't give 'em extra information.

457

00:20:15.425 --> 00:20:18.035

They don't got get to sit there and they can ask questions,

458

00:20:18.095 --> 00:20:20.955

but they're, it's just gonna be like, if a, a reporter does,

459

00:20:21.125 --> 00:20:22.795

we're not gonna give 'em an analysis,

460

00:20:23.415 --> 00:20:24.635  
but we will provide 'em that.

461

00:20:24.635 --> 00:20:26.795  
We, we believe that's the courtesy that we provide them.

462

00:20:26.795 --> 00:20:29.035  
They are the ones that have, that their family members have,

463

00:20:29.055 --> 00:20:30.355  
are either seriously injured

464

00:20:30.355 --> 00:20:32.995  
or paid the ultimate price, especially in your business.

465

00:20:33.835 --> 00:20:36.405  
They deserve that information before Joe Public gets it.

466

00:20:36.825 --> 00:20:39.805  
And that's what we do on big accidents.

467

00:20:40.025 --> 00:20:41.805  
We take extraordinary measures for this.

468

00:20:41.835 --> 00:20:45.525  
Like for, uh, 5 87, um, we were in Rockaway.

469

00:20:45.665 --> 00:20:48.525  
We flew, we, we took a helicopter over to the Javi Center.

470

00:20:49.705 --> 00:20:52.645  
Um, there was 1000 family members in the Javit Center

471

00:20:54.985 --> 00:20:58.355  
from the Dominican Republic, not speaking English, English.

472

00:20:58.355 --> 00:21:03.315  
It was very difficult. Um, we may have, uh,

473

00:21:03.315 --> 00:21:05.355  
usually probably for, for any accidents

474

00:21:05.355 --> 00:21:07.875  
that you guys would be involved, probably just one, uh,

475

00:21:07.875 --> 00:21:08.995  
press conference a day.

476

00:21:09.615 --> 00:21:11.915  
Um, unless it's a significant issue,

477

00:21:11.945 --> 00:21:13.275  
like it went into a school

478

00:21:13.295 --> 00:21:16.515  
or something to that effect, um, then, then that would be a,

479

00:21:16.555 --> 00:21:18.115  
a multiple press conferences a day.

480

00:21:20.855 --> 00:21:23.795  
So we always say, parties, you can't talk to the press.

481

00:21:24.455 --> 00:21:26.675  
Is that true? Can you not have a press conference?

482

00:21:26.695 --> 00:21:29.035  
Can your CEO not come out and have a press conference?

483

00:21:32.005 --> 00:21:35.585  
We just can't release information. Right? Okay.

484

00:21:36.125 --> 00:21:38.865  
As I always say, if the NTSB learned something from your

485

00:21:38.865 --> 00:21:40.745  
press conference, it's not a good thing.

486

00:21:42.165 --> 00:21:43.745

Um, and it's happened.

487

00:21:44.565 --> 00:21:47.225

Or if you're releasing information

488

00:21:47.485 --> 00:21:50.345

or if you're, uh, you know, uh, from the data

489

00:21:50.445 --> 00:21:54.865

or if you're trying to defend your, your organization, okay?

490

00:21:55.455 --> 00:21:59.865

That is not something that that will, um, result in removal.

491

00:22:00.395 --> 00:22:02.785

We've had, we've in, in the last couple of years.

492

00:22:02.785 --> 00:22:05.745

Fortunately, we used to not, it used to be sort of this,

493

00:22:05.975 --> 00:22:07.985

this big heavy stick that we would never wield

494

00:22:08.485 --> 00:22:09.545

in the last couple of years.

495

00:22:09.815 --> 00:22:12.065

It's, uh, gone, um, the opposite way.

496

00:22:13.465 --> 00:22:17.925

Um, I did, uh, uh, American Airlines, uh, had a overrun in,

497

00:22:18.065 --> 00:22:22.465

um, no, not Jamaica, in,

498

00:22:22.465 --> 00:22:23.865

um, Wyoming.

499

00:22:25.005 --> 00:22:28.345

Um, and, uh, they Jackson Hole,

500  
00:22:29.205 --> 00:22:33.025  
and long story short, it was a middle

501  
00:22:33.025 --> 00:22:35.385  
of a blizzard they could get, there was no,

502  
00:22:35.405 --> 00:22:37.065  
no FA guy could get out there to help out.

503  
00:22:37.495 --> 00:22:39.425  
They said, Hey, we got a airplane going in there,

504  
00:22:39.425 --> 00:22:43.025  
they're gonna, and they're gonna bring it to DC for us.

505  
00:22:43.105 --> 00:22:46.505  
I said, we said, great. Don't download it. Yep. Okay.

506  
00:22:47.195 --> 00:22:49.385  
Guess what? They stopped in Oklahoma City to

507  
00:22:50.855 --> 00:22:51.865  
drop off some guys,

508  
00:22:52.045 --> 00:22:53.625  
and they downloaded the FDR

509  
00:22:56.305 --> 00:22:57.345  
internal mix up was,

510  
00:22:57.565 --> 00:23:00.305  
was reported when they downloaded the FDR,

511  
00:23:00.305 --> 00:23:01.585  
they de deleted the last

512  
00:23:02.045 --> 00:23:04.905  
or the, uh, first four minutes of the, of the data.

513  
00:23:05.735 --> 00:23:08.185

Okay? Fortunately, it was 40 hours prior to the accident

514

00:23:08.285 --> 00:23:09.425  
or the event incident.

515

00:23:09.965 --> 00:23:11.745  
But, um, it shows what happens.

516

00:23:11.825 --> 00:23:14.025  
I mean, this is a flag carrier. As a result of

517

00:23:14.025 --> 00:23:15.065  
that, we kicked them off.

518

00:23:15.065 --> 00:23:16.585  
It was a very difficult investigation

519

00:23:17.125 --> 00:23:18.665  
as an IICI had to sit there.

520

00:23:18.945 --> 00:23:21.345  
Normally a group has that con connection with the company

521

00:23:21.605 --> 00:23:23.745  
and all the other groups, and they'd get the information.

522

00:23:23.745 --> 00:23:26.145  
But now, because they weren't a party, every group member

523

00:23:26.825 --> 00:23:28.865  
chairman, when they wanted something from American Airlines,

524

00:23:29.065 --> 00:23:30.545  
I had to, they had to send it to me,

525

00:23:30.545 --> 00:23:31.905  
and then I had to send it to American Airlines,

526

00:23:31.905 --> 00:23:33.025  
and they had to send it to me and then back.

527

00:23:33.045 --> 00:23:35.585

And it was a pain in the butt, but it was necessary.

528

00:23:35.965 --> 00:23:38.065

And that was sort of a shot heard around the world

529

00:23:38.065 --> 00:23:41.105

that we got a lot of, uh, um, input from

530

00:23:41.105 --> 00:23:42.105

that from other companies.

531

00:23:42.485 --> 00:23:44.225

Uh, then we just kicked off UPS

532

00:23:44.285 --> 00:23:45.885

and, um, IPA, the, uh,

533

00:23:45.885 --> 00:23:48.085

independent Pilots Association one week prior

534

00:23:48.085 --> 00:23:50.645

to the board meeting, uh, for Birmingham,

535

00:23:50.745 --> 00:23:52.245

the Birmingham accident that they had.

536

00:23:53.245 --> 00:23:56.705

And that's because they got into a, uh, uh, discussion, uh,

537

00:23:56.845 --> 00:23:57.905

in the online.

538

00:23:58.405 --> 00:24:01.945

Uh, IPA put out what their, um, their analysis was

539

00:24:02.865 --> 00:24:04.645

of the accident one week prior to,

540

00:24:04.805 --> 00:24:06.405

I think they got bad advice from one

541

00:24:06.405 --> 00:24:08.845  
of their consultants saying It's one week

542

00:24:08.845 --> 00:24:10.005  
prior to the board meeting.

543

00:24:10.005 --> 00:24:12.485  
What are they gonna do? Well, we'll kick you off.

544

00:24:13.625 --> 00:24:16.205  
And, uh, it, it's a black eye for both companies to do it.

545

00:24:16.205 --> 00:24:17.245  
If you talk to UPS

546

00:24:17.245 --> 00:24:19.605  
or IPA, they're very, they, it won't happen again.

547

00:24:20.945 --> 00:24:24.765  
So have, if you wanna have a press conference, have,

548

00:24:25.115 --> 00:24:26.685  
make sure that, again, what is it?

549

00:24:27.005 --> 00:24:29.205  
Communication. Let the IC know, the ICO,

550

00:24:29.205 --> 00:24:31.605  
say Boeing sends out moms multi operator

551

00:24:31.605 --> 00:24:32.685  
messages all the time.

552

00:24:32.985 --> 00:24:34.365  
If you wanna send something, uh, you know,

553

00:24:34.575 --> 00:24:37.005  
after an event, mostly it says we're working

554

00:24:37.005 --> 00:24:38.645  
with the NTSB on the initial ones,

555

00:24:38.785 --> 00:24:40.685  
but then it'll repeat the information

556

00:24:40.685 --> 00:24:42.165  
that we have put out in the press.

557

00:24:42.165 --> 00:24:43.765  
Either press conference, press release.

558

00:24:44.385 --> 00:24:45.445  
You can do the same thing.

559

00:24:45.505 --> 00:24:49.085  
If you have operators asking questions, just run it

560

00:24:49.085 --> 00:24:51.685  
by us social media.

561

00:24:53.115 --> 00:24:54.125  
This is one that's in a,

562

00:24:54.125 --> 00:24:55.285  
in the commercial side of things more.

563

00:24:55.345 --> 00:24:56.605  
But it will, it could happen with you.

564

00:24:57.065 --> 00:25:00.975  
We do tweet, we do send photos out.

565

00:25:01.675 --> 00:25:04.375  
Um, we can talk about it if you want.

566

00:25:04.655 --> 00:25:05.975  
I have my own feelings about it.

567

00:25:06.515 --> 00:25:10.735

Um, but, uh, it's something that, that's out there

568

00:25:10.735 --> 00:25:12.055

because we live in the 21st century.

569

00:25:12.875 --> 00:25:15.695

One thing you can see in this photo, you have, uh, our,

570

00:25:15.875 --> 00:25:19.055

our old chairman, uh, uh, Debbie Hersman,

571

00:25:19.395 --> 00:25:21.295

and then this is the IIC Tim LeBaron.

572

00:25:21.325 --> 00:25:24.415

He's the, they were, we had, uh, he was assisting bill.

573

00:25:24.445 --> 00:25:27.535

They sort of, it was a dual IIC role that they set up.

574

00:25:27.535 --> 00:25:30.655

It worked out perfect. But, uh, they swapped every day.

575

00:25:30.955 --> 00:25:32.495

But you can see how far away Tim is.

576

00:25:32.755 --> 00:25:34.815

Um, Tim's there, it depends on the board member,

577

00:25:34.815 --> 00:25:37.775

but is there to answer technical questions if they come up.

578

00:25:37.875 --> 00:25:39.895

But the board member is, is the front and center.

579

00:25:42.455 --> 00:25:45.155

How do we finish up on scene?

580

00:25:45.155 --> 00:25:47.755

We finish up with something called field notes. Okay?

581

00:25:47.775 --> 00:25:50.075

We call 'em notes because that, that they're not, uh,

582

00:25:50.075 --> 00:25:52.155

then they're, we can't, we, we don't have to, uh,

583

00:25:52.155 --> 00:25:53.235

release them in foia.

584

00:25:54.255 --> 00:25:56.315

Do you think that that prevents them from being

585

00:25:56.675 --> 00:25:58.275

discovered in discovery?

586

00:25:59.475 --> 00:26:04.055

The answer is no. Okay. There can be errors in it.

587

00:26:04.805 --> 00:26:06.375

It's not a, it's not saying that

588

00:26:06.375 --> 00:26:08.095

because this is, these, these are never released

589

00:26:08.415 --> 00:26:09.495

publicly by the NTSB.

590

00:26:10.515 --> 00:26:11.855

Um, we are gonna request

591

00:26:11.855 --> 00:26:14.055

that your group members will sign it,

592

00:26:14.925 --> 00:26:16.935

because we wanna say that you guys,

593

00:26:16.935 --> 00:26:20.375

that they took part in it, if they have a question about,

594

00:26:20.395 --> 00:26:22.775

or a problem with something in it, then you just got to, uh,

595

00:26:22.775 --> 00:26:24.935

they gotta annotate it, saying, I don't agree with this,

596

00:26:24.935 --> 00:26:26.015

this, and this, and that's it.

597

00:26:26.685 --> 00:26:29.205

I've never seen that pictures.

598

00:26:29.205 --> 00:26:30.485

We got tons of pictures nowadays.

599

00:26:30.905 --> 00:26:35.205

Um, those are all, uh, uh, collated

600

00:26:35.225 --> 00:26:36.325

and, and brought together.

601

00:26:36.325 --> 00:26:39.805

And every, every party will get every, uh, picture out there

602

00:26:40.115 --> 00:26:41.765

that, that's taken in the investigation.

603

00:26:41.775 --> 00:26:44.205

Every party will get every field note

604

00:26:44.675 --> 00:26:47.165

because, uh, even if they didn't have anybody on that group,

605

00:26:48.935 --> 00:26:51.275

you can't be released until the IIC says so.

606

00:26:52.095 --> 00:26:54.955

And then once you are released, then um,

607

00:26:55.175 --> 00:26:56.675

you're not done with the investigation.

608

00:26:56.675 --> 00:26:57.675

You're there for the long haul.

609

00:26:58.015 --> 00:27:00.955

You're there to help out with the post on scene.

610

00:27:05.415 --> 00:27:08.315

The poston scene stuff is, is what you would expect.

611

00:27:08.345 --> 00:27:13.235

Testing, uh, simulations, uh, examinations, right?

612

00:27:13.465 --> 00:27:16.235

It's just your general work that we have to do in order to,

613

00:27:16.235 --> 00:27:18.035

everybody always says, well, you're done from the on scene.

614

00:27:18.035 --> 00:27:19.275

Why aren't you done with the investigation?

615

00:27:19.345 --> 00:27:22.715

Well, 'cause you got a lot of other stuff to do.

616

00:27:23.455 --> 00:27:25.395

Um, we do more interviews.

617

00:27:25.705 --> 00:27:29.035

This is where we also get into another issue with who,

618

00:27:29.095 --> 00:27:30.435

who would we interview from your company?

619

00:27:30.435 --> 00:27:31.475

Would it just be pilots?

620

00:27:36.215 --> 00:27:37.555

The answer is no. Right?

621

00:27:37.765 --> 00:27:41.155

It'll be if interview engineers, which is kind

622

00:27:41.155 --> 00:27:42.475  
of scary since I'm an engineer,

623

00:27:42.475 --> 00:27:44.395  
and everybody in a, in any company

624

00:27:44.495 --> 00:27:45.515  
is also scared about that.

625

00:27:45.755 --> 00:27:47.115  
'cause engineers are honest, right?

626

00:27:48.455 --> 00:27:51.565  
Um, so not like anybody else

627

00:27:51.695 --> 00:27:52.805  
isn't, but you know what I mean.

628

00:27:52.915 --> 00:27:55.965  
It's, it's, it does make people nervous, right?

629

00:27:56.125 --> 00:27:57.925  
I mean, the company nervous. But we will do that

630

00:27:57.925 --> 00:27:59.685  
because we have to understand what was the,

631

00:27:59.685 --> 00:28:01.925  
what was happening, especially in a flight test situation.

632

00:28:02.275 --> 00:28:05.245  
What was known prior to why, what were you looking at?

633

00:28:05.625 --> 00:28:09.355  
Was this an issue? A potential issue? Okay.

634

00:28:14.655 --> 00:28:19.355  
Ashburn Accord. Um, this is one that is, uh,

635

00:28:19.435 --> 00:28:21.195

I can send out to you guys if you want it.

636

00:28:21.195 --> 00:28:22.355

And it's probably something

637

00:28:22.355 --> 00:28:24.635

that you should know from a manufacturer's standpoint.

638

00:28:25.215 --> 00:28:27.915

Mainly we were doing this, it's both from a manufacturer

639

00:28:27.975 --> 00:28:30.435

and an operator, but you guys are, are technically both.

