

LOSS OF CONTROL - INFLIGHT


TRAINING + AUTOMATION:
A WINNING COMBINATION



SETP/SFTE SAFETY WORKSHOP - 2012

BACKGROUND AND PURPOSE

- Experience as a Test Pilot/TP Instructor/ Manager/ Safety Consultant says:
- Our “SYSTEM” Is Not Working Effectively
- What are the Problems and How Can – We fix It ??






*From Complexity and Uncertainty -
Order and Excellence*

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WHY LOOK BACK IN HISTORY ?

“ What is Past is Prologue ”

* William Shakespeare



“ The Future ”

“ Those Who do not Learn from History are Doomed to Repeat it ”


* George Santayana

MAIN REFERENCE SOURCE

- Single Most Important “TAKE AWAY” for ALL of YOU!!
- Dr. Simon Bennett (sab22@le.ac.uk)
University of Leicester
> The Aerospace Professional, RAeS,
“Out of the Fog” July and October 2012


CURRENT “SYSTEM” STATUS

- 2009 AF 447 Accident Provides a Basis for Discussion (Not the only basis!)
- Background Terms:
 - > “Black Swan Events” (Taleb)
 - > Automatic versus Autonomous
 - > Human Pilot versus Auto(matic) Pilot



CURRENT STATUS (cont'd)

- What Does Capt. “Sully” Sullenberger Say:
 - > We have a “Human/Technology System”
 - > Must Look at the WHOLE SYSTEM:
 - Aircraft Design and Certification,
Training and Human Factors
 - > AOA is Important (e.g. AF 447 accident)
 - > Generally Choose Not to Do It (Fix it)
.....WHY?



CURRENT STATUS (cont'd)

- AF 447 Accident (Bennett)
- Many LATENT Errors/Activated in “EVENT”
 - > Pitot Tube Design/ Regulatory Response
 - > CRM Failure (who's in charge)
 - > AOA Data Not Accessible
 - > Training: Stall ID and Recovery NOT in Recurrent Pilot Training



AF 447 NOTES

- Bottom Line:
 - > “Activated” Latent errors overwhelmed the Aircraft System Defenses and the Capabilities of the 3 Man Crew
- James Reason: Latent Errors Originate in:
 - > Supervision Practices (CRM failures)
 - > Operational Conditions (AOA missing)
 - > Organizational Dynamics (Training, Failure of Regulatory Oversight)

TRAINING AND AUTOMATION

An Essential “Team” to Prevent LOC-I

Currently (e.g. AF 447) NOT a “Team”

Need “Bricolage” – balancing of competing
and sometimes Antagonistic Agendas

Human Pilot (manual) Control, and
Auto (matic) Pilot Control are Both Required
for Human/Technology System to Function
Safely !!

TRAINING ISSUES


Currency versus Proficiency

**Need “Excess Workload Capacity” to perform
under Stress**

**Need for Required SA (Situational
Awareness)**

**Recurrent Training (Stall/ Stall Recovery),
Not enough if TASK SATURATED!**

**Required Training is a Major Challenge for
Ground Simulators: Stress/“Startle Factor” ?**



Case Study: The X-22A and Me !

**Loss of Individual SA /
Excess Workload
Capacity**



Situational Awareness ??



Under STRESS !!


Practice (PROFICIENCY) makes ____?

Permanent

AUTOMATION ISSUES

Common View of Automation:

- > Creates a more Reliable System
- > Greater consistency of Performance
- > COST SAVINGS !! (Remember that One)
- > Nature “Cowed” – Fear Banished –
Risk Eliminated = Less Training?
- > Aviating now an “Unexceptional Activity
(Pilot – “Removed”)



And...THE TRUTH IS:

**Training CANNOT cover the highly improbable –
“Black Swan” Events (Retrospective only)**

Automation and Human Pilots CAN !

(With Focused Training)

Recognized 30 years ago:

- > Automation (with system opacity) can
Increase NOT Decrease Risk
- > Must keep Pilots “in the loop” – tough to
“Jump In”

And...THE TRUTH IS: (cont'd)

- > Automation (as in 447) can be a risk to Safety (Training, Stall Warning Fiasco)
- > Automation used properly can provide A “Safety Plateau” (Defense) and enhance Safety
- > Degradation of Automatic System MUST be Graceful !!
- > In the Risk-Laden world of Aviation, the PILOT Remains the last line of Defense!

AUTOMATION FOR RECOVERY

AF 447 Accident (10^{-9} , “Black Swan” Event)

Could have been Prevented with:

A PILOT ACTIVATED RECOVERY SYSTEM (PARS)

- > All System Sensors/Computers on Board
- > Just a Programming/ Estimator Issue
- > Why not? Cultural Resistance (“Panic Button”) – just “dumb pilots” etc
- > Not New !! : Mig 29, AFTI 16, Eurofighter, F-16 Block 60, All new F-16's, Others?

SO, WHAT ARE THE PROBLEMS ?

All Companies (Big and Small) have Two Virtual Departments:

- > “Dept. of Wishful Thinking” (Who??)
- > “Dept. of Reality” (Who??)

Ideally, Balanced Inputs – What Do You Think? (I know you are correct!)

What About the Regulators (FAA, CAA, EASA?)- Real Conflicts of Interest ?

And...THE PROBLEM (Cont'd) IS:

The Two Departments DO NOT Talk

Dept. of Wishful Thinking Dominates (G650)

Regulators Only “Stand Up” at Their Peril

ROOT CAUSE Not Properly Identified:

- > It is...COSTS / PROFIT (Natural Goal of WT's)**
- > A Reality in Our World of Aerospace**
- > Pilots COST, Additional Capability COSTS**

A SOLUTION IS:

The BEST of BOTH Worlds: HUMAN PILOT
Control and AUTOPILOT Control

> Improved TRAINING and AUTOMATION
(PARS/ Graceful).....and REGULATION !

But Who Will PAY?

- > The INSURANCE Companies?
- > SAFER = Fewer Payouts, Cheaper Premiums (Mark Twain Analogy)
- > More Profit For Them !



MY WINNING COMBINATION

COMMUNICATION (Two Departments)

INDEPENDENT Regulatory Oversight

**'IF You Think that SAFETY is Expensive.....
Try an ACCIDENT!"**

INTERACTION With INSURANCE PROVIDERS

> To Make the Financial Case