640

00:28:30.435 --> 00:28:34.355

If you have an accident. Again, it in

641

00:28:36.095 --> 00:28:38.795

the basics are is that the FAA can do their investigation.

642

00:28:38.935 --> 00:28:40.875

But then we can go back to that question back here

643

00:28:40.875 --> 00:28:41.915

with regard to DOD.

644

00:28:41.935 --> 00:28:43.395

The DOD can also do that.

645

00:28:43.415 --> 00:28:45.155

We, they're not in this 'cause it's, we don't deal

646

00:28:45.155 --> 00:28:46.155

with them on a daily basis.

647

00:28:47.295 --> 00:28:49.875

But the biggest question thing here is that sometimes

648

00:28:50.895 --> 00:28:54.235

the main issue that, that we wanted to, this accord

649

00:28:54.235 --> 00:28:56.955

to come out to was the Fis o guys across the country.

650

00:28:57.945 --> 00:29:01.755

Unfortunately, that hasn't happened as broadly as we wanted.

651

00:29:02.455 --> 00:29:04.235

So you as a manufacturer, and

652

00:29:04.295 --> 00:29:08.435

or as I tell, the operators should make sure that your CMO,

653

00:29:08.945 --> 00:29:13.115

your fdo, your mi o knows about this

654

00:29:13.815 --> 00:29:15.675

and how to operate with us.

655

00:29:16.375 --> 00:29:18.555

So it's say, basically, this is what it says.

656

00:29:18.895 --> 00:29:22.155

If there's data, we're gonna like, like everything,

657

00:29:22.155 --> 00:29:23.675

but we're gonna provide it to the FAA

658

00:29:23.675 --> 00:29:24.675

and us at the same time.

659

00:29:25.375 --> 00:29:27.435

But if there's an interview that needs to be done,

660

00:29:27.695 --> 00:29:28.955

we have priority over that.

661

00:29:29.705 --> 00:29:30.715

Depending on the event,

662

00:29:30.715 --> 00:29:32.555

we might modify our schedule in order to get

663

00:29:32.555 --> 00:29:34.595

that interview done before the, uh,

664

00:29:35.175 --> 00:29:37.075

before we would normally do it just so

665

00:29:37.075 --> 00:29:39.475

that they could interview, okay?

666

00:29:41.385 --> 00:29:45.045

We have what we call an IICC, an inter, uh, interagency con,

667

00:29:45.125 --> 00:29:46.845

a conference call that we can set up to make sure

668

00:29:46.845 --> 00:29:48.685

that the local office understands that

669

00:29:49.225 --> 00:29:50.525

the SECO understands it.

670

00:29:50.645 --> 00:29:52.405

I don't know if we've had one with, uh,

671

00:29:52.515 --> 00:29:54.525

with Kansas City or Wichita.

672

00:29:55.185 --> 00:29:57.365

Um, it might be good if an event happens to have one

673

00:29:57.365 --> 00:29:59.525

of those to make sure that everybody in those offices

674

00:29:59.715 --> 00:30:02.645

understands that, uh, the, the way that it works,

675

00:30:02.985 --> 00:30:05.605

and one of the main, main reasons we have this too, is so

676

00:30:05.605 --> 00:30:07.525

that you guys aren't overloaded with requests.

677

00:30:07.525 --> 00:30:08.925

If you're getting the same requests from us

678

00:30:08.925 --> 00:30:12.605

and from FAA, we've gotten a lot of people that says,

679

00:30:12.605 --> 00:30:14.525

you know, you know, uncle, wait a minute,

680

00:30:14.525 --> 00:30:15.645

who do I answer to first?

681

00:30:16.745 --> 00:30:18.565

Who do you think they're gonna wanna answer to first,

682

00:30:18.585 --> 00:30:19.965

the oversight authority or somebody

683

00:30:19.965 --> 00:30:21.005

that has no authority over them.

684

00:30:22.385 --> 00:30:26.945

That's the issues. And I can, I can get you guys a copy

685

00:30:27.085 --> 00:30:28.345

of this if you, if you want.

686

00:30:28.815 --> 00:30:33.065

It's just a two page. So it's been a,

687

00:30:34.155 --> 00:30:35.935

as you can see, a group activity,

688

00:30:36.195 --> 00:30:37.735

we can't do this without you,

689

00:30:39.545 --> 00:30:41.325  
but at some point in time, we, we,

690

00:30:41.325 --> 00:30:42.685  
we separate ourselves from you

691

00:30:42.685 --> 00:30:45.485  
because we have to have an independent investigation.

692

00:30:46.025 --> 00:30:48.165  
And this is the first place that, that, that we do it.

693

00:30:48.235 --> 00:30:50.645  
This is called, once you get done with the on scene,

694

00:30:50.645 --> 00:30:51.845  
you get done with the post on scene.

695

00:30:52.035 --> 00:30:56.405  
What we, what the group chairman will do is, um,

696

00:30:56.945 --> 00:30:59.525  
is write a group chairman's factual report.

697

00:30:59.705 --> 00:31:01.125  
See, it says Survival Factors

698

00:31:01.215 --> 00:31:02.685  
Group Chairman's factual Report.

699

00:31:02.985 --> 00:31:07.085  
It does not say the Survival Factors Group Factual Report.

700

00:31:07.895 --> 00:31:09.185  
There's a distinction for that.

701

00:31:09.405 --> 00:31:11.265  
You will get to, you group members will get

702

00:31:11.265 --> 00:31:12.785

to review this, this document.

703

00:31:13.285 --> 00:31:15.625

You will provide input, you will make corrections,

704

00:31:16.125 --> 00:31:17.465

you will on, on everything.

705

00:31:17.605 --> 00:31:20.025

But if we don't agree with that correction,

706

00:31:20.045 --> 00:31:21.145

we don't have to put it in there.

707

00:31:21.705 --> 00:31:24.905

'cause it's the group chairman's factual report. Okay?

708

00:31:25.455 --> 00:31:28.505

This can be, you know, generally we have no problem with it,

709

00:31:28.505 --> 00:31:29.705

but there are issues that come up,

710

00:31:29.705 --> 00:31:32.025

which has a significant difference between what's there

711

00:31:32.525 --> 00:31:33.945

and what the company wants.

712

00:31:35.795 --> 00:31:38.565

Okay? But this is where we don't have to put that in there.

713

00:31:38.625 --> 00:31:41.205

We don't have to annotate that you guys think differently

714

00:31:42.215 --> 00:31:43.705

that you can put into your

715

00:31:43.705 --> 00:31:45.065

submission, which we'll talk about later.

716

00:31:47.885 --> 00:31:50.735

There's all, there's factual. These are factual reports.

717

00:31:50.765 --> 00:31:53.455

What do you do have to do is to look, to make sure

718

00:31:53.455 --> 00:31:55.775

that everything date all the data in there is factual.

719

00:31:55.885 --> 00:31:58.215

It's not analytical. Sometimes it's very hard

720

00:31:58.215 --> 00:31:59.575

to write a good factual report.

721

00:32:00.475 --> 00:32:02.775

Um, you got one people to have that conclusion

722

00:32:02.775 --> 00:32:03.895

where you're trying to lead 'em,

723

00:32:03.995 --> 00:32:05.175

but without telling 'em how

724

00:32:05.175 --> 00:32:06.575

to do it in an analytical manner.

725

00:32:08.765 --> 00:32:12.255

Then we take all those and we put it into a public docket.

726

00:32:12.685 --> 00:32:15.975

This is, this is the, the infamous public docket that a lot

727

00:32:15.975 --> 00:32:18.295

of manufacturers and operators and all don't like,

728

00:32:18.295 --> 00:32:21.575

because it's, it basically bears everything that,

729

00:32:21.575 --> 00:32:23.535

that we've found in the, in the investigation.

730

00:32:24.745 --> 00:32:26.535

We're about the only country in the world that does this.

731

00:32:29.405 --> 00:32:31.585

And we can talk about that when we get to Annex 13,

732

00:32:31.715 --> 00:32:32.785

about the review process

733

00:32:32.885 --> 00:32:33.945

and why there's a difference

734

00:32:33.945 --> 00:32:37.025

between talking about our review process and,

735

00:32:37.245 --> 00:32:39.065

and the Annex 13 review process.

736

00:32:40.825 --> 00:32:42.965

So this is all available online nowadays.

737

00:32:43.025 --> 00:32:44.045

It used to have to come in

738

00:32:44.045 --> 00:32:46.085

and look on microfiche and everything like that.

739

00:32:46.185 --> 00:32:47.245

Now, you don't have to do that.

740

00:32:47.585 --> 00:32:49.765

Um, you can just go to our website.

741

00:32:50.065 --> 00:32:51.165

If you look on the website,

742

00:32:51.215 --> 00:32:53.125

which isn't the greatest website, uh,

743  
00:32:53.305 --> 00:32:55.765  
but in the right, in the middle, you'll see there's, uh,

744  
00:32:55.765 --> 00:32:57.725  
public dockets, and you click on that.

745  
00:32:58.305 --> 00:33:01.005  
Or you can also get our, um, uh,

746  
00:33:01.145 --> 00:33:03.005  
our accident database at the same spot.

747  
00:33:03.005 --> 00:33:05.205  
It's right in the middle of the page. You gotta look for it.

748  
00:33:05.315 --> 00:33:06.565  
It's not at the top of the page.

749  
00:33:10.015 --> 00:33:11.795  
So we have this public docket,

750  
00:33:13.935 --> 00:33:15.555  
and this is where everybody's all worried about.

751  
00:33:15.655 --> 00:33:18.275  
And we'll talk now, talk about the commercially sensitive

752  
00:33:18.795 --> 00:33:22.715  
material or IAR even, and even, um,

753  
00:33:23.855 --> 00:33:26.195  
or, uh, proprietary data, whichever you want,

754  
00:33:26.195 --> 00:33:27.475  
however you wanna describe it.

755  
00:33:30.805 --> 00:33:33.615  
When we went to Spaceship two, uh, we got there

756  
00:33:33.675 --> 00:33:36.415

and at like seven in the morning, uh,

757

00:33:36.795 --> 00:33:39.735

and, uh, we were getting our organizational meeting going

758

00:33:39.735 --> 00:33:42.135

about 10, 10 30, I think that day.

759

00:33:42.795 --> 00:33:45.615

As we were sitting in space, in, uh, in scaled, uh,

760

00:33:45.705 --> 00:33:48.855

composites, uh, hallway, waiting to get into the, going back

761

00:33:48.855 --> 00:33:51.255

and forth into the meeting room, you know, scale,

762

00:33:51.255 --> 00:33:52.935

didn't know how to, to deal with us.

763

00:33:53.485 --> 00:33:56.215

They, you know, they were, it, it, of course, the chaos,

764

00:33:56.565 --> 00:33:59.415

they just lost, uh, a good friend of theirs.

765

00:34:00.275 --> 00:34:02.535

Um, it was, they didn't even know

766

00:34:02.535 --> 00:34:04.095

what the organizational meeting was.

767

00:34:04.755 --> 00:34:07.295

We could hear the talk in the background going, uh,

768

00:34:07.315 --> 00:34:08.975

you know, okay, if they ask you these questions, just,

769

00:34:08.975 --> 00:34:10.655

just give 'em the, the direct answers.

770

00:34:10.705 --> 00:34:12.575  
Don't, don't offer anything more.

771

00:34:13.235 --> 00:34:15.935  
Um, and, and then we'd get into this meeting,

772

00:34:15.955 --> 00:34:17.575  
and then they, we, they realized, okay,

773

00:34:17.575 --> 00:34:19.095  
it's not an investigative, it's,

774

00:34:19.095 --> 00:34:20.215  
it's the organizational meeting.

775

00:34:20.225 --> 00:34:22.015  
We're not answer asking those questions,

776

00:34:22.515 --> 00:34:24.735  
but also we'd ask for questions in that meeting.

777

00:34:24.735 --> 00:34:25.895  
And they said, well, okay, we have

778

00:34:25.895 --> 00:34:27.175  
to review it for IAR and then give it to you.

779

00:34:27.175 --> 00:34:29.935  
It's like, no, that's not the question.

780

00:34:30.915 --> 00:34:32.295  
The question is, we need this.

781

00:34:32.435 --> 00:34:33.695  
It doesn't matter if it's ITAR R

782

00:34:33.695 --> 00:34:35.575  
because we are United States citizens.

783

00:34:36.515 --> 00:34:40.905

We will, and we will protect this data after 24 hours.

784

00:34:40.935 --> 00:34:42.105

They fully understood that,

785

00:34:42.295 --> 00:34:44.385

that the Spaceship two investigations, those

786

00:34:44.385 --> 00:34:45.985

that took part in it, I think could, could agree.

787

00:34:45.985 --> 00:34:48.505

And I think if you ask, uh, scaled as well as Virgin

788

00:34:49.125 --> 00:34:52.225

as well, that it was a, from a investigative standpoint,

789

00:34:52.345 --> 00:34:54.525

a great cooperative effort, um,

790

00:34:55.385 --> 00:34:57.365

and they learned that afterwards,

791

00:34:57.375 --> 00:34:59.885

after that first day, they realized that we'd asked

792

00:34:59.885 --> 00:35:02.445

for something they'd provided to us, even if it's ITAR.

793

00:35:02.445 --> 00:35:03.445

It's not that first day.

794

00:35:03.445 --> 00:35:05.725

They wanted to wait and have their, their lawyers review it

795

00:35:05.725 --> 00:35:07.845

and see ITAR r That's, there's two issues

796

00:35:07.845 --> 00:35:09.885

that we gotta look at providing it to us

797

00:35:09.985 --> 00:35:11.245  
and then release of the data.

798

00:35:12.025 --> 00:35:13.445  
So here's two examples.

799

00:35:14.555 --> 00:35:16.265  
Again, I put this cl in here just

800

00:35:16.425 --> 00:35:18.985  
'cause from a proprietary, the, uh, the lift curve.

801

00:35:19.155 --> 00:35:21.105  
Again, there's no, we take off the

802

00:35:21.105 --> 00:35:22.145  
stuff that's not necessary.

803

00:35:23.765 --> 00:35:26.105  
The qu the, the, the magnitude of the, of the,

804

00:35:26.205 --> 00:35:29.185  
of the CL isn't necessary for what we needed in there.

805

00:35:29.725 --> 00:35:30.745  
But here are two others.

806

00:35:30.815 --> 00:35:34.985  
This one on the right is, is from the, um, 7, 8, 7 battery

807

00:35:35.665 --> 00:35:39.045  
investigation, uh, lithium ion battery, uh, smoke event.

808

00:35:40.075 --> 00:35:42.815  
And then this is from the engine, uh, report,

809

00:35:42.995 --> 00:35:44.055  
uh, factual report.

810

00:35:44.755 --> 00:35:48.215

Um, for Spaceship two, we even blocked out.

811

00:35:48.235 --> 00:35:51.335

You can see, uh, there's one photo

812

00:35:51.335 --> 00:35:52.615

that we did not, uh, release.

813

00:35:53.355 --> 00:35:55.335

Um, we have multiple things.

814

00:35:55.415 --> 00:35:58.935

A lot of this, again, is, is a magnitude issue that these,

815

00:35:59.055 --> 00:36:00.655

a lot of these, these, uh,

816

00:36:00.705 --> 00:36:03.095

these redacted areas is the magnitude

817

00:36:03.095 --> 00:36:04.095

that we didn't need there.

818

00:36:05.195 --> 00:36:07.375

Um, over here it's the same thing

819

00:36:07.375 --> 00:36:08.575

with the, with the battery.

820

00:36:08.955 --> 00:36:10.695

So you have to look at it in two sets.

821

00:36:11.355 --> 00:36:14.255

The investigation, we get all information, any and all.

822

00:36:14.845 --> 00:36:17.495

When it gets the top secret stuff, it is slightly different

823

00:36:17.685 --> 00:36:20.815

because we do have to be, we do have to set up some way

824

00:36:20.835 --> 00:36:25.375  
to verify and to get, uh, get, um, uh, the Ts uh,

825

00:36:25.895 --> 00:36:28.295  
approval to, to, to, to look at it if necessary.

826

00:36:29.675 --> 00:36:32.415  
And, and we would probably even work with our safety centers

827

00:36:32.575 --> 00:36:35.895  
around, if it's a Navy or an Air Force, work with them to,

828

00:36:35.915 --> 00:36:37.575  
to do that, uh, initially.

829

00:36:37.595 --> 00:36:40.095  
And if there's a need to do it, then we will, uh, get

830

00:36:40.095 --> 00:36:42.975  
that go through the process to, to be able to see it.

831

00:36:43.875 --> 00:36:46.055  
But then what happens is that with, with this,

832

00:36:46.085 --> 00:36:49.455  
with these two reports, we do it with all of the reports,

833

00:36:49.555 --> 00:36:53.785  
but we, the company will say what is, will give us

834

00:36:53.895 --> 00:36:57.225  
what they believe is proprietary, uh, commercially sensitive

835

00:36:57.225 --> 00:37:01.135  
or iar r um, the IAR is slightly different,

836

00:37:01.195 --> 00:37:04.135  
but, so just company proprietary, we will say, this is

837

00:37:04.135 --> 00:37:06.295

what we are going to consider

838

00:37:06.315 --> 00:37:08.255

as proprietary, and this is what we are not.

839

00:37:08.355 --> 00:37:12.735

So we will provide this to the, to the manufacturer, to the,

840

00:37:12.955 --> 00:37:15.375

and this will be working through our, our general counsel,

841

00:37:16.395 --> 00:37:18.615

and we will go back and forth and they will, if

842

00:37:18.835 --> 00:37:20.535

and generally speaking, we have no,

843

00:37:20.675 --> 00:37:22.135

we usually don't have a problem with this.

844

00:37:22.205 --> 00:37:25.785

Both of these reports, 7 87 was a little bit difficult

845

00:37:25.785 --> 00:37:27.785

because we were using, we were dealing with, uh,

846

00:37:28.265 --> 00:37:29.945

companies in Japan and France,

847

00:37:30.565 --> 00:37:33.905

and it was, so you had that international issue.

848

00:37:34.845 --> 00:37:38.665

Um, but even for, for, for the Spaceship two investigation,

849

00:37:39.135 --> 00:37:41.185

they, we added that ITAR component

850

00:37:41.725 --> 00:37:44.025

and it went, we, we met a couple times.

851

00:37:45.355 --> 00:37:48.295

It was, it was a a no brainer. It was not a problem.

852

00:37:49.395 --> 00:37:52.015

Uh, for the, if there is something that we believe is,

853

00:37:52.115 --> 00:37:54.135

is necessary to describe the accident

854

00:37:54.135 --> 00:37:55.615

and to determine probable cause,

855

00:37:56.555 --> 00:37:58.135

the company still doesn't want it released.

856

00:37:58.325 --> 00:38:00.335

There's a process. We don't just release it.

857

00:38:00.795 --> 00:38:03.015

We give, we would send you what's called a 10 day letter.

858

00:38:03.805 --> 00:38:07.055

Okay? That means that we tell you in 10 days we are gonna

859

00:38:07.055 --> 00:38:08.055

release this information.

860

00:38:08.875 --> 00:38:10.055

If you don't agree with that

861

00:38:10.075 --> 00:38:12.055

and you believe that it is proprietary,

862

00:38:12.735 --> 00:38:16.335

commercially sensitive information, you can then sue us.

863

00:38:17.875 --> 00:38:19.255

Um, and, uh,

864

00:38:19.395 --> 00:38:21.775

and then to pre to prevent release of that information,

865

00:38:21.775 --> 00:38:24.295

then we'd go through the process of of, of doing that.

866

00:38:25.355 --> 00:38:27.775

So realistically, all this data is protected

867

00:38:28.115 --> 00:38:30.535

to the point all this data is protected from foia.

868

00:38:32.005 --> 00:38:35.285

Thank you. Any questions on it?

869

00:38:37.625 --> 00:38:39.485

If you have any questions, please let me know on this.

870

00:38:39.485 --> 00:38:41.045

Even afterwards, sorry,

871

00:38:41.865 --> 00:38:44.285

I'm not clear on your earlier, there was some other things

872

00:38:44.285 --> 00:38:46.805

that are not protected from foia.

873

00:38:48.905 --> 00:38:51.955

Well, generally we have protections from FOIA only for,

874

00:38:52.575 --> 00:38:54.395

uh, commercially sensitive information.

875

00:38:55.255 --> 00:38:59.075

And of course any, any, um, uh, top any uh, uh,

876

00:38:59.075 --> 00:39:01.995

classified information or ITAR data.

877

00:39:02.505 --> 00:39:07.395

Okay. Um, but that is a very small amount of the work.

878

00:39:07.405 --> 00:39:09.635  
Everything else is foible. So

879

00:39:09.635 --> 00:39:11.355  
It's just a matter of labeling.

880

00:39:12.135 --> 00:39:13.915  
It is. Now the problem is, is that

881

00:39:13.915 --> 00:39:16.075  
what all the companies have gotten into is every

882

00:39:16.635 --> 00:39:18.115  
freaking piece of, of,

883

00:39:18.615 --> 00:39:21.995  
of paper we get including a memo saying where to come

884

00:39:22.015 --> 00:39:24.715  
for the meeting is con is marked classify

885

00:39:24.775 --> 00:39:26.875  
or is marked commercially sensitive information.

886

00:39:27.895 --> 00:39:29.395  
You know, so it's a pain in the butt.

887

00:39:29.495 --> 00:39:32.075  
So I'd hopefully, you know, but we go back

888

00:39:32.075 --> 00:39:33.755  
and we go back and forth.

889

00:39:35.215 --> 00:39:36.355  
It just causes more problem.

890

00:39:36.495 --> 00:39:38.555  
You, any other questions on that? Yeah.

891

00:39:38.835 --> 00:39:40.715

Question for you there. You said you had

892

00:39:41.135 --> 00:39:42.355  
the ICAR requirement.

893

00:39:42.455 --> 00:39:43.035  
Now say

894

00:39:48.855 --> 00:39:51.335  
disagree, are they?

895

00:39:52.555 --> 00:39:54.295  
No. Okay, so IAR R is different than Com.

896

00:39:54.535 --> 00:39:55.655  
Commercially sensitive information.

897

00:39:56.135 --> 00:39:59.335  
ITAR we actually work with, um, the DOT and the

898

00:39:59.435 --> 00:40:00.855  
and, uh, and DOD.

899

00:40:01.195 --> 00:40:03.415  
And we set it up and they, we, we work with them

900

00:40:03.515 --> 00:40:05.255  
and they approve the release.

901

00:40:06.045 --> 00:40:07.935  
Okay? The good thing is, is one month

902

00:40:07.935 --> 00:40:11.215  
after spaceship two, they modified the IAR R regs

903

00:40:11.355 --> 00:40:12.855  
and which opened it up a little bit.

904

00:40:13.075 --> 00:40:15.775  
And basically what we did for, for, uh,

905

00:40:15.775 --> 00:40:18.255

spaceship two is determined that it was, um, you know,

906

00:40:18.255 --> 00:40:21.375

if it was an airplane, airplane part, it's not ITAR,

907

00:40:21.795 --> 00:40:23.615

but that's where the majority of the, uh,

908

00:40:23.635 --> 00:40:25.215

of redactions for IAR R was.

909

00:40:25.215 --> 00:40:28.775

Were in the, uh, the engine factual report,

910

00:40:28.775 --> 00:40:31.175

because that is, uh, all iar R related.

911

00:40:33.095 --> 00:40:34.385

Plus it wasn't part of the accident.

912

00:40:34.405 --> 00:40:38.305

So we didn't have any problem public hearing.

913

00:40:38.685 --> 00:40:40.585

I'm not gonna spend too much time on this, just

914

00:40:40.585 --> 00:40:41.825

to let you know, you can have one.

915

00:40:42.285 --> 00:40:45.665

Um, it would be an extraordinary situation for one

916

00:40:45.665 --> 00:40:50.065

to be held for, for, um, one of your accidents.

917

00:40:50.065 --> 00:40:53.825

But it can happen. If it's a, uh, mass casualty event or ma

918

00:40:53.885 --> 00:40:56.585

or a big 1 21 event, we will have one.

919

00:40:56.585 --> 00:40:57.785

We had one for Adriana.

920

00:40:57.785 --> 00:41:00.025

We had one for the 7, 8, 7 battery investigation.

921

00:41:00.025 --> 00:41:02.505

Both of those, we actually had real time, um,

922

00:41:03.215 --> 00:41:05.265

translation services from the DOS.

923

00:41:06.085 --> 00:41:10.225

And, um, but basically it's a legal proceeding is the,

924

00:41:10.285 --> 00:41:11.305

is the public hearing.

925

00:41:11.765 --> 00:41:14.945

The, the, uh, witnesses are all, um, sworn in.

926

00:41:15.135 --> 00:41:17.785

Each party has its own table at this table in

927

00:41:17.785 --> 00:41:19.825

what we call the pit down in the, in our board meeting.

928

00:41:20.095 --> 00:41:21.985

This is a, a, a company table here.

929

00:41:22.525 --> 00:41:24.105

You can have your lawyers there,

930

00:41:24.125 --> 00:41:25.585

you'll have another spokesman.

931

00:41:26.085 --> 00:41:27.865

Um, everybody's designated,

932

00:41:28.005 --> 00:41:29.265  
or the parties are designated

933

00:41:29.545 --> 00:41:30.785  
separately from the investigation.

934

00:41:31.325 --> 00:41:32.865  
So it's a, it's a different event.

935

00:41:33.545 --> 00:41:35.605  
It, um, there's two reasons to,

936

00:41:35.605 --> 00:41:37.005  
or the, the two reasons to have.

937

00:41:37.005 --> 00:41:39.325  
One is to provide information

938

00:41:39.325 --> 00:41:41.525  
to the public on an ongoing investigation,

939

00:41:41.525 --> 00:41:42.765  
factual information only.

940

00:41:43.865 --> 00:41:46.405  
And then two is to gain additional information from, um,

941

00:41:47.545 --> 00:41:48.645  
uh, for the investigation.

942

00:41:49.385 --> 00:41:50.965  
Uh, 30 years ago, they used

943

00:41:50.965 --> 00:41:52.525  
to put any surviving crew members

944

00:41:52.545 --> 00:41:53.685  
up there and interview 'em.

945

00:41:53.945 --> 00:41:55.285

We generally don't do that anymore.

946

00:41:58.025 --> 00:42:01.245

So when publish in this public hearing,

947

00:42:01.275 --> 00:42:02.325

your probable cause

948

00:42:02.345 --> 00:42:03.565

And stuff, no, no, no, no.

949

00:42:03.565 --> 00:42:04.885

There's, this is why, see,

950

00:42:05.165 --> 00:42:06.245

actually it should say investigate.

951

00:42:06.245 --> 00:42:08.325

We changed it from public hearing to investigative hearing.

952

00:42:08.835 --> 00:42:11.045

Okay? It's a public hearing. This is all factual still.

953

00:42:11.045 --> 00:42:13.845

This is halfway through the investigation. Okay?

954

00:42:14.015 --> 00:42:16.125

We'll have the board meeting, which is the probable cause.

955

00:42:16.795 --> 00:42:19.285

Okay? That's analysis.

956

00:42:21.755 --> 00:42:24.365

Okay? This is, tech review is an important meeting.

957

00:42:24.365 --> 00:42:26.365

This should be a a half hour meeting.

958

00:42:27.025 --> 00:42:29.045

Uh, but it's to check the box.

959

00:42:29.075 --> 00:42:31.125

This is where you get as a party, the last chance

960

00:42:31.125 --> 00:42:33.725

to give us comments on your, on any of the factual reports.

961

00:42:34.945 --> 00:42:38.525

And, uh, and we ask if there is any additional

962

00:42:38.525 --> 00:42:39.605

testing that needs to be done.

963

00:42:40.545 --> 00:42:43.765

Um, and then we tell you when the submissions are due.

964

00:42:44.545 --> 00:42:47.125

The party submissions are the important aspect.

965

00:42:47.795 --> 00:42:49.245

This is not an analytical meeting.

966

00:42:49.255 --> 00:42:51.005

We're not gonna sit there and say, what do you think?

967

00:42:51.705 --> 00:42:54.545

But that's what you put in your submissions, okay?

968

00:42:54.885 --> 00:42:56.825

The submission is very important in the sense

969

00:42:56.825 --> 00:42:58.225

that it goes into the public docket

970

00:42:58.285 --> 00:43:00.225

and it's your company's analysis.

971

00:43:00.415 --> 00:43:02.945

Make it short. Make it sweet Lexington.

972

00:43:02.985 --> 00:43:07.225

I had one, um, uh, party give me a, uh,

973

00:43:07.545 --> 00:43:10.065  
a submission that was 115 pages.

974

00:43:10.845 --> 00:43:12.545  
Our final report was like 105.

975

00:43:12.725 --> 00:43:14.465  
So it was bigger than, and if you think

976

00:43:14.465 --> 00:43:17.225  
that the board members are gonna read 115 pages, I don't,

977

00:43:17.225 --> 00:43:19.225  
you know, we, the, the staff have to,

978

00:43:19.245 --> 00:43:20.785  
and we do, it's important.

979

00:43:21.445 --> 00:43:24.665  
Uh, please provide a submission even on small ones.

980

00:43:24.785 --> 00:43:27.785  
You can, if you want, because it's your, you help us

981

00:43:28.415 --> 00:43:30.825  
make sure we've checked, we've, we've looked at everything

982

00:43:30.825 --> 00:43:32.985  
and that we include everything in that final report.

983

00:43:35.565 --> 00:43:39.335  
There's no, um, there's no, uh, uh, format for it.

984

00:43:39.335 --> 00:43:42.855  
You can do whatever you want. Uh, you can go online

985

00:43:42.875 --> 00:43:45.935  
and look for submissions, uh, under the, under any, uh,

986

00:43:46.355 --> 00:43:48.175  
docket and, and find out what they are.

987

00:43:48.515 --> 00:43:50.215  
Or just to see what examples are there.

988

00:43:52.195 --> 00:43:54.015  
So then we're gonna go back once we, at

989

00:43:54.015 --> 00:43:56.255  
that technical meeting, we say, thank you for your, uh,

990

00:43:56.405 --> 00:43:58.215  
your assistance in the fact finding phase.

991

00:43:58.235 --> 00:43:59.455  
Now we go and we write the report.

992

00:44:00.515 --> 00:44:03.295  
If we get done, if we're gonna have a major investigation

993

00:44:03.485 --> 00:44:07.815  
completed in one year, when do you think, um, we have

994

00:44:07.815 --> 00:44:12.295  
to have the, uh, draft final report basically,

995

00:44:12.595 --> 00:44:16.065  
uh, written six months out.

996

00:44:16.845 --> 00:44:19.705  
Six months out? Okay.

997

00:44:19.765 --> 00:44:22.345  
So when we talk about that, we, that's the other thing.

998

00:44:22.545 --> 00:44:24.545  
Oh, it's a 12 month, uh, investigation.

999

00:44:24.695 --> 00:44:26.425

It's actually only a six month investigation.

1000

00:44:26.425 --> 00:44:29.945

And then, then six months of just pure hell, um,

1001

00:44:30.755 --> 00:44:31.885

going back and forth.

1002

00:44:31.885 --> 00:44:36.125

Should we use an and there or the, I mean, and we go back

1003

00:44:36.125 --> 00:44:38.405

and forth over things that, that, you know,

1004

00:44:38.405 --> 00:44:40.045

we get worried over saying certain things

1005

00:44:40.105 --> 00:44:42.085

and then the ones that we don't worry about are the things

1006

00:44:42.085 --> 00:44:43.485

that come back at us and bite us.

1007

00:44:44.225 --> 00:44:45.845

Um, so, but it's a process.

1008

00:44:46.125 --> 00:44:47.565

I mean, and it's good because I think that we,

1009

00:44:47.665 --> 00:44:50.725

we eventually get a final report that is, that is, uh,

1010

00:44:51.205 --> 00:44:52.805

a good representation of the work that,

1011

00:44:52.805 --> 00:44:57.655

that the whole team did in the,

1012

00:44:57.675 --> 00:44:59.495

in the, I won't go the, if you want, all

1013

00:44:59.495 --> 00:45:00.535  
of our board meetings and,

1014

00:45:00.595 --> 00:45:03.055  
and our investigative hearings are all webcast.

1015

00:45:04.115 --> 00:45:07.975  
You can, so if you've never taken part in one, look at one.

1016

00:45:09.765 --> 00:45:12.415  
Okay. So quick question on the company submissions you

1017

00:45:12.415 --> 00:45:13.415  
walked through previously.

1018

00:45:13.435 --> 00:45:15.295  
You said that you don't want the, uh, companies

1019

00:45:15.295 --> 00:45:17.015  
or other parties doing their own investigation.

1020

00:45:17.435 --> 00:45:19.055  
Can you elaborate a little bit on the difference

1021

00:45:19.055 --> 00:45:20.855  
between the company's submission? Okay. On

1022

00:45:21.095 --> 00:45:23.095  
Previous right, versus, uh, What

1023

00:45:23.095 --> 00:45:24.095  
You said. So, so what the,

1024

00:45:24.095 --> 00:45:25.535  
what basically the submission

1025

00:45:25.535 --> 00:45:28.975  
that you consider this, it is, it would be cessna's uh,

1026

00:45:29.415 --> 00:45:31.375

analysis of the, of the facts.

1027

00:45:32.075 --> 00:45:33.375

You don't have to repeat all the facts

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00:45:33.575 --> 00:45:35.895

'cause that's all in the po in the, um, uh,

1029

00:45:35.955 --> 00:45:36.975

in the public docket.

1030

00:45:37.115 --> 00:45:40.615

But what it would be would be you would, um, you would put

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00:45:41.245 --> 00:45:44.815

your analysis, probable cause recommendations, um,

1032

00:45:45.195 --> 00:45:47.455

any changes that you've done if you were involved.

1033

00:45:47.575 --> 00:45:49.095

I mean, that's a good one. We always put

1034

00:45:49.095 --> 00:45:51.215

that if you've done something that's changed prior

1035

00:45:51.215 --> 00:45:54.215

to the fi the final report, we will, we will put in

1036

00:45:54.215 --> 00:45:56.575

that we'll say, Hey, subsequent to the accident,

1037

00:45:56.575 --> 00:45:58.335

company X did, yada, yada, yada.

1038

00:45:58.685 --> 00:46:01.735

Okay? The separate investigation part is when you go

1039

00:46:01.735 --> 00:46:05.135

and do it outside of our investigation, um,

1040

00:46:06.045 --> 00:46:08.815  
looking at it, uh, at all of the data,

1041

00:46:08.915 --> 00:46:12.575  
making your own conclusions probable cause testing, uh,

1042

00:46:12.575 --> 00:46:16.135  
interviews, um, uh, simulations

1043

00:46:16.165 --> 00:46:17.415  
that, that we aren't part of.

1044

00:46:17.995 --> 00:46:19.535  
So that's the difference of it.

1045

00:46:19.535 --> 00:46:22.295  
We don't want that to find out in your submission

1046

00:46:22.375 --> 00:46:23.895  
that you've done a separate investigation.

1047

00:46:24.655 --> 00:46:27.915  
Um, so it's, uh, so that's, that's the difference.

1048

00:46:27.915 --> 00:46:30.435  
So it is just basically the, the, the party's analysis

1049

00:46:30.435 --> 00:46:31.675  
of the facts that everybody has,

1050

00:46:32.335 --> 00:46:34.235  
and everybody always talks about every, that's one

1051

00:46:34.235 --> 00:46:36.195  
of the things that, that's a misnomer about investigators.

1052

00:46:36.255 --> 00:46:37.515  
Oh, you can't talk about analysis.

1053

00:46:37.825 --> 00:46:40.595

Well, if you didn't talk analysis, then you wouldn't,

1054

00:46:40.735 --> 00:46:42.915

you can't put a plan together to investigate things.

1055

00:46:43.495 --> 00:46:45.275

The big thing is an investigator is to know

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00:46:46.025 --> 00:46:49.315

that you're not make a, a, a be able

1057

00:46:49.315 --> 00:46:52.115

to change your opinion given different facts, like not

1058

00:46:52.115 --> 00:46:53.795

Having, having jurors investigate

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00:46:53.795 --> 00:46:54.915

something separately from

1060

00:46:54.915 --> 00:46:55.915

The whole. Exactly.

1061

00:46:55.915 --> 00:46:56.875

It's very much that way.

1062

00:46:59.085 --> 00:47:00.195

Could You repeat that question?

1063

00:47:00.215 --> 00:47:03.715

Oh, uh, he said it's just like not having individual jurors

1064

00:47:04.015 --> 00:47:06.475

do their own investigation in, in a court case,

1065

00:47:08.575 --> 00:47:09.995

Had a question on the, on the submissions

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00:47:09.995 --> 00:47:11.835

before on we were lucky enough

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00:47:11.835 --> 00:47:14.235

to see a presentation on the, as part of our mm-hmm.

1068

00:47:14.405 --> 00:47:16.315

Right. Bill did. Mm-hmm. And, uh,

1069

00:47:16.855 --> 00:47:18.635

One of the things that really struck me is when you,

1070

00:47:18.635 --> 00:47:20.835

when you talk about the, the submissions was

1071

00:47:20.835 --> 00:47:22.915

that the submissions from all of the parties,

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00:47:23.985 --> 00:47:26.005

at least from my perspective, were plainly written

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00:47:26.025 --> 00:47:27.605

by their lawyers and designed

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00:47:27.605 --> 00:47:29.005

to point blame at everybody in,

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00:47:29.040 --> 00:47:30.525

in the process, except for their own

1076

00:47:30.685 --> 00:47:31.805

Selves. Yep. So,

1077

00:47:32.105 --> 00:47:35.325

So what value is That?

1078

00:47:35.995 --> 00:47:38.125

Okay. And, and, but that's what the part, actually,

1079

00:47:38.125 --> 00:47:40.525

you know, what you've just hit on what the, the, the,

1080

00:47:41.305 --> 00:47:43.685

the beauty of the party system is, okay?

1081

00:47:43.865 --> 00:47:46.285

Now, it should all be done in the, in the realm of safety.

1082

00:47:46.865 --> 00:47:50.005

But the reason why we have parties is that every, no matter

1083

00:47:50.005 --> 00:47:52.725

what, everybody looks at things, even in politics,

1084

00:47:52.725 --> 00:47:54.405

looks at things through their own prism, right?

1085

00:47:55.355 --> 00:47:58.245

Okay. So each party looks at different aspects

1086

00:47:58.465 --> 00:48:00.605

of the accident from their own prism.

1087

00:48:01.065 --> 00:48:03.725

And, uh, an operator will say, we've

1088

00:48:03.925 --> 00:48:07.005

provided them with great, uh, training

1089

00:48:07.185 --> 00:48:08.165

and that we've done this

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00:48:08.325 --> 00:48:09.245

training, this training and this training.

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00:48:09.545 --> 00:48:12.325

But the, the, uh, union is gonna sit there

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00:48:12.325 --> 00:48:14.325

and go, you call that training.

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00:48:14.395 --> 00:48:17.085

This is what it is. This is, you know, so actually

1094  
00:48:17.085 --> 00:48:19.405  
through the entire investigation, everybody's concentrating

1095  
00:48:19.465 --> 00:48:21.405  
or, or focused on different aspects

1096  
00:48:21.405 --> 00:48:22.485  
from their own perspective.

1097  
00:48:22.905 --> 00:48:25.285  
Now, hopefully it's not a legal, like,

1098  
00:48:25.285 --> 00:48:27.165  
just legal protection side of things,

1099  
00:48:27.745 --> 00:48:29.645  
but it is, everybody's looking at it differently.

1100  
00:48:29.645 --> 00:48:32.565  
And that's what we, that's what the, uh, the, the,

1101  
00:48:32.705 --> 00:48:35.325  
the beauty of the, of the, of the party system is.

1102  
00:48:35.785 --> 00:48:38.085  
It all culminates in the, in the submissions

1103  
00:48:39.115 --> 00:48:41.605  
with the lawyers putting together what it is.

1104  
00:48:41.675 --> 00:48:43.165  
I've had some though, that have

1105  
00:48:43.905 --> 00:48:45.325  
had nothing to do with the accident.

1106  
00:48:46.425 --> 00:48:50.485  
Uh, I had one party that was clearly, um, you know,

1107  
00:48:50.505 --> 00:48:53.645

in the probable cause, basically write a submission

1108

00:48:53.715 --> 00:48:57.605

that was, um, uh, just meant to be public

1109

00:48:57.665 --> 00:49:00.085

for public consumption, didn't have anything to do with,

1110

00:49:00.085 --> 00:49:02.165

with writing the final report or analysis

1111

00:49:02.425 --> 00:49:04.325

or anything to that effect, because it goes in the public

1112

00:49:04.385 --> 00:49:07.555

docket that's put out there in the public

1113

00:49:07.565 --> 00:49:08.635

prior to our report.

1114

00:49:09.535 --> 00:49:11.435

So you're correct, lawyers do do it.

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00:49:11.435 --> 00:49:13.155

Like even the factual report. That's another thing.

1116

00:49:13.155 --> 00:49:16.315

Lawyers, your lawyers will review it. Guess what?

1117

00:49:16.335 --> 00:49:18.035

We can tell the difference between a lawyer comment

1118

00:49:18.035 --> 00:49:19.075

and a technical comment.

1119

00:49:20.105 --> 00:49:22.635

It's not hard. Okay?

1120

00:49:23.295 --> 00:49:24.595

We, but sometimes,

1121

00:49:24.735 --> 00:49:26.035  
but the, the good thing about

1122

00:49:26.105 --> 00:49:28.955  
what a lawyer does do sometimes is, is their, their,

1123

00:49:29.045 --> 00:49:31.595  
their input does, uh, on both the factual reports,

1124

00:49:31.615 --> 00:49:34.955  
it does actually catch some, some analytical, um, uh,

1125

00:49:34.955 --> 00:49:36.915  
discussion that's put in a factual report.

1126

00:49:37.025 --> 00:49:40.635  
Okay? So there is a little bit of a good of a lawyer.

1127

00:49:46.345 --> 00:49:47.915  
It's okay, my brother's a lawyer, so,

1128

00:49:48.495 --> 00:49:49.715  
but he fires bad teachers.

1129

00:49:49.715 --> 00:49:52.355  
So that's how I just, that's how I justify 'em.

1130

00:49:54.095 --> 00:49:56.595  
Um, so then we get the final report.

1131

00:49:56.665 --> 00:49:58.155  
Everybody's seen our, we call it,

1132

00:49:58.155 --> 00:49:59.355  
you'll hear the term blue cover.

1133

00:49:59.455 --> 00:50:01.835  
If this is not a, uh, a headquarters report,

1134

00:50:01.895 --> 00:50:03.355

it won't be a, a blue cover.

1135

00:50:03.485 --> 00:50:05.955

It'll just be a, uh, what we call a brief.

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00:50:06.655 --> 00:50:10.475

Um, but don't, you know, don't take that the brief isn't a,

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00:50:10.715 --> 00:50:11.395

a full report

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00:50:15.425 --> 00:50:16.405

recommendations.

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00:50:16.425 --> 00:50:18.245

Here's where we get at the bottom of our,

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00:50:18.245 --> 00:50:22.165

or at the end of our, uh, reports, uh, section, uh,

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00:50:22.355 --> 00:50:23.525

four, is it?

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00:50:24.635 --> 00:50:26.565

Yeah. Yeah. Four, section four, I got it. Right.

1143

00:50:27.265 --> 00:50:31.045

Uh, is, is the recommendations, generally speaking, we,

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00:50:31.065 --> 00:50:35.405

we give most of our recommendations to the FAA and it's not

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00:50:35.405 --> 00:50:37.725

because they have bad oversight, it's

1146

00:50:37.725 --> 00:50:39.965

because that's who can make the changes.

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00:50:40.155 --> 00:50:43.485

Okay? They can affect the change, make that, make companies,

1148

00:50:44.145 --> 00:50:45.725

uh, make that change.

1149

00:50:46.265 --> 00:50:49.285

If we send them all to, to Boeing to assess that

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00:50:49.285 --> 00:50:51.365

to Gulfstream, they don't have to do it

1151

00:50:51.365 --> 00:50:53.085

because they're not required to do it.

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00:50:53.295 --> 00:50:55.885

Right? So that's why we generally do it.

1153

00:50:55.885 --> 00:50:58.325

However, recently we've actually started to,

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00:50:58.505 --> 00:50:59.725

to deviate from that.

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00:51:00.185 --> 00:51:01.405

And we have been sending some,

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00:51:01.405 --> 00:51:03.645

we've been sending some recommendations to even

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00:51:04.275 --> 00:51:07.845

some industry groups, um, uh, gamma

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00:51:08.025 --> 00:51:09.845

and, uh, SCTP.

1159

00:51:10.065 --> 00:51:12.805

Yep. And, uh, and, and all.

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00:51:12.865 --> 00:51:15.445

So, um, because, and, and,

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00:51:15.505 --> 00:51:17.045

and a lot of has to do is our recommendations.

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00:51:17.045 --> 00:51:20.045

So our recommendations do not, you know, you don't have to,

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00:51:20.045 --> 00:51:21.765

they don't have to be, uh, complied with.

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00:51:22.705 --> 00:51:25.885

We technically don't take into account, uh, any, um,

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00:51:26.585 --> 00:51:27.845

uh, cost requirements.

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00:51:27.945 --> 00:51:28.965

We do do a little bit,

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00:51:29.465 --> 00:51:32.085

but sometimes we, we, we, we try to stretch the industry.

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00:51:32.085 --> 00:51:35.165

That's like what we did with, uh, fuel tank alerting. Okay?

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00:51:35.505 --> 00:51:37.725

We put that wreck out there 10 years ago knowing

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00:51:37.725 --> 00:51:39.405

that it wasn't a able to be there, right?

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00:51:39.505 --> 00:51:41.645

But we just kept it open knowing that, trying

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00:51:41.645 --> 00:51:43.805

to push the industry along to get that fuel tank inert.

1173

00:51:44.165 --> 00:51:47.245

'cause if not, we, we were gonna get one fuel tank explosion

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00:51:47.245 --> 00:51:48.245

every 10 years or so.

1175

00:51:49.275 --> 00:51:53.285

Okay. Questions on recommendations.

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00:51:54.465 --> 00:51:58.925

One thing is, uh, there, I think there's a history of

1177

00:52:00.045 --> 00:52:03.985

FAA versus MT SP recommendation center not agreeing.

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00:52:04.965 --> 00:52:08.625

And so, um, sometimes

1179

00:52:09.705 --> 00:52:11.845

you get the feeling that, that the, uh,

1180

00:52:11.955 --> 00:52:14.365

that the FPSB recommendations are done in the vacuum

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00:52:15.145 --> 00:52:17.765

and not realizing what the A FAA is able

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00:52:17.785 --> 00:52:19.845

and not able to do regulatory wise.

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00:52:20.785 --> 00:52:23.205

And maybe, and I've seen that improving over time.

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00:52:24.585 --> 00:52:28.445

The question is, is, uh, the interaction between the NTSB

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00:52:28.445 --> 00:52:31.645

and FAA on reg recommendations, to put it succinctly

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00:52:31.645 --> 00:52:35.085

and nicely, um, There is

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00:52:35.515 --> 00:52:37.325

what we do there, there it is difficult.

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00:52:37.355 --> 00:52:38.485

Okay? They have a different,

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00:52:38.795 --> 00:52:40.365

they look at it in a different aspect.

1190

00:52:40.365 --> 00:52:41.965

They do have to take into account cost.

1191

00:52:41.965 --> 00:52:44.085

They do have to take into account, uh,

1192

00:52:44.395 --> 00:52:45.845

many things that we don't have to.

1193

00:52:46.455 --> 00:52:49.525

There is sometimes, uh, people can see

1194

00:52:49.525 --> 00:52:52.525

that there is some friction between the two agencies

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00:52:52.525 --> 00:52:56.685

because of, um, you know,

1196

00:52:56.835 --> 00:53:00.005

both agencies live in, in Washington DC Okay?

1197

00:53:00.905 --> 00:53:03.005

Um, but it doesn't mean that,

1198

00:53:03.005 --> 00:53:05.125

that the worker bees aren't working.

1199

00:53:05.425 --> 00:53:08.245

We talk now, we do have more open invest, uh, discussions

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00:53:08.245 --> 00:53:09.445

with the, both the FAA

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00:53:09.445 --> 00:53:11.445

and industry prior to putting 'em out.

1202

00:53:11.965 --> 00:53:12.925

I believe we talked to you guys

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00:53:12.925 --> 00:53:14.205

before putting that out, right?

1204

00:53:14.265 --> 00:53:15.365

We make everybody known.

1205

00:53:15.785 --> 00:53:19.005

We recommendations are not ones that people should go, that,

1206

00:53:19.005 --> 00:53:22.725

that it's okay, you know, uh, Gulfstream or,

1207

00:53:22.825 --> 00:53:24.245

or FAA,

1208

00:53:24.245 --> 00:53:26.045

that they weren't aware that we were gonna put 'em out.

1209

00:53:26.305 --> 00:53:28.125

Not that we're gonna change what we're gonna put out,

1210

00:53:28.125 --> 00:53:29.845

but just to let you know, okay?

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00:53:30.835 --> 00:53:32.145

Again, a communication thing.

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00:53:32.845 --> 00:53:34.385

Um, but there's different aspects.

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00:53:34.545 --> 00:53:37.385

A lot of this has to do too, too, though, is if you have

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00:53:37.385 --> 00:53:40.545

to look at, in the, you know, eighties, seventies, eighties,

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00:53:40.545 --> 00:53:42.385

there's a lot of, there was a lot of low hanging fruit.

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00:53:42.725 --> 00:53:45.345

So as we describe it, right, there's a lot

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00:53:45.365 --> 00:53:49.865

of one recommendation solving multiple, uh,

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00:53:49.865 --> 00:53:51.145

fatality cases, right?

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00:53:52.145 --> 00:53:55.225

Nowadays, our, we, we all fly even on a flight test side,

1220

00:53:55.805 --> 00:53:57.785

an inherently safe airplane.

1221

00:53:59.005 --> 00:54:02.615

Technically it is because of the, the, uh, low rates.

1222

00:54:03.595 --> 00:54:04.935

But so what we're trying to do is

1223

00:54:04.935 --> 00:54:06.015

we're trying to stretch everything.

1224

00:54:06.015 --> 00:54:08.255

So we're gonna have that interaction that, that friction

1225

00:54:08.255 --> 00:54:10.215

between agencies is, is good.

1226

00:54:10.315 --> 00:54:13.215

Now, sometimes that's been politicized a little bit too much

1227

00:54:13.275 --> 00:54:16.295

or there's been a i'll, I'll be perfectly honest,

1228

00:54:16.375 --> 00:54:19.055

I think sometimes some NTSB, um,

1229

00:54:19.845 --> 00:54:22.975

from a has come out a little bit too much, uh,

1230

00:54:24.155 --> 00:54:26.255

too negative on the fa at some, at some times,

1231

00:54:26.875 --> 00:54:29.935

but they're in an unenviable position of requiring

1232

00:54:30.435 --> 00:54:31.855

or being that oversight agency.

1233

00:54:32.235 --> 00:54:33.235

So

1234

00:54:35.195 --> 00:54:39.055

If we have a, uh, need for, for a desire

1235

00:54:39.155 --> 00:54:40.375

for more clarification

1236

00:54:40.415 --> 00:54:43.935

or more background information behind recommendation,

1237

00:54:44.605 --> 00:54:47.775

what would be the best way to who contact?

1238

00:54:48.435 --> 00:54:50.735

You can contact the, you can contact me, you can contact,

1239

00:54:50.915 --> 00:54:52.935

uh, you can call up the, uh, the rock,

1240

00:54:53.075 --> 00:54:54.335

and if it's, if it's something that,

1241

00:54:54.405 --> 00:54:55.775

that you mean from another accident

1242

00:54:55.775 --> 00:54:56.775

that you weren't involved with.

1243

00:54:57.645 --> 00:54:59.295

Yeah. Specific, you

1244

00:54:59.295 --> 00:55:00.295

Know, yeah. Recommendations

1245

00:55:00.295 --> 00:55:02.095

from report. You can part of a group

1246

00:55:02.095 --> 00:55:03.375

That's Trying to Yeah.

1247

00:55:03.395 --> 00:55:04.975

No, we definitely would, would, uh,

1248

00:55:04.975 --> 00:55:06.295

would love to talk with you.

1249

00:55:06.295 --> 00:55:09.455

And what we'll do is we'll figure out who the, um, you know,

1250

00:55:09.455 --> 00:55:11.735

who initiated that or who, who did the most work on it,

1251

00:55:11.735 --> 00:55:12.975

and be able to discuss that with you.

1252

00:55:13.195 --> 00:55:15.895

We talk with the FAA working groups all the time, cast

1253

00:55:15.915 --> 00:55:17.375

and all that to, to make sure they're

1254

00:55:17.375 --> 00:55:19.615

understanding of what that is.

1255

00:55:19.815 --> 00:55:21.575

'cause that, that, that discussion needs to be there.

1256

00:55:26.485 --> 00:55:29.865

So what I want to talk about, uh, really quickly is, uh, um,

1257

00:55:30.495 --> 00:55:31.985

foreign accidents, okay?

1258

00:55:32.005 --> 00:55:33.145

As I said, you know,

1259

00:55:33.145 --> 00:55:35.545

how many people do cold weather testing?

1260

00:55:35.765 --> 00:55:37.425

How many organizations do cold weather

1261

00:55:37.425 --> 00:55:38.785

testing up in, up in Canada?

1262

00:55:40.985 --> 00:55:44.065

Okay. Yellow knife. Anything to that effect, right?

1263

00:55:44.085 --> 00:55:46.425

You're gonna be up there, or just even flying, looking

1264

00:55:46.445 --> 00:55:47.505

for ice, right?

1265

00:55:48.085 --> 00:55:50.305

You guys are gonna be flying over Canadian airspace.

1266

00:55:50.645 --> 00:55:51.785

That's a foreign accident.

1267

00:55:52.765 --> 00:55:55.865

And it's completely different working

1268

00:55:55.865 --> 00:55:57.905

with the Canadians than it is working with us.

1269

00:55:58.685 --> 00:56:00.585

Not complete. They're, they're very similar.

1270

00:56:01.205 --> 00:56:05.065

Uh, we, we work in a sense, uh, in general senses,

1271

00:56:05.065 --> 00:56:07.545

but there's specific differences that will,

1272

00:56:08.645 --> 00:56:10.385

it causes me to lose my hair.

1273

00:56:10.845 --> 00:56:14.025

But, um, it's, it's a pain sometimes to deal in

1274

00:56:14.025 --> 00:56:16.785

that from a state to state, um, aspect.

1275

00:56:17.845 --> 00:56:19.185

The majority of my guys' work

1276

00:56:19.405 --> 00:56:21.305

and my work over the last, you know,

1277

00:56:21.505 --> 00:56:22.865

18 years has been international.

1278

00:56:23.505 --> 00:56:26.365

Uh, so I'll talk about Ann, uh, annex 13, why we do it,

1279

00:56:26.745 --> 00:56:29.205

but then, um, talk about a little bit more of the,

1280

00:56:29.205 --> 00:56:32.365

the Canadian, uh, way of doing things, uh, or others.

1281

00:56:32.625 --> 00:56:33.685

We can talk about other country.

1282

00:56:33.805 --> 00:56:35.245

I know there's people from other states

1283

00:56:35.305 --> 00:56:36.965  
as well, if you have those questions.

1284

00:56:37.415 --> 00:56:38.765  
These are Fly Dubai.

1285

00:56:38.765 --> 00:56:42.565  
This is do, it just happened over in, uh, SAV on Don in, in,

1286

00:56:42.585 --> 00:56:43.765  
uh, in Russia.

1287

00:56:43.875 --> 00:56:46.725  
They did put out a very complete, um, uh,

1288

00:56:46.725 --> 00:56:49.485  
preliminary report, um, on this.

1289

00:56:49.545 --> 00:56:51.325  
It, uh, they crashed, uh, during the go

1290

00:56:51.325 --> 00:56:52.365  
around second go around.

1291

00:56:52.985 --> 00:56:55.885  
Uh, and it was a, um, high speed, uh, impact.

1292

00:56:57.105 --> 00:57:00.045  
Uh, we have, of course, both Malaysians, Malaysian 17

1293

00:57:00.185 --> 00:57:02.845  
and Malaysian 3 70 17 is completed.

1294

00:57:03.465 --> 00:57:06.885  
Um, hopefully that'll keep anybody from, you know,

1295

00:57:07.125 --> 00:57:09.725  
questioning TW 800, because we now have evidence to show

1296

00:57:09.725 --> 00:57:12.805

what, what an airplane looks like when it's shot down.

1297

00:57:13.225 --> 00:57:14.965

Um, as opposed to just looking at one little,

1298

00:57:15.345 --> 00:57:16.685

you know, glob of metal.

1299

00:57:17.505 --> 00:57:22.045

Um, which they say caused, uh, TWA to go down.

1300

00:57:23.105 --> 00:57:25.045

Um, MH 17. They haven't found it.

1301

00:57:25.165 --> 00:57:27.285

I don't think they ever will. It's gonna be very difficult.

1302

00:57:27.445 --> 00:57:29.925

I think, you know, Steve Cameron will find it at some point.

1303

00:57:30.465 --> 00:57:33.605

Um, as I've told people, it's at breakfast, we know exactly

1304

00:57:33.605 --> 00:57:35.685

where it is, plus or minus 500 miles.

1305

00:57:36.905 --> 00:57:40.485

Um, we only have about seven data points, uh,

1306

00:57:40.675 --> 00:57:42.005

over, over seven hours.

1307

00:57:42.785 --> 00:57:44.765

So, um, it's,

1308

00:57:45.145 --> 00:57:48.045

and, uh, so we have a nice area to go in.

1309

00:57:48.045 --> 00:57:50.805

Plus it's at, uh, anywhere from 16 to 18,000 feet.

1310

00:57:51.635 --> 00:57:54.175

Um, they're, they're completing that investigation

1311

00:57:54.595 --> 00:57:59.095

or that the search most likely will be completed in July,

1312

00:57:59.195 --> 00:58:00.455

August timeframe, probably.

1313

00:58:01.425 --> 00:58:03.665

I don't know if they're gonna continue on or not.

1314

00:58:04.445 --> 00:58:06.225

The Aussies have already said they will not.

1315

00:58:06.415 --> 00:58:08.105

They've already spent a hundred million dollars.

1316

00:58:09.495 --> 00:58:10.585

This is Adriana.

1317

00:58:10.885 --> 00:58:15.625

Uh, and then this is, uh, first Air, which is a 7 3 7 combi

1318

00:58:15.625 --> 00:58:19.025

that crashed up in Resolute Bay, um, in,

1319

00:58:19.085 --> 00:58:21.105

uh, the Arctic Circle.

1320

00:58:21.435 --> 00:58:25.865

About 300 miles from, um, from the, uh, magnetic North

1321

00:58:27.045 --> 00:58:29.265

as one of the guys I was driving around a, uh,

1322

00:58:29.945 --> 00:58:33.825

A BMW up there, which was, I never thought I, in, um,

1323

00:58:34.705 --> 00:58:37.905

resolute it was a, a guy, a Pakistani that came over there.

1324

00:58:37.905 --> 00:58:39.825

And he said, I, when I came there, he goes,

1325

00:58:40.375 --> 00:58:42.425

they said there was a, a woman behind every tree.

1326

00:58:42.845 --> 00:58:44.665

Of course, they failed to tell 'em, there are no trees.

1327

00:58:45.815 --> 00:58:47.745

It's, uh, it's literally, I mean, it's amazing.

1328

00:58:47.745 --> 00:58:50.305

You're, it, there is nothing up there except rocks.

1329

00:58:51.205 --> 00:58:52.545

It was pretty cool. Went swimming.

1330

00:58:53.245 --> 00:58:54.345

Now it's a different thing,

1331

00:58:54.445 --> 00:58:58.965

but, so,

1332

00:58:59.385 --> 00:59:00.925

Ike o Annex 13 is the Bible

1333

00:59:00.985 --> 00:59:02.605

of international accent investigation.

1334

00:59:02.605 --> 00:59:06.845

It says, uh, what, um, what we have to do, uh,

1335

00:59:07.625 --> 00:59:10.445

as a signatory to that, uh, treaty,

1336

00:59:10.945 --> 00:59:12.805

and we also have to do from a, a main, uh,

1337

00:59:12.965 --> 00:59:16.005

a manufacturer standpoint is annex, uh, eight,

1338

00:59:16.175 --> 00:59:17.245

which is airworthiness.

1339

00:59:17.665 --> 00:59:20.365

So basically you need to, we need, those are the two annexes

1340

00:59:20.365 --> 00:59:23.605

that we operate under, uh, in, in an international regime.

1341

00:59:25.825 --> 00:59:28.165

So, but we do it in, in that ba bottom one.

1342

00:59:28.165 --> 00:59:29.845

Again, we get that, that safety recommendations.

1343

00:59:29.845 --> 00:59:31.725

We've had multiple times that we've had safety

1344

00:59:31.725 --> 00:59:33.205

recommendations come out from foreign.

1345

00:59:33.825 --> 00:59:36.645

Um, we had, uh, an Okinawa accident, if you remember,

1346

00:59:36.645 --> 00:59:41.565

the 7 3 7 landed retracted the slats, uh,

1347

00:59:41.825 --> 00:59:43.445

as when they retracted the slats.

1348

00:59:43.535 --> 00:59:47.845

There was a buildup in tolerances in the, uh, in the, um,

1349

00:59:48.305 --> 00:59:51.805

uh, the nut and, uh, uh, washer stack.

1350

00:59:52.605 --> 00:59:53.825

And it punctured the fuel tank.

1351

00:59:54.535 --> 00:59:57.105

When they retracted it as they taxied in.

1352

00:59:57.105 --> 00:59:58.345

There was a video of it.

1353

00:59:58.455 --> 01:00:00.185

Everybody started getting off the air.

1354

01:00:00.545 --> 01:00:01.865

Airplane gets on fire as soon

1355

01:00:01.865 --> 01:00:04.025

as the last person gets off the left wing explodes.

1356

01:00:04.025 --> 01:00:07.305

They're all, and, uh, no one was, there was no injuries.

1357

01:00:08.205 --> 01:00:10.505

Um, we launched over there to, uh, Okinawa

1358

01:00:11.005 --> 01:00:15.795

and, um, uh, as a result with the FAA there, uh,

1359

01:00:15.815 --> 01:00:19.315

we had a ad to inspect the aircraft within two weeks.

1360

01:00:19.855 --> 01:00:21.435

And once we figured out what was going on,

1361

01:00:21.695 --> 01:00:23.955

and they found about, I think it was like five

1362

01:00:23.955 --> 01:00:26.755

to eight here in the states that were affected.

1363

01:00:28.025 --> 01:00:29.445

So that's why we go do it.

1364

01:00:29.555 --> 01:00:31.845

It's a good, it's actually a, you know, for the money.

1365

01:00:31.845 --> 01:00:34.005

It's, it's great for the, the American people for us

1366

01:00:34.005 --> 01:00:35.365

to go over and do those things.

1367

01:00:36.825 --> 01:00:39.885

Um, if you are taking part in an accident investigation

1368

01:00:40.125 --> 01:00:41.205

overseas, this is what you're gonna

1369

01:00:41.205 --> 01:00:42.325

spend a lot of time doing.

1370

01:00:43.235 --> 01:00:46.805

Okay? As I say, the NTSB might not do it right all the time,

1371

01:00:47.225 --> 01:00:48.245

but we do do it a lot.

1372

01:00:49.145 --> 01:00:50.445

And there's a, there's,

1373

01:00:50.445 --> 01:00:52.245

we do it the most out of anybody in the world.

1374

01:00:53.265 --> 01:00:56.085

So we can handle a, this is the Colletta 7, 4 7,

1375

01:00:56.425 --> 01:00:57.485

uh, in Brussels.

1376

01:00:58.045 --> 01:00:59.525

I mean, we sat for three days

1377

01:00:59.635 --> 01:01:01.325

because they didn't, you know,

1378

01:01:01.325 --> 01:01:02.565  
they wanted to defuel the airplane.

1379

01:01:02.565 --> 01:01:04.205  
We could be under the airplane.

1380

01:01:04.265 --> 01:01:06.565  
We could be in the, in the engines.

1381

01:01:06.565 --> 01:01:07.445  
We could be sitting around there,

1382

01:01:07.445 --> 01:01:08.565  
but we couldn't get on the airplane.

1383

01:01:09.425 --> 01:01:11.805  
Um, but, you know, with us,

1384

01:01:11.805 --> 01:01:13.445  
we'd have be done with that in three days.

1385

01:01:13.645 --> 01:01:14.805  
'cause we know how to do, you know,

1386

01:01:14.805 --> 01:01:16.165  
we just have that experience.

1387

01:01:17.155 --> 01:01:20.285  
This is some cell phone, um, pictures of the, uh,

1388

01:01:20.345 --> 01:01:21.725  
of the tilt rotor in Italy.

1389

01:01:26.085 --> 01:01:28.065  
So Annex 13, just to, to go through it.

1390

01:01:28.065 --> 01:01:29.065  
I won't go through what it is,

1391

01:01:29.065 --> 01:01:31.025

but one of the things you'll hear is SARPs

1392

01:01:31.825 --> 01:01:34.305

standards recommended recommendations and practices.

1393

01:01:34.885 --> 01:01:37.865

So it'll tell, it says what the, the standard is.

1394

01:01:37.985 --> 01:01:39.425

A standard of, uh, is of course.

1395

01:01:39.645 --> 01:01:43.545

Um, um, a standard is a, uh,

1396

01:01:43.685 --> 01:01:44.825

is what you shall do.

1397

01:01:44.925 --> 01:01:47.145

And a recommendation is you should do.

1398

01:01:47.645 --> 01:01:52.425

But, and Annex 13 will talk later. How can you enforce it?

1399

01:01:53.485 --> 01:01:55.665

Um, so you have, it talks about the investigation.

1400

01:01:55.665 --> 01:01:57.425

It even talks about why we write our blue covers.

1401

01:01:57.445 --> 01:01:59.345

The way we write our blue covers final report

1402

01:01:59.365 --> 01:02:00.425

is because of Annex 13.

1403

01:02:03.805 --> 01:02:06.345

Uh, the current one is, uh, the 10th, uh, edition.

1404

01:02:08.975 --> 01:02:12.915

So, just so that you know, some terms, uh, terms of, uh,

1405

01:02:13.175 --> 01:02:16.715

our, the state of occurrence, state of registry, state

1406

01:02:16.715 --> 01:02:20.765

of design and manufacture, and those having, uh, fatalities.

1407

01:02:21.865 --> 01:02:23.965

One clarification, state of design

1408

01:02:23.965 --> 01:02:26.085

and manufacturer is talking about the airframe.

1409

01:02:26.305 --> 01:02:28.965

It is not talking about the engine manufacturer.

1410

01:02:29.905 --> 01:02:34.745

But, so as I've been, I won't say,

1411

01:02:35.045 --> 01:02:39.905

um, the, uh, so with a engine manufacturer, we have

1412

01:02:39.905 --> 01:02:43.785

to technically request to be, um, to have, uh,

1413

01:02:43.785 --> 01:02:45.105

status in the investigation.

1414

01:02:45.765 --> 01:02:50.385

We, uh, as a, as a airframe manufacturer, we don't, um,

1415

01:02:50.385 --> 01:02:52.425

that's one of the clarifications that's very important.

1416

01:02:52.905 --> 01:02:57.145

I do not have to ask the, uh, the, the Turkish IIC

1417

01:02:57.325 --> 01:02:58.745

to take part in their investigation

1418

01:02:59.265 --> 01:03:00.945

'cause they're signatory to Annex 13.

1419

01:03:01.425 --> 01:03:03.105

I have a right to be there, and I will be

1420

01:03:03.105 --> 01:03:04.625

there if I need to be.

1421

01:03:05.355 --> 01:03:09.405

This was in Thailand. I was there in, uh, uh, early 2000.

1422

01:03:10.545 --> 01:03:13.035

Um, they, uh,

1423

01:03:13.085 --> 01:03:15.875

7 3 7 fuel tank explosion at the gate.

1424

01:03:17.295 --> 01:03:19.075

Um, the Prime Minister

1425

01:03:19.095 --> 01:03:21.635

or the pr, yeah, prime Minister was gonna be on about a half

1426

01:03:21.635 --> 01:03:24.275

hour after, or bef later on

1427

01:03:24.275 --> 01:03:26.595

that flight killed one flight attendant.

1428

01:03:26.625 --> 01:03:27.955

They, of course, thought it was a bomb.

1429

01:03:28.875 --> 01:03:30.695

We went over there, sat for five days.

1430

01:03:30.695 --> 01:03:32.615

They wouldn't let us on the airplane. Said it's a bomb.

1431

01:03:32.915 --> 01:03:36.215

We tested. There was RDX over the entire airplane. Okay?

1432

01:03:36.515 --> 01:03:38.215

So that tells you that they had a little problem

1433

01:03:38.215 --> 01:03:39.655

with their, uh, their testing.

1434

01:03:40.015 --> 01:03:42.015

'cause it's never over the entire airplane.

1435

01:03:42.755 --> 01:03:45.055

Um, it's only in certain, uh, areas.

1436

01:03:45.555 --> 01:03:48.015

Um, so eventually they, they realized

1437

01:03:48.015 --> 01:03:49.575

that it was a fuel tank explosion.

1438

01:03:49.575 --> 01:03:51.215

We actually ended up writing the report form.

1439

01:03:51.715 --> 01:03:55.495

It was a center tank explosion caused by the, um, center,

1440

01:03:55.635 --> 01:03:57.495

uh, fuel pumps when it ran dry,

1441

01:03:57.835 --> 01:03:59.855

and it sparked the fuel tank to explode.

1442

01:04:01.375 --> 01:04:04.625

This is Turkish Airlines, 7 3 7 in Amsterdam.

1443

01:04:05.085 --> 01:04:09.625

Uh, they, uh, stalled out at about, uh, 400 feet.

1444

01:04:10.405 --> 01:04:14.025

Um, and then they did not, uh, recover properly.

1445

01:04:14.025 --> 01:04:18.065

It took 'em 10 seconds to, uh, bring both, uh, engines up

1446

01:04:18.065 --> 01:04:19.185

to full throttle.

1447

01:04:20.285 --> 01:04:23.985

Um, as a result, they, they impacted in a very soft field.

1448

01:04:24.285 --> 01:04:26.305

So it's the worst case scenario for impact.

1449

01:04:26.305 --> 01:04:29.905

But we only had, uh, seven fatalities. It's a huge thing.

1450

01:04:29.905 --> 01:04:34.305

We did a, a ton of work on, um, on, uh, survival factors.

1451

01:04:37.705 --> 01:04:41.365

So, as I talked about, we have a right to participate

1452

01:04:41.425 --> 01:04:43.205

and we have a right to, uh, appoint.

1453

01:04:43.275 --> 01:04:45.845

What you you'll hear is either an AR an CC rep,

1454

01:04:45.955 --> 01:04:47.445

it's an accredited representative.

1455

01:04:47.755 --> 01:04:50.085

That would be one of my guys, okay?

1456

01:04:50.085 --> 01:04:52.405

That's the only person from the United States government

1457

01:04:52.405 --> 01:04:54.925

that has taken part in the investigation is that ACT rep.

1458

01:04:56.145 --> 01:04:57.965

Um, but we do have a responsibility

1459

01:04:57.985 --> 01:05:01.485

to notify other states when, uh, uh, in, uh,

1460

01:05:01.845 --> 01:05:02.925

incidents or accidents occur.

1461

01:05:03.425 --> 01:05:04.765

And that to provide all the data,

1462

01:05:04.765 --> 01:05:06.165

that's another thing why we have to go there.

1463

01:05:06.325 --> 01:05:10.565

'cause they don't know how, how a Boeing or, uh, a, uh, Lear

1464

01:05:10.665 --> 01:05:13.205

or, uh, Airbus, uh, anything how it works.

1465

01:05:13.305 --> 01:05:15.645

We have to, we have to go there to assist them.

1466

01:05:16.595 --> 01:05:19.365

This is, is, uh, Swiss Air one 11 up in Peggy's Cove.

1467

01:05:19.985 --> 01:05:22.125

Uh, that happened one week prior

1468

01:05:22.125 --> 01:05:23.565

to when I started the board.

1469

01:05:24.225 --> 01:05:26.165

And so I was a systems investigator when I,

1470

01:05:26.165 --> 01:05:28.285

when I started the board, and I spent, um,

1471

01:05:28.645 --> 01:05:30.405

I think about eight weeks total up there,

1472

01:05:30.665 --> 01:05:34.925

or nine weeks, um, sitting there going like this with pieces

1473

01:05:35.085 --> 01:05:38.165

that this big, trying to, to, uh, put, I think I

1474

01:05:38.915 --> 01:05:41.085

matched like three pieces my entire time up there.

1475

01:05:41.115 --> 01:05:42.845

It's, it was, it was impossible.

1476

01:05:43.265 --> 01:05:44.685

The TSB did an excellent job.

1477

01:05:44.685 --> 01:05:47.245

They actually lowered the seabed by, uh, one meter

1478

01:05:47.785 --> 01:05:50.005

by suctioning up, uh, in like a thousand

1479

01:05:50.005 --> 01:05:51.085

by a thousand foot area.

1480

01:05:51.795 --> 01:05:53.085

Something to that effect.

1481

01:05:53.385 --> 01:05:56.365

Um, did a lot of work looking for, for wire.

1482

01:05:58.985 --> 01:06:00.325

So who's their credit representative?

1483

01:06:00.545 --> 01:06:01.645

That's what they think they are.

1484

01:06:02.985 --> 01:06:06.525

Um, but the, uh, credit representative is someone

1485

01:06:06.525 --> 01:06:08.965

that's technically qualified and and appointed by the state.

1486

01:06:09.235 --> 01:06:11.165

They're the, again, I I will repeat it.

1487

01:06:11.165 --> 01:06:13.645

The only one taking part in the investigation, okay?

1488

01:06:13.915 --> 01:06:14.925

Technically speaking.

1489

01:06:15.705 --> 01:06:18.205

Um, but everybody, what they do do is they,

1490

01:06:18.305 --> 01:06:21.205

is we do appoint technical advisors, okay?

1491

01:06:21.905 --> 01:06:24.765

But the, uh, this is what a, uh,

1492

01:06:25.325 --> 01:06:26.965

a credit representative actually looks like.

1493

01:06:27.225 --> 01:06:30.725

Uh, that's me down. And, and, uh, first Aaron Resolute,

1494

01:06:31.105 --> 01:06:35.365

and then that's actually Tim over doing some, uh, uh, some,

1495

01:06:35.745 --> 01:06:38.965

uh, team building with his, uh, this is Tim right here.

1496

01:06:39.315 --> 01:06:41.405

He's a, now he's over in Avon.

1497

01:06:41.425 --> 01:06:43.165

Don, uh, this was on a weekend.

1498

01:06:43.785 --> 01:06:47.305

Um, he's a, um, you know,

1499

01:06:47.305 --> 01:06:48.865  
he gotta build up those relationships.

1500

01:06:49.085 --> 01:06:51.345  
So he's drinking vodka off of a,

1501

01:06:52.185 --> 01:06:53.385  
a sword if you can't see it.

1502

01:06:54.685 --> 01:06:59.285  
Um, but we haven't, we are entitled to do certain things.

1503

01:06:59.675 --> 01:07:01.245  
Okay? We can go to the site.

1504

01:07:02.505 --> 01:07:05.485  
We have, we, we can examine the wreckage.

1505

01:07:06.905 --> 01:07:09.765  
We have full access to all relevant data.

1506

01:07:10.585 --> 01:07:13.165  
We can participate in all the recorder readouts.

1507

01:07:13.905 --> 01:07:16.285  
And we get to review and comment on the final report.

1508

01:07:17.475 --> 01:07:19.735  
And I'll talk a little bit later if you think it's that easy

1509

01:07:20.475 --> 01:07:24.095  
in certain, uh, situations, it's not, especially this one.

1510

01:07:24.925 --> 01:07:26.015  
Participate in recorder.

1511

01:07:26.095 --> 01:07:29.935  
Readouts is not something that's easily done up in Canada.

1512

01:07:30.795 --> 01:07:32.535

If you think you're gonna be able to be a group member,

1513

01:07:32.535 --> 01:07:35.135

like if you take part in, in, uh, an NTSB investigation,

1514

01:07:35.135 --> 01:07:36.535

have a group member listening

1515

01:07:36.535 --> 01:07:40.715

to the CVR not gonna happen.

1516

01:07:42.185 --> 01:07:44.155

Okay? Even I, as the accredit representative,

1517

01:07:44.365 --> 01:07:45.435

won't be able to listen to that.

1518

01:07:46.065 --> 01:07:48.075

Only under very certain circumstances.

1519

01:07:48.685 --> 01:07:51.075

First error was one that we actually did get

1520

01:07:51.075 --> 01:07:54.675

to get the actual transcript of the report

1521

01:07:54.775 --> 01:07:55.955

of the, of the CVR.

1522

01:07:55.955 --> 01:07:58.235

That's the first time ever that I've ever gotten that.

1523

01:07:58.985 --> 01:08:00.565

And we didn't get it here. We got to, we,

1524

01:08:00.585 --> 01:08:02.725

we couldn't take it out, but we had to use it up there.

1525

01:08:03.115 --> 01:08:05.285

It's the first time in Canada.

1526

01:08:05.305 --> 01:08:07.645

That's what you do, is you go down if you have an accident.

1527

01:08:07.995 --> 01:08:09.765

What I tell my guys as the CC rep,

1528

01:08:09.785 --> 01:08:11.485

as you get off the, you introduce yourself.

1529

01:08:11.505 --> 01:08:13.885

Hi, I'm Joe Seater. I'm the US accredited representative.

1530

01:08:13.975 --> 01:08:16.585

Let's talk about the recorders. Okay?

1531

01:08:16.605 --> 01:08:19.065

So if you are, uh, testing up a yellow knife

1532

01:08:19.165 --> 01:08:22.145

and crash, have a CVR have anything to that effect,

1533

01:08:22.495 --> 01:08:24.105

it's gonna be the exact same thing.

1534

01:08:25.845 --> 01:08:27.065

You might not even get access

1535

01:08:27.065 --> 01:08:32.065

to your own recorder.

1536

01:08:32.745 --> 01:08:33.745

So protected?

1537

01:08:34.735 --> 01:08:35.745

It's a privacy thing.

1538

01:08:35.775 --> 01:08:38.305

It's, and, uh, uh, you know, we've talked to, I've talked

1539

01:08:38.305 --> 01:08:41.665

to others, uh, during the day here on, on it, is

1540

01:08:41.665 --> 01:08:44.145

that we get criticized for how much we put out.

1541

01:08:45.725 --> 01:08:47.065

We put out a full transcript.

1542

01:08:47.165 --> 01:08:49.465

We don't put out, like if it's a non pertinent conversation

1543

01:08:49.525 --> 01:08:52.705

or somebody's, uh, somebody's name that's not related

1544

01:08:52.765 --> 01:08:56.385

to the, uh, flight, we will, uh, we will redact those.

1545

01:08:57.325 --> 01:09:01.705

Um, they will only put out certain, uh, data that,

1546

01:09:01.705 --> 01:09:05.585

or the, the, the comments that are, uh, that are necessary.

1547

01:09:05.895 --> 01:09:07.185

They never put out a full transcript.

1548

01:09:08.405 --> 01:09:10.865

Um, and then you have the opposite where Russia,

1549

01:09:10.965 --> 01:09:14.905

Russia basically has released multiple, uh, cvs.

1550

01:09:14.905 --> 01:09:16.625

And, you know, if you know that Polish, um,

1551

01:09:17.445 --> 01:09:20.225

the Polish accident, they released the whole CVR.

1552

01:09:20.325 --> 01:09:22.905

If you can go on and it's a, in, in the simulation

1553

01:09:26.065 --> 01:09:27.435

Tech advisors, that's you guys.

1554

01:09:27.435 --> 01:09:29.755

You've got a new name, you're not parties,

1555

01:09:29.775 --> 01:09:31.795

you're a tech advisor, okay?

1556

01:09:32.905 --> 01:09:35.165

You're there to assist the accredit representative.

1557

01:09:35.865 --> 01:09:38.645

In reality, you're, you, we, you get treated like a party,

1558

01:09:39.865 --> 01:09:42.565

but, um, technically you're, you're just assisting.

1559

01:09:42.635 --> 01:09:45.085

Okay? You gotta provide that report, uh,

1560

01:09:45.085 --> 01:09:46.205

or that support, um,

1561

01:09:46.745 --> 01:09:49.005

and you're, you're, you're working with us.

1562

01:09:49.425 --> 01:09:50.605

Any foreign accident

1563

01:09:50.665 --> 01:09:53.285

and foreign launch is gonna be a lot smaller than a domestic

1564

01:09:53.345 --> 01:09:54.925

one in general, okay?

1565

01:09:54.925 --> 01:09:57.925

In general, we'd have a, if a 7 4 7 goes down in the us,

1566

01:09:57.955 --> 01:10:00.445

we'd have a full go team launch, 12 to 15 groups.

1567

01:10:01.065 --> 01:10:04.405

If it goes down in, um, in Baghdad, we had two,

1568

01:10:05.445 --> 01:10:07.165

a credit representative and a structures

1569

01:10:07.165 --> 01:10:08.445

group chairman go plan.

1570

01:10:09.305 --> 01:10:11.765

Um, so it's a lot smaller.

1571

01:10:12.955 --> 01:10:15.485

This again, what you're doing here is my tech advisors and,

1572

01:10:15.585 --> 01:10:17.485

and Brussels looking at the airplane

1573

01:10:17.485 --> 01:10:18.725

going, I wish we could get on.

1574

01:10:19.345 --> 01:10:23.285

Uh, this is up in, uh, this is, uh, up in, uh, resolute Bay,

1575

01:10:23.435 --> 01:10:24.645

getting our feet cold.

1576

01:10:25.455 --> 01:10:28.435

Um, the good thing is, I mean, the, the safety as you know,

1577

01:10:28.435 --> 01:10:29.715

in flight test is the same thing.

1578

01:10:29.715 --> 01:10:34.235

We have a very small community, um, these Boeing, Pratt

1579

01:10:34.235 --> 01:10:37.635

and Whitney, um, FAA, that's another NTSB,

1580

01:10:37.635 --> 01:10:39.315  
or, um, I know I,

1581

01:10:39.425 --> 01:10:40.995  
I've traveled the world with all those guys.

1582

01:10:41.575 --> 01:10:43.555  
Uh, so we all know each other very well.

1583

01:10:43.575 --> 01:10:44.795  
We know our fam the families

1584

01:10:44.955 --> 01:10:46.075  
and know and everything to that effect.

1585

01:10:46.075 --> 01:10:48.755  
So it's a very close knit group like you guys.

1586

01:10:49.655 --> 01:10:53.435  
Um, and, uh, it's a, it's a, it's a good support.

1587

01:10:53.435 --> 01:10:54.715  
We can't do it again without you.

1588

01:10:57.575 --> 01:11:00.315  
If it happens out, if you're flying over the Atlantic Ocean

1589

01:11:01.175 --> 01:11:02.915  
or the Pacific looking for ice,

1590

01:11:02.935 --> 01:11:07.555  
or doing anything to that effect 12 miles out, um, you,

1591

01:11:07.695 --> 01:11:10.355  
it is the responsibility of the state of registry.

1592

01:11:11.025 --> 01:11:15.165  
Okay? This is actually an issue with regard to the new, uh,

1593

01:11:15.845 --> 01:11:18.005

a three 20 Neos being produced down in Alabama.

1594

01:11:18.835 --> 01:11:21.045

They're actually, uh, register,

1595

01:11:21.045 --> 01:11:22.805

they're French registered aircraft that are,

1596

01:11:22.805 --> 01:11:23.925

that are doing first flights.

1597

01:11:24.985 --> 01:11:26.885

Um, so we've worked with Airbus

1598

01:11:26.885 --> 01:11:29.205

and BEA to make sure that all the protocols are there.

1599

01:11:29.725 --> 01:11:32.405

'cause if it crashes inside, it's ours.

1600

01:11:32.405 --> 01:11:34.485

If it crashes, if they go out to their, uh,

1601

01:11:34.485 --> 01:11:37.445

test area out in the Gulf, it's, um,

1602

01:11:38.585 --> 01:11:40.515

it's actually a French investigation.

1603

01:11:41.855 --> 01:11:45.675

So, um, or if the Honda jet, uh,

1604

01:11:45.695 --> 01:11:49.355

or not, um, the, uh, Mitsubishi, uh,

1605

01:11:49.355 --> 01:11:51.635

they're gonna be testing over and out in, in Seattle.

1606

01:11:53.015 --> 01:11:55.435

So it's not, but it's, if it happens, we're the state

1607

01:11:55.435 --> 01:11:55.955  
of occurrence

1608

01:12:00.545 --> 01:12:01.215  
Delegation.

1609

01:12:02.715 --> 01:12:04.575  
We can get delegate, uh, uh,

1610

01:12:05.015 --> 01:12:06.895  
investigations have been delegated and we've accept.

1611

01:12:06.895 --> 01:12:09.495  
But the thing is, is here, it's gotta be initiated

1612

01:12:09.515 --> 01:12:10.575  
by the state of occurrence,

1613

01:12:10.635 --> 01:12:12.975  
but it also has to be accepted by the other state.

1614

01:12:13.685 --> 01:12:17.055  
Okay? A state can't say, we can't do this,

1615

01:12:17.195 --> 01:12:18.255  
please do it for us.

1616

01:12:18.275 --> 01:12:20.175  
And if we, you know, we're not gonna do that

1617

01:12:20.235 --> 01:12:23.975  
unless it's something that is, these are two, it can be full

1618

01:12:23.975 --> 01:12:25.175  
and partial is an important thing.

1619

01:12:25.355 --> 01:12:28.175  
Um, from a operation standpoint, we never,

1620

01:12:28.195 --> 01:12:31.735

we always usually delegate a, uh, the operational aspect

1621

01:12:31.735 --> 01:12:34.335

of an inter, of a domestic international accident.

1622

01:12:34.435 --> 01:12:38.655

So, um, like for Egypt Air, this one,

1623

01:12:38.655 --> 01:12:40.415

the Egyptians were, were tried

1624

01:12:40.415 --> 01:12:42.175

to take it back from us, and we, we said no.

1625

01:12:42.835 --> 01:12:44.775

Uh, if you remember Egypt Air nine 90

1626

01:12:44.775 --> 01:12:47.935

that crashed off the coast in the Atlantic Ocean, um,

1627

01:12:48.025 --> 01:12:50.455

everything we, we determined in that report

1628

01:12:50.455 --> 01:12:52.655

that it was an intentional act by the copilot.

1629

01:12:53.555 --> 01:12:57.025

Um, they, uh, did not agree with that.

1630

01:12:57.285 --> 01:12:59.985

Um, they tried, they delegated to us before that was known

1631

01:13:00.135 --> 01:13:04.425

because it was only like 20 miles or 30 miles off the coast.

1632

01:13:05.285 --> 01:13:08.265

Um, so it would be easier for us to do. We accepted it.

1633

01:13:08.265 --> 01:13:10.265

They paid for it, but we did it.

1634

01:13:10.805 --> 01:13:13.345  
Um, and then once we were finding

1635

01:13:13.345 --> 01:13:14.545  
everything, they wanted it back.

1636

01:13:14.565 --> 01:13:16.825  
But we said, you've already delegated it to us.

1637

01:13:17.085 --> 01:13:19.865  
So we kept it. And National Airlines, this is the,

1638

01:13:19.865 --> 01:13:23.545  
the Baghdad one that I just, um, that we discussed earlier.

1639

01:13:24.165 --> 01:13:26.545  
Uh, the Afghans were technically in charge.

1640

01:13:26.685 --> 01:13:30.025  
The, actually the IIC was tragically killed in a domestic

1641

01:13:30.075 --> 01:13:32.625  
issue, um, during the investigation.

1642

01:13:32.725 --> 01:13:37.505  
But, um, we did a lot of work on cargo, uh, uh, with regard

1643

01:13:37.505 --> 01:13:40.665  
to, um, uh, load masters and, and everything with

1644

01:13:40.685 --> 01:13:42.705  
and on the domestic cargo side.

1645

01:13:43.125 --> 01:13:44.705  
So we actually requested

1646

01:13:44.705 --> 01:13:46.305  
that they delegate it to us, and they did.

1647

01:13:49.775 --> 01:13:53.035

So if you have an event in Canada, what, it's a small one,

1648

01:13:53.295 --> 01:13:55.675

that's potentially what they would do is delegate it

1649

01:13:55.675 --> 01:13:59.275

to us if it's not a, a fatality or a significant incident.

1650

01:14:00.815 --> 01:14:04.435

Um, but if it's, if it's a, if it's a hull loss, um,

1651

01:14:04.435 --> 01:14:06.395

then they're gonna, they're gonna take it no matter what.

1652

01:14:09.225 --> 01:14:12.965

So the final report, you know, what I'm gonna do is,

1653

01:14:13.025 --> 01:14:14.085

is do a little bit different.

1654

01:14:14.105 --> 01:14:15.965

I'm gonna go here first.

1655

01:14:17.325 --> 01:14:18.645

'cause then I'll, you'll see why I do this.

1656

01:14:18.865 --> 01:14:21.805

So it's a treaty like KO Annex 13.

1657

01:14:22.345 --> 01:14:26.805

We don't have Sylvester Stallone to, to enforce anything.

1658

01:14:27.145 --> 01:14:29.005

You cannot enforce a treaty.

1659

01:14:29.635 --> 01:14:32.205

It's impossible, okay?

1660

01:14:32.595 --> 01:14:34.845

There's a lot of things that happen internationally.

1661

01:14:34.945 --> 01:14:36.565

All my, as an accredit representative,

1662

01:14:37.215 --> 01:14:41.485

their job is a diplomat and before an investigator, okay?

1663

01:14:42.185 --> 01:14:44.445

Um, the only thing that we have

1664

01:14:44.465 --> 01:14:46.925

for us is this, the final report.

1665

01:14:48.185 --> 01:14:51.325

And the reason why I say that is that this last bullet here,

1666

01:14:52.065 --> 01:14:53.965

we have to, we, we get

1667

01:14:53.965 --> 01:14:56.805

to review a draft report, and guess what?

1668

01:14:56.945 --> 01:14:58.325

You're a technical advisor,

1669

01:14:58.425 --> 01:15:00.405

and, uh, we want you to help us review

1670

01:15:00.405 --> 01:15:02.005

that technical report, that final report.

1671

01:15:02.425 --> 01:15:04.805

So they will, you will review it too,

1672

01:15:04.905 --> 01:15:06.165

and you'll provide comments to it.

1673

01:15:06.165 --> 01:15:09.085

And it's not just the factual side, it's the analysis

1674

01:15:09.225 --> 01:15:11.365

and the probable cause and the recommendations,

1675

01:15:11.705 --> 01:15:12.845  
except if you're Canada, they

1676

01:15:12.845 --> 01:15:14.005  
don't send the recommendations down.

1677

01:15:14.945 --> 01:15:18.765  
Um, but, uh, the only thing that we,

1678

01:15:18.985 --> 01:15:20.565  
we can't enforce anything,

1679

01:15:20.705 --> 01:15:22.845  
but we do have that last appended comments,

1680

01:15:23.145 --> 01:15:24.365  
is one that we can do.

1681

01:15:24.425 --> 01:15:27.405  
If we really don't agree with the investigation, we will,

1682

01:15:27.785 --> 01:15:29.125  
we will, uh, append comments.

1683

01:15:29.845 --> 01:15:32.965  
I can name you on one hand, which when we've done that,

1684

01:15:32.995 --> 01:15:35.005  
generally speaking, we don't have to do it.

1685

01:15:35.715 --> 01:15:38.285  
Silk air in the Philippines, it was an intentional act.

1686

01:15:38.745 --> 01:15:40.925  
We appended comments. Uh,

1687

01:15:40.925 --> 01:15:43.505  
everybody knows the Brazil midair, okay?

1688

01:15:44.415 --> 01:15:47.145

With concurrence with the IC actually, we appended comments

1689

01:15:47.145 --> 01:15:49.225

because they couldn't get access to the A TC

1690

01:15:49.605 --> 01:15:51.545

and had issues with a TC side of things.

1691

01:15:52.325 --> 01:15:53.665

That's still ongoing, by the way.

1692

01:15:53.725 --> 01:15:55.585

We, I just saw some stuff with regard to,

1693

01:15:55.585 --> 01:15:57.505

they're still trying to get the pilots, um,

1694

01:15:59.405 --> 01:16:00.585

uh, licenses revoked.

1695

01:16:01.845 --> 01:16:05.185

Um, uh, my, uh,

1696

01:16:07.075 --> 01:16:09.615

uh, Turkish Airlines in Amsterdam, actually, uh,

1697

01:16:09.715 --> 01:16:12.255

for some reasons that are, that were complicated,

1698

01:16:12.255 --> 01:16:13.455

that we appended comments.

1699

01:16:14.315 --> 01:16:17.375

So there, we don't generally do it, but we can do it.

1700

01:16:17.375 --> 01:16:18.735

And we can just say, we can call 'em out.

1701

01:16:18.735 --> 01:16:20.375

We say, listen, we do not agree.

1702

01:16:23.675 --> 01:16:24.895

That's the only thing that we can do.

1703

01:16:24.895 --> 01:16:26.215

But it's a big, it's a big thing.

1704

01:16:28.325 --> 01:16:29.945

And that's where it gets into the differences.

1705

01:16:30.485 --> 01:16:31.825

So the differences and,

1706

01:16:31.845 --> 01:16:33.745

and where, we'll, we'll end up here with the, with,

1707

01:16:34.045 --> 01:16:37.025

so you can, a state can say, listen, our state is different.

1708

01:16:37.375 --> 01:16:38.905

Like the us we can't,

1709

01:16:38.905 --> 01:16:41.825

we can't waithold certain records for foia.

1710

01:16:41.845 --> 01:16:43.625

Now, if it's a foreign, if it's a, um,

1711

01:16:43.825 --> 01:16:44.865

a foreign investigation.

1712

01:16:44.925 --> 01:16:48.065

So if you have a, an event in, um, Canada,

1713

01:16:50.355 --> 01:16:53.705

we're protected from FOIA to release anything for two years

1714

01:16:53.965 --> 01:16:56.465

or when the final report's released, whichever is sooner.

1715

01:16:57.835 --> 01:17:00.975

Um, we can extend that two years if it's, um,

1716

01:17:01.075 --> 01:17:03.415

if it's very close to being released.

1717

01:17:04.995 --> 01:17:07.215

Um, and then we also, we've, we've always,

1718

01:17:07.265 --> 01:17:09.095

we've been asking people to review our reports,

1719

01:17:09.120 --> 01:17:11.560

reports in 30 days anyway, so we decided to make it a, uh,

1720

01:17:11.565 --> 01:17:12.925

a legal, uh, difference.

1721

01:17:12.925 --> 01:17:14.485

So we just, uh, put that in there.

1722

01:17:14.705 --> 01:17:16.685

And then the interesting one is from the US side

1723

01:17:16.685 --> 01:17:19.045

of certain things is that we will approve certain TAs.

1724

01:17:19.315 --> 01:17:21.165

This comes out from that Egypt air accident,

1725

01:17:21.165 --> 01:17:23.525

the Egypt Air nine 90 accident that they were trying

1726

01:17:23.525 --> 01:17:25.085

to get certain consultants

1727

01:17:25.085 --> 01:17:27.165

and that sort of thing involved in the investigation.

1728

01:17:27.905 --> 01:17:29.445

Uh, and we disapproved them

1729

01:17:29.445 --> 01:17:31.325  
because we knew that they were not really

1730

01:17:32.205 --> 01:17:33.605  
approaching it in a safety manner.

1731

01:17:35.785 --> 01:17:40.365  
So Canada, I've talked about the CVR, um, that goes through

1732

01:17:40.365 --> 01:17:41.285  
and the, and then the interviews,

1733

01:17:41.285 --> 01:17:42.245  
the confidential interviews.

1734

01:17:42.505 --> 01:17:44.245  
That's a very difficult thing.

1735

01:17:44.945 --> 01:17:47.765  
Um, you will not be, if, if you have a pilot

1736

01:17:47.825 --> 01:17:51.645  
that's survived, you will not be in there with them.

1737

01:17:52.665 --> 01:17:55.725  
Not like you would be anyway, your group members would.

1738

01:17:55.865 --> 01:17:57.765  
But we don't have, we don't get the transcript.

1739

01:17:58.105 --> 01:18:00.445  
We only find out certain general information of it

1740

01:18:00.445 --> 01:18:02.445  
that's relevant, but they determine what's relevant.

1741

01:18:02.745 --> 01:18:03.805  
The unfortunate thing is,

1742

01:18:03.905 --> 01:18:05.805  
the reason why our group activities are good

1743

01:18:05.805 --> 01:18:09.165  
with interviews is because you guys as like party members,

1744

01:18:09.955 --> 01:18:11.245  
your group member would sit there

1745

01:18:11.245 --> 01:18:13.405  
and knows the airplane, knows what should be done,

1746

01:18:13.535 --> 01:18:14.805  
knows the questions to ask.

1747

01:18:15.835 --> 01:18:18.605  
What we generally work out with the t uh, with the TSB

1748

01:18:18.605 --> 01:18:20.765  
of Canada is that we would provide them some questions

1749

01:18:20.765 --> 01:18:22.765  
that we want, that we think they should ask.

1750

01:18:23.725 --> 01:18:27.105  
Um, actually for my Halifax 7, 4, 7 accident, accident,

1751

01:18:27.345 --> 01:18:29.425  
MK Airlines was the last time we actually,

1752

01:18:29.425 --> 01:18:31.185  
we had a great relationship with them, I think.

1753

01:18:31.265 --> 01:18:33.345  
'cause it was up in Halifax, so it was out of, out

1754

01:18:33.345 --> 01:18:34.465  
of the mainland.

1755

01:18:35.005 --> 01:18:37.665

But we worked it out where, um, we,

1756

01:18:37.665 --> 01:18:40.065

there was two interviews we sat in on the first interview.

1757

01:18:40.185 --> 01:18:41.905

'cause it was a loading issue or not.

1758

01:18:41.965 --> 01:18:43.865

It wasn't, we thought it was a loading issue at first,

1759

01:18:44.605 --> 01:18:45.625

and then we left.

1760

01:18:45.725 --> 01:18:47.865

And then they said, do you wanna say anything in, uh,

1761

01:18:48.005 --> 01:18:49.185

the, in confidence?

1762

01:18:49.965 --> 01:18:51.065

That's never happened again.

1763

01:18:51.215 --> 01:18:53.105

They got, they got yelled at for that.

1764

01:18:54.045 --> 01:18:56.545

Um, but, um,

1765

01:18:56.565 --> 01:18:58.425

and then the other thing is that we've never had to do,

1766

01:18:58.965 --> 01:19:01.705

but I understand would be very difficult for us to do, is

1767

01:19:01.705 --> 01:19:03.625

to append comments to a Canadian report.

1768

01:19:05.495 --> 01:19:08.155

Um, they've not said it, but in officially,

1769

01:19:08.375 --> 01:19:11.515

but in talking with them, uh, I think that it's, uh,

1770

01:19:11.985 --> 01:19:14.235

that they would really not append comments if

1771

01:19:14.235 --> 01:19:15.315

we had a significant difference.

1772

01:19:15.395 --> 01:19:16.435

I don't think we would. But

1773

01:19:16.435 --> 01:19:17.915

that's just a, it is a important thing.

1774

01:19:17.915 --> 01:19:19.915

That's, like I just said, that's the only,

1775

01:19:19.985 --> 01:19:22.355

only weapon we have in the, in the international community.

1776

01:19:26.975 --> 01:19:28.115

So I bored you enough.

1777

01:19:29.505 --> 01:19:32.795

Have I not covered something that you have a question of

1778

01:19:32.855 --> 01:19:35.195

or have a concern about with the NTSB

1779

01:19:35.195 --> 01:19:36.235

that you don't understand?

1780

01:19:37.335 --> 01:19:38.515

If you have any questions,

1781

01:19:40.135 --> 01:19:43.315

Um, I know that in the case of a cockpit voice recorder,

1782

01:19:44.055 --> 01:19:45.795

you'll provide a transcript of it,

1783

01:19:45.795 --> 01:19:47.195  
but not the recording itself.

1784

01:19:48.145 --> 01:19:51.115  
What do you do with, um, the actual recordings

1785

01:19:51.135 --> 01:19:53.435  
and what do you do with the actual video?

1786

01:19:54.095 --> 01:19:55.315  
At the completion of the

1787

01:19:55.555 --> 01:19:57.595  
Investig, we return it to the company.

1788

01:19:58.225 --> 01:20:02.395  
It's not ours that the recordings do get, um,

1789

01:20:02.775 --> 01:20:04.595  
uh, involved in litigation.

1790

01:20:05.615 --> 01:20:08.060  
Uh, certain individuals depending on the, uh,

1791

01:20:08.185 --> 01:20:11.285  
or get access to that to verify the transcript

1792

01:20:11.285 --> 01:20:12.325  
or to listen to sounds.

1793

01:20:13.225 --> 01:20:16.885  
Um, but that's out outside of our, so I forgot to, the,

1794

01:20:17.025 --> 01:20:20.205  
the question was what happens with regard to the recordings,

1795

01:20:20.225 --> 01:20:22.485  
uh, the CVR recordings or videos or anything like that?

1796

01:20:23.185 --> 01:20:26.725

Um, so yeah, we return them to the owner, so,

1797

01:20:26.725 --> 01:20:28.725

which is the manufacturer or the operator.

1798

01:20:29.705 --> 01:20:31.995

Okay. So they're, they're not releasable, uh,

1799

01:20:32.785 --> 01:20:33.955

They still can't be released.

1800

01:20:34.145 --> 01:20:36.115

They're still, they, they still can't be released.

1801

01:20:36.255 --> 01:20:38.835

And they're, uh, like if they are used within litigation,

1802

01:20:38.835 --> 01:20:40.555

there are protections put on the data.

1803

01:20:41.095 --> 01:20:43.275

If for some reason it's not, um, like even

1804

01:20:43.275 --> 01:20:46.475

for spaceship two, we had a forward facing video, of course,

1805

01:20:46.855 --> 01:20:49.715

and if you, we, there's no pictures of that in the public.

1806

01:20:49.775 --> 01:20:53.635

But if you look in our docket, we do have, uh, a transcript

1807

01:20:53.775 --> 01:20:57.235

of what is seen, even saying co-pilot's hand moves up

1808

01:20:57.235 --> 01:20:59.195

to the, to the unlock lever and pulls.

1809

01:21:00.335 --> 01:21:02.115

But those are stills on the video.

1810

01:21:02.645 --> 01:21:04.275

Those No, no, we don't have any video.

1811

01:21:04.535 --> 01:21:07.395

No, no, no video is put out there. It's, it's a transcript.

1812

01:21:07.425 --> 01:21:10.355

It's a transcript of the video to, to, because

1813

01:21:10.505 --> 01:21:12.475

because we still can't put, we, we,

1814

01:21:12.495 --> 01:21:15.195

we are prohibited from putting out the, the, those pictures.

1815

01:21:16.425 --> 01:21:18.355

Okay. And, uh, uh, unrelated question,

1816

01:21:18.375 --> 01:21:23.035

but it's a very important also, what does MTSB recommend

1817

01:21:23.095 --> 01:21:26.755

to flight test activities in terms of pre-accident planning?

1818

01:21:27.465 --> 01:21:30.405

So that, so you have a plan in place if you have an

1819

01:21:30.565 --> 01:21:33.045

accident, and it gets right in with the tsb.

1820

01:21:35.515 --> 01:21:38.615

So the question is, is what should a flight test, uh, uh,

1821

01:21:38.615 --> 01:21:41.335

organization or a company conducting flight

1822

01:21:41.375 --> 01:21:42.535

tests due for pre-planning?

1823

01:21:42.725 --> 01:21:45.815

There's a couple things. One, get to know us,

1824

01:21:46.185 --> 01:21:47.535

understand our procedures.

1825

01:21:48.075 --> 01:21:51.135

If you are out and you wanna know, uh, if you wanna stop in

1826

01:21:51.135 --> 01:21:54.495

and see me, uh, at any time or talk with me on the phone

1827

01:21:54.755 --> 01:21:59.295

or, um, if there's anybody, uh, any NTS beers that are,

1828

01:21:59.595 --> 01:22:02.855

uh, regional guys that are in your area, we can,

1829

01:22:02.915 --> 01:22:05.215

we can make sure to so that they get to know you.

1830

01:22:05.245 --> 01:22:09.335

Like up in Seattle, Boeing knows all of our, our, the guys

1831

01:22:09.335 --> 01:22:11.455

that are in Seattle knows them very well.

1832

01:22:11.845 --> 01:22:13.655

Okay. Because they interact for us.

1833

01:22:13.655 --> 01:22:15.055

They, they go out there and, and deal

1834

01:22:15.245 --> 01:22:17.055

with some teardowns and that sort of thing.

1835

01:22:18.275 --> 01:22:21.735

So to, to get that relationship built up as, um, Bob Benson,

1836

01:22:22.115 --> 01:22:25.615

uh, who is a, uh, IIC and I learned a lot from him.

1837

01:22:25.615 --> 01:22:28.455

He, as he said, it's better to learn about it like here or

1838

01:22:28.455 --> 01:22:29.935

before than it is in a cornfield.

1839

01:22:30.565 --> 01:22:33.505

Um, because I've done two, I've done one accident where, um,

1840

01:22:33.975 --> 01:22:36.905

well two accidents with, with Southwest, uh,

1841

01:22:37.055 --> 01:22:39.865

Southwest Burbank, back in 2000,

1842

01:22:40.255 --> 01:22:44.905

overrun touchdown at V Ref plus 40, something like that.

1843

01:22:45.285 --> 01:22:49.385

Um, they ran over, uh, they stopped 50 feet short

1844

01:22:49.385 --> 01:22:50.425

of a, of a gas station.

1845

01:22:51.485 --> 01:22:55.215

Um, Southwest at up to

1846

01:22:55.215 --> 01:22:58.255

that point had not really, you know, they had that, the,

1847

01:22:58.255 --> 01:22:59.975

the standard attitude, it's not gonna happen to us.

1848

01:22:59.995 --> 01:23:02.735

We don't have to do it. We had to explain

1849

01:23:02.735 --> 01:23:04.295

to them this process that I just went

1850

01:23:04.295 --> 01:23:06.205

through you throughout the entire investigation.

1851

01:23:06.705 --> 01:23:09.725

It was a pain in the butt. It was after that though.

1852

01:23:10.385 --> 01:23:13.245

Uh, and actually at that time, um, Boeing's,

1853

01:23:13.245 --> 01:23:14.565

uh, engineers were on strike.

1854

01:23:14.835 --> 01:23:16.805

It's the only accident I did without a Boeing, uh,

1855

01:23:17.085 --> 01:23:19.445

engineer on, uh, on to document a 7, 3 7.

1856

01:23:20.145 --> 01:23:22.365

Um, but, um,

1857

01:23:22.735 --> 01:23:25.645

after that, they went the other way.

1858

01:23:26.105 --> 01:23:30.525

And so when, uh, when, um, Chicago happened for them,

1859

01:23:30.555 --> 01:23:33.165

when they did the overrun and had a fatality in the car

1860

01:23:34.385 --> 01:23:35.965

and all the other ones that we've done with them,

1861

01:23:36.115 --> 01:23:37.125

it's easy to work with them.

1862

01:23:37.305 --> 01:23:39.645

So that's the thing. Know our procedures, know the people

1863

01:23:39.645 --> 01:23:42.085

that, that we can talk and, and interact with.

1864

01:23:42.625 --> 01:23:45.845

Uh, and then the bigger thing from, uh, is also with regard

1865

01:23:45.845 --> 01:23:48.405

to the family side, the family affairs side.

1866

01:23:48.505 --> 01:23:52.165

How are you gonna deal with the, uh, with the family members

1867

01:23:52.305 --> 01:23:55.325

of deceased or, uh, severely injured pilots

1868

01:23:55.825 --> 01:23:57.165

and flight test engineers

1869

01:23:57.395 --> 01:24:00.725

because, um, a lot of, a lot of places don't do that.

1870

01:24:00.985 --> 01:24:03.965

Uh, and um, it's, it's got a lot of issues there.

1871

01:24:05.145 --> 01:24:08.405

And if you need help with that, um, I can also get you

1872

01:24:08.405 --> 01:24:11.405

to our TDA folks, our transportation disaster assistance.

1873

01:24:11.955 --> 01:24:13.125

They can provide a lot

1874

01:24:13.125 --> 01:24:14.645

of information on that side of things.

1875

01:24:17.605 --> 01:24:19.245

I think there was one question, four years.

1876

01:24:19.875 --> 01:24:24.525

Yeah. I was curious. So flight test data products that

1877

01:24:25.185 --> 01:24:27.325  
are obviously you wouldn't have any labs

1878

01:24:27.385 --> 01:24:29.365  
or ability to read that. Can you just

1879

01:24:29.365 --> 01:24:30.365  
Come on site? We

1880

01:24:30.365 --> 01:24:31.525  
would come on site. And actually

1881

01:24:31.525 --> 01:24:32.685  
that's the thing is headquarters.

1882

01:24:33.025 --> 01:24:35.805  
In headquarters, what we have is, uh, a material lab

1883

01:24:35.805 --> 01:24:40.125  
that's actually got a, uh, one of the best, um, sems around,

1884

01:24:40.545 --> 01:24:44.365  
uh, we, our guys are, are great at, uh, at, uh,

1885

01:24:45.285 --> 01:24:47.645  
investigations of, of, uh, structural failures,

1886

01:24:47.645 --> 01:24:49.045  
metal failures mainly.

1887

01:24:49.625 --> 01:24:53.485  
Um, but other than that, we utilize the, either the operator

1888

01:24:53.745 --> 01:24:57.565  
or the, um, or the manufacturer to do it.

1889

01:24:57.705 --> 01:25:00.565  
We are still in charge. We are control the invest

1890

01:25:00.585 --> 01:25:02.245

or the, the tear down, like say an engine.

1891

01:25:02.325 --> 01:25:03.605

I mean, you can't tear down a GE

1892

01:25:03.745 --> 01:25:06.365

or anything like that safely outside of a, uh,

1893

01:25:06.505 --> 01:25:07.605

out of a manufacturing.

1894

01:25:07.825 --> 01:25:10.645

So, um, we will utilize your facilities

1895

01:25:10.645 --> 01:25:12.685

or the manufacturer's facilities to conduct the test.

1896

01:25:12.745 --> 01:25:16.045

Or if it's data, we will come to your house and, and do it.

1897

01:25:16.265 --> 01:25:17.565

Or I mean, your place. So,

1898

01:25:19.065 --> 01:25:22.405

And I was just gonna say the, uh, Terry's question

1899

01:25:23.185 --> 01:25:27.205

or expand it, that there's, you should have a mis plan.

1900

01:25:27.425 --> 01:25:29.085

Yep. And There are many examples of it.

1901

01:25:31.375 --> 01:25:34.815

Small company trying to stand up like this organization.

1902

01:25:35.345 --> 01:25:36.415

There many examples.

1903

01:25:37.195 --> 01:25:38.855

Yes, there's very, and I think you guys have

1904

01:25:38.975 --> 01:25:40.055  
a whole bunch of that data on

1905

01:25:40.595 --> 01:25:42.255  
Flight, this operations manual mm-hmm.

1906

01:25:42.335 --> 01:25:44.495  
Which has a, has a very good study

1907

01:25:44.495 --> 01:25:45.575  
point, let's put it that way.

1908

01:25:45.965 --> 01:25:50.915  
Exactly. Any other questions?

1909

01:25:51.855 --> 01:25:53.275  
That's my phone number. Don't,

1910

01:25:53.515 --> 01:25:56.115  
and, uh, email, don't hesitate to call or,

1911

01:25:56.215 --> 01:25:58.675  
or, uh, if you have any questions whatsoever.

1912

01:25:58.695 --> 01:26:01.155  
And if I'm, I can't answer it, I'll, I'll get you in touch

1913

01:26:01.175 --> 01:26:03.235  
or, uh, with TDA or anything to that effect.

1914

01:26:05.455 --> 01:26:05.875  
Thanks.